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PSYCHIC INJURY AND TORT LIABILITY
IN NEW YORK
I.

INTRODUCTION

HEproblem of tort liability where a mental injury is involved has troubled the courts for a great many years,
and even at present no consistent pattern of liability rules
exists. When injuries and causes of injuries leave the realm
of the tangible world and enter the uncharted areas of the
mind, courts understandably have difficulty in establishing
principles of law calculated to assure substantial justice. In
the psychic injury field, Mr. Justice Douglas' observation,
though made in another connection, seems to be of peculiar
pertinence: "But there are few areas of the law in black and
white. The greys are dominant and even among them the
shades are innumerable. For the eternal problem of the law
is one of making accommodations between -conflicting interests. This is why most legal problems end as questions
of degree." 1
More often than not, physical injury is easily detected
and measured and the problem of causation relatively clearcut. If a plaintiff be run down by a truck or automobile,
the cause of the injury is manifest, and the extent thereof
is fairly readily ascertainable through medical testimony.
However, when mind becomes a significant factor in the skein
of injury and liability, all the ordinary tort problems are
* This article is a portion of a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Juridical Science (Juridicm

Scientim Doctor) at New York University School of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance rendered by Paul D. Kaufman, Professor
of Law, New York University School of Law.
I Estin v. Estin, 334 U. S. 541, 545 (1948).
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intensified. Consider the apparently simple case wherein a
plaintiff dies from the effects of fright which in turn resulted
from a defendant's negligent act in driving an automobile so
close to plaintiff as to frighten him severely. Manifold problems at once arise. Vas the result "foreseeable"? Would
the reasonably prudent actor foresee that a consequence of
negligent driving would be death through fright? Was the
result "proximately caused"? Was the fright the substantial
factor in producing the physiological reaction manifested in
the heart attack? Again, was the plaintiff unduly susceptible to fright because of a pre-existing neurotic or psychopathic condition? Finally, is our medical knowledge sufficient to establish the answers to all these questions with
adequate definiteness, or must liability be denied because of
the generally speculative and uncertain character of the
psychic phenomenon?
Such are the difficulties which confront courts as soon
as a mental factor-the so-called "psychic stimulus"-enters
the scene. Furthermore, if still another variable-a psychic
injury-be introduced, the difficulties become even more complex. Assume in the above mentioned automobile negligence
case that the plaintiff suffers not a physiological reaction but
a psychic one-some form of neurotic, psychopathic, or psychotic condition. Then not only does the chain of causation
contain as its main link a psychic stimulus, but the injury
itself is a mental one. Thus problems of evaluation come to
the fore. Is the mental injury real or feigned? Was the
stimulus induced by defendant the substantial factor ini producing the injury, or was it caused chiefly by the plaintiff's
pre-existing neurotic condition? Is the present state of our
medical knowledge adequate to solve these problems, or must
liability be denied because of the speculative character of the
injury? 2 And what of the possibility of fraudulent claims
being foisted upon the courts?

3

Do juries have sufficient

competence to detect the true from the false in this new
realm of mental injuries?
2 See Study Relating to Liability for Injuries Resulting from Fright or
Shock, 1936 LEG. Doc. No. 65(E), 1936 REPORT, N. Y. LAw REVisioN

COMMISSION.

3 Mitchell v. Rochester Ry.. 151 N. Y. 107, 45 N. E. 354 (1896).
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These queries are but a few of the many facing a court

called upon to decide a case involving psychic injury. Truly
then liability in this field is one of the unexplored frontiers
of modern tort law. Such liability has had a long and varied

history in England and in this country, and one of the most
interesting phases of its development has occurred in the
State of New York. The New York law on the subject is a
complex admixture of the conservatism of the older English

case law and the liberalism of present day psychiatry, all
intertwined with a considerable dash of native aberrational
variation. Since New York law on this question finds its
genesis in English case law, it is well to consider briefly the
historical aspects as illustrated in the British precedents.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ENGLISH IULE
A.

Early English Backgrounds

The primary root of legal liability through psychic
causes can be traced back to the year 1349 to a tort action
which recognized a liability for assault without physical
touching under the writ of trespass. 4 The reason for the de4I. de S. et ux. v. W. de S., Y. B. 22 EDw. III, f. 99, pl. 60 (1349).
"And it was found by verdict of the inquest that the said W. came in the night
to the house of the said I., and would have bought some wine. but the door of
the tavern was closed; and he struck on the door with a hatchet, which he had
in his hand, and the woman plaintiff put her head out at a window and ordered
him to stop; and he perceived her and struck with the hatchet, but did not
touch the woman." Despite the woman's successful dodging of the missile,
the court, speaking through Thorpe, C. J., felt that the mere attempt was a
sufficient trespass to allow recovery.
Since this early case, assault rules have developed along the same general
lines. A representative sampling of typical assault cases in various jurisdictions shows the present-day framework of rules surrounding the tort: Geraty
v. Stem, 30 Hun 426 (N. Y. 1883) (taking one's cloak is an assault and
battery though no actual touching of the body); Mortin v. Shoppee, 3 Car.
& P. 373, 172 Eng. Rep. 462 (N. P. 1828) (threat, while shaking a whip, to
the effect "Come out and I will lick you before your own servants.", an
assault) ; Newell v. Whitcher, 53 Vt. 589 (1880) (persistent solicitations for
sexual intimacy at night in woman's bedroom an assault) ; Croaker v. Chicago
& N. W. R., 36 Wisc. 657 (1875) (kissing of a girl an assault). The exact
limits of assault are not absolutely determined, however. Cases endeavoring
to make a delimitation include: Turberville v. Savage, 1 Mod. Rep. 3, 86 Eng.
Rep. 684 (1669) ("If it were not assize-time I would not take such language
from you.", not an assault in view of qualifying words) ; Brooker v. Silverthorne, 111 S. C. 553, 99 S. E. 350 (1919) (statement to a telephone operator
over the telephone, "You are a GDliar. If I were there, I would
break your GDneck.", not an assault but mere violent words).
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cision, while not specifically stated in the brief opinion, probably was the policy consideration of preventing assaults and
threatened breaches of the peace.
This case did mean, however, a breach in the dike, and
after it, a way was opened, albeit small, to argue for redress
of injury where no physical touching had occurred. The
courts, treating assault cases as sui generis, were still very
reluctant to move forward into the new field; and their reluctance to redress psychic injury carried over into those
cases where there had been an independent legal injury as
well as a psychic one. It was early held that parents had no
right to the recovery of damages for mental anguish where
injuries had been inflicted on their children,5 except in the
case of seduction of a daughter.6 Thus, where the facts
showed that defendant in the hearing of others had charged
plaintiff, a woman, with unchastity, the court held that the
special damage necessary to sustain the action had not been
shown even though plaintiff's nervous shock was sufficient
to cause physical injury requiring medical attention. 7 The
chief ground of the holding seems to have been that the harm
was too remote in the expectation of a reasonably prudent
actor.8
5
Flemington v. Smithers, 2 Car. & P. 292, 173 Eng. Rep. 131 (K. B.
1826) (boy of fifteen thrown from the seat of a coach by defendant's negligence; no compensation for parents' mental pain). To the same general effect
as the husband-wife relationship was Huxley v. Berg, 1 Stark. 98, 171 Eng.
Rep. 413 (K. B. 1815) (defendant's conduct in burglarizing plaintiff's house
resulted in frightening plaintiff's wife, she dying from the effects of the fright;
no compensation for injury to wife).
6 Andrews v. Askey, 8 Car. & P. 7, 173 Eng. Rep. 376 (C. P. 1837) (in
action by a widow for the seduction of her daughter, jury instructed that damages not confined to the mere loss of services but includes damages for distress
and anxiety of the mother). This limitation of recovery for parental anguish
in situations where the main injury is to the child to cases involving seduction
is still the general rule.
7 Allsop v. Allsop, 5 H. & N. 534, 157 Eng. Rep. 1292 (Ex. 1860).
It
was necessary to prove special damage in this particular case because at the
time charging a woman with unchastity was not slander per se. This rule was
later altered by a statute, the Slander of Women Act, 54 & 55 Vicr., c. 51
(1891).
8 It might certainly be questioned whether suffering physical injury from
shock at being charged with unchastity is in truth an idiosyncratic reaction,
as the court evidently felt. Perhaps in recognition of the weakness of that
argument the court brought forth other arguments to the effect that there was
no precedent for such liability and that allowing recovery would tend towards
undue restriction of free speech.
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The Coultas Case

Such was the state of the English judicial mind when
the first important modern case, Vietoriam Railways Cornmissioners v. Coultas9 arose in 1888. In that case it appeared that Mary Coultas and her brother had been riding
in a buggy which the brother was driving. They came to
defendant's railroad crossing, and defendant's gatekeeper
negligently admitted them on the tracks when a train was
coming. The train narrowly missed the buggy, and MKary
Coultas was put in great fear and fainted. As a result of the
experience she suffered severe shock, poor health, damaged
eyesight, and impairment of memory. When the case reached
the Privy Council,10 the negligence appeared clear, causation
equally clear, and damages obvious, but the Council nonetheless decided that there was no liability. Its decision
rested on the principle that there was no precedent for the
action and that allowing such a suit could only mean increased litigation and encouragement of flimsy claims with
great difficulties of proof. Furthermore, such damages were
too remote to be compensable because injury was not the
ordinary consequence of fright.
C.

Cases Attacking the Coultas Reasoning

This case, severely criticized by legal writers and many
lawyers and judges, did not long remain the law of England.
It was first challenged by an Irish case 11 which permitted
recovery for physical injury due solely to psychic stimuli
generated by defendant's culpable conduct, without any
bodily impact. In that case a railroad car in which the plaintiff, Mrs. Bell, was riding began rolling down hill, putting
her in fear of death. Later and as a result of the shock Mrs.
9 13 App. Cas. 222 (P. C. 1888).

10 The case originally arose in Canada where the trial jury granted a verdict

of $2,000 to Mary Coultas for her injury and $1,700 to her husband for loss
of services and medical costs. The Supreme Court of Victoria affirmed the
judgment, holding, contrary to the later view of the Privy Council, that physical harm from fright was a sufficiently proximate injury to allow recovery.
11 Bell v. Great Northern Ry., L. R. 26 Ir. 428 (1890).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 24

Bell became very nervous and virtually demented. 2 The
jury found for plaintiff, and the case was sustained on appeal, Baron Palles modifying radically the theory of the
Coultas case. Whereas the Coultas case had held that disability caused solely from fright was as a matter of law a
consequence too remote in expectation of the reasonably prudent actor to constitute compensable damage, Baron Palles

rejected that contention and said that it was for the jury to
decide whether injury by fright was a reasonable and natural

13
consequence of defendant's conduct.
In England itself the Coultas case was very shortly modified as an authority by Pugh 'v. London, B. &: S. C. y.,14
which involved a railway employee suing on a company policy insuring against "accidental injury." The employee, in
an effort to stop a train which was in danger of being
wrecked, suffered nervous shock, and illness resulted therefrom. Despite the fact that the psychic stimulus had caused
the injury, the court found it to be "accidental" within the

12 It is interesting to note that though the Bell case is an important landmark
in the final promulgation of the English liberal rule of liability without impact,
the case itself when viewed in the perspective of later medical knowledge was
probably wrongly decided so as to give plaintiff an undeserved verdict.
Dr. Hubert Smith in Relation of Emotions, to Injury and Disease, 30 VA. L.
.Ev. 193, 204 (1944), points out that the Bell case was such that, "The medical
evidence relied upon as proving causation is subject to most serious doubts.
One will recall that Mrs. Bell was able to continue her journey. It was not
until three weeks after the frightening episode that her disability (mental derangement) appeared, an interval too long to warrant drawing a causal connection between stimulus and effect. Furthermore, the evidence indicated
plaintiff was suffering from symptoms arising from a pre-existing neurological
or psychiatric disorder. There are allusions in the record to 'before the last
shock,' and the like, showing that distinct shocks were suffered some time
after the frightening stimulus had ceased. From this we are entitled to infer
that Mrs. Bell's complaints probably arose from independent cerebral vascular
accidents not connected in any way with her frightening experience." This
would seem to be a particularly good illustration of the difficulties of proof
always inherent in the psychic stimulus situation.
13 Baron Palles expressed his view in these words: "...
I am of opinion
that, as the relation between fright and injury to the nerve and brain structures
of the body is a matter which depends entirely upon scientific and medical
testimony, it is impossible for any Court to lay down as a matter of law, that
if negligence cause fright, and such fright, in its turn, so affects such structures as to cause injury to health, such injury cannot be 'a consequence which,
in the ordinary course of things would flow from the negligence,' unless such
injury 'accompany such negligence in point of time.'" Bell v. Great Northern
Ry., supra note 11 at 440.
14 [1896] 2 Q. B. 248.
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meaning of the policy. 15 Another case 1" shortly afterwards
continued the liberalizing tendency in allowing a recovery
for injury resulting from nervous shock caused by intentional
and wanton use of words.
The final acceptance of the new doctrine was enunciated
in a leading case which allowed recovery for damages due to
nervous shock and fright resulting in illness and premature
birth. 1 7 It there appeared that plaintiff, a pregnant woman,
was working behind the bar in her husband's public house

when defendant negligently drove a pair-horse van into the
pub, putting plaintiff in fear of being trampled underfoot.
D.

Later English Holdings

Later cases both in England 18 and Scotland 19 have fol-

lowed this liberal line of reasoning.

Representative of the

more important of the recent decisions is Owens v. Liverpool
20
Corporation.

In that case a hearse was struck by a tram-

15 In discussing the Coultas case, Lord Esher, M. R., remarked in dismissing
it as an authority: "That case is different, and I should not like to express
an opinion as to whether we ought to follow it until I am forced to do so."
Ibid. at 250.
16 Wilkinson v. Downton, [1897] 2 Q. B. 57 (a woman falsely informed
that her husband was injured). The court pointed out that the Coultas case
had not been followed in Pugh v. London, B. & S. C. Ry., .rpra note 14, and
had been repudiated in Ireland in Bell v. Great Northern Ry., supra note 11.
While it did not feel called upon expressly to repudiate the Coultas case, the
court achieved the same effect by distinguishing the Wilkinson case from it
on the ground that the latter involved an intentional injury rather than a
negligent one.
17 Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K. B. 669, 677. Kennedy, J., paid high
tribute to the well reasoned opinion of Baron Palles in the first case which
had challenged the Coultas view, Bell v. Great Northern Ry., supra note
11. It was also pointed out that the Coultas case had been "unfavourably reviewed by legal authors of recognized weight such as Mr. Sedgwick,
Sir Frederick Pollock and Mr. Beven."
'S Hambrook v. Stokes Bros., [1925] 1 K. B. 141; Coyle v. Watson,
[1915] A. C. 1, 13. In the latter case the court flatly stated: "But in England,
in Scotland, and in Ireland alike, the authority of Victoriam Railway Commissioners v. Coultas has been questioned, and . . . the case can no longer be
treated as a decision of guiding authority . . .
'19 Gilligan v. Robb, Sess. Cas. 856, 47 Scot. L. R. 733 (1910)
(recovery
allowed for illness caused by nervous shock without impact; a cow dashed
from the street into the house where plaintiff was staying). Plaintiff claimed
that she sustained a very severe nervous shock and was hysterical for a considerable time. She had to be put to bed, her pulse became high, her heart
was affected, and she was thereafter unable to appear on the streets
unaccompanied.
20 [1939] 1 K. B. 394.
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car negligently driven by defendant's servant so that the
hearse was severely damaged and the coffin overturned. The
court held that the mourners at the funeral could recover
damages for mental shock in an action for negligence although there was not even any apprehension of injury to a
human being.21 Thus it may be said that the principle is
now firmly established in the British Isles that actual injury
culpably caused by psychic stimuli is actionable whether
or
22
not accompanied by contemporaneous physical impact.
21 In the Owens case the plaintiffs were the aged mother of the deceased,
an uncle, a cousin, and the cousin's husband. Plaintiffs alleged that they
"witnessed" and "were horrified by" the accident, that the old mother had in
consequence suffered from "severe shock and collapse," and the other three
from "severe shock." The court, through MacKinnon, L. J., discussed the
case of Hambrook v. Stokes Bros., [1925] 1 K. B. 141, wherein a mother was
allowed to recover for shock occasioned from apprehension of injury to her
young children, and extended its application to cover the Owens situation,
saying, "On principle we think that the right to recover damages for mental
shock caused by the negligence of a defendant is not limited to cases in which
apprehension as to human safety is involved ....
In the present case the shock
was said to have been occasioned, not by any fear for human life, but by the
imperilment of the coffin containing the corpse of a near relative. . . . A man
. . . might readily be disbelieved if he alleged that such an incident as this
had caused him the form of ill health which is known as shock. The present
plaintiffs might well have been disbelieved in that assertion, but the learned
deputy-judge believed them, and we think we must accept his findings of fact.
It may be that the plaintiffs are of that class which is peculiarly susceptible
to the luxury of woe at a funeral so as to be disastrously disturbed by any
untoward accident to the trappings of mourning. But one who is guilty of
negligence to another must put up with idiosyncrasies of his victim that increase the likelihood or extent of damage to him; it is no answer to a claim
for a fractured skull that its owner had an unusually fragile one." Owens v.
Liverpool Corporation, supra note 20 at 400, 401.
22 Even under the liberal English view there must, of course, be a duty
owed to the plaintiff before there can be any recovery in negligence, as illustrated by the recent decision in Hay or Bourhill v. Young, Sess. Cas. 395
(1941), aff'd by House of Lords in [1943] A. C. 92. There a motorcyclist,
while negligently driving at an excessive rate of speed, collided with an automobile and was killed. The plaintiff, a fish-wife, was standing 45 feet from
the point of contact. She heard the noise although she did not see the accident.
She admitted that at the time she had no reasonable fear of immediate bodily
harm to herself, but alleged that she suffered severe nervous shock which disabled her from carrying on her trade for a considerable time. The fish-wife
was eight months pregnant when the accident occurred and one month later
gave birth to a stillborn child. Lengthy opinions were written by Lord
Thankerton, Lord Russell of Killowen, Lord Macmillan, Lord Wright and
Lord Porter. The view taken was that the duty of the motorcyclist on the
road was to drive with reasonable care to avoid risk of injury (including
injury by shock) to such persons as he could reasonably foresee might be injured by his failure to exercise that care, but that the fish-wife was not within
the area of potential danger and accordingly was owed no duty. The court
(in the opinion of Lord Porter) dealt at length with Hambrook v. Stokes
Bros., smpra note 21 (discussed), and Owens v. Liverpool Corporation, supra
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DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN R ULE

Before examining the particular growth pattern of the
New York rule it is important to attain an over-all view of

the general state of the law in the United States relating to
emotional disturbance. It has already been noted that the
law is well crystallized in England, Scotland, and Ireland as
favoring liability in the psychic injury cases. Unfortunately
American law is in no such state of certainty, but is rather
marked by great confusion and diversity of opinion.

A.

Early American Back ground&

The earliest American cases took the view that there
could be no remedy whatever for mental injury. Numerous
reasons were cited to explain this denial of liability though
none of the reasons seem compelling, at least when examined
in the perspective of modern medical knowledge. A favorite
argument was that mental disorders and consequences could
not be considered proximate results because they were lacking in tangibility and dependent upon the individual peculiarities of the person injured. 23 Modern medical evidence
is, of course, directly opposed to this view, and is overwhelmingly of the opinion that emotional distress can cause both
mental and physical disorders, even in that hypothetically
sturdy person, the "reasonably prudent man." 24
note 20 (discussed in text, pp. 14, 15), both of which had allowed recoveries.
Lord Porter felt that those cases represented ".... the high water mark reached
in claims of the character now in question," and that the Hay case was not
within their category because ". . . there was never any duty owed by the
cyclist to the appellant or breach of such a duty . . . ." Hay or Bourhill v.
Young, m pnra at 116, 120.
23 This view is well exemplified in several cases decided in this country
401, 51 N. E.
around the turn of the present century. Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill.
557 (1898) ; Chittick v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 224 Pa. 13, 73 Atl. 4
(1909); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N. Y. 107, 45 N. E. 354 (1896). In
discussing the proximate cause argument, a noted author comments rather
caustically: "It is not difficult to discover in the earlier opinions a distinctly
masculine astonishment that any woman should ever be so silly as to allow
herself to be frightened or shocked into a miscarriage." PROSsER, ToRTS 55
(1941).
24 One of the more interesting studies of the extent to which clinical disorders are related to emotional stimuli is found in Smith, Relation of Ewtions to Injury and Disease, 30 VA. L. Rav. 193, 217-220 (1944). The study
shows that virtually all areas of the human system can be affected by emotional
stimulation.
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Still another contention was that mental injury was so
difficult of proof as to make the problem of measuring damage insuperable.2 5 Perhaps the quickest answer to this argument is that courts have always allowed recovery for mental
pain and suffering where such suffering accompanied a physi-

cal injury even though the physical injury was of slight
character, 26 and hence have had extensive experience in evalnating mental pain.
Bolstered by these arguments and by the belief that a
flood of litigation would be let loose were barriers once relaxed in the mental injury field,2 7 the courts erected strong
dikes. An early manifestation of this tendency was the rule
that words alone did not constitute an assault and were, in
the absence of slander, not actionable.2 8
B.

Developnent of Modern Rule on Intentional Injury

The breakdown in the early strict rule against recovery
occurred first in those situations where some already well
recognized tort had been committed so that the mental injury could be "tacked on" to the ordinary damages traditionally associated with the tort.2 9 The next step was to
25

Lynch v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas. 577, 11 Eng. Rep. 854, 863 (1861). The
court commented: "Mental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does
not pretend to redress, when the unlawful act complained of causes that alone."
To the same effect, see Cleveland C. C. & St. L. R. v. Stewart, 24 Ind. App.
374, 56 N. E. 917 (1900) ; Chicago B. & Q. R. v. Gelvin, 238 Fed. 14 (C. C. A.
8th 1916).
26 E.g., Croaker v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 36 Wis. 657 (1875)
(railway
conductor kissed young woman passenger, $1,000 damages awarded against the
company) ; Draper v. Baker, 61 Wis. 450, 21 N. W. 527 (1884) (spitting in
plaintiff's face in the presence of others, $1,200 damages awarded).
27 Spade v. Lynn & Boston R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N. E. 88 (1897) ; Ward
v. West Jersey & S. R., 65 N. J. L. 383, 47 Atl. 561 (Sup. Ct. 1900).
28 Kramer v. Ricksmeier, 159 Iowa 48, 139 N. W. 1091 (1913); Brooker v.
Silverthorne, 111 S. C. 553, 99 S. E. 350 (1919).
For an accotMt of the
especially interesting circumstances in the Brooker case, see note 4 supra.
29 This growth is illustrated in Anthony v. Norton, 60 Kan. 341, 56 Pac.
529 (1899) (primary injury seduction) ; Draper v. Baker, 61 Wis. 450, 21
N. W. 527 (1884) (primary injury battery) ; Kline v. Kline, 158 Ind. 602,
64 N. E. 9 (1902) (primary injury assault); and Goodell v. Tower, 77 Vt.
61, 58 Atl. 790 (1904) (primary injury false imprisonment). Because of the
nature of these damages as subsidiary to some underlying main and well recognized element of injury, they have sometimes been referred to as "parasitic."
Some writers have regarded such "parasitic" damages as the first step in the
formation of the new cause of action. See, e.g., 1 STREr, FouDxAroNs OF
LEGAL LIABILITY

460, 470 (1906):

"The treatment of any element of damage

as a parasitic factor belongs essentially to a transitory stage of legal evolution.
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allow recovery in special situations where mental suffering
alone had been caused by an intentional act of an unusually
indefensible character. For example, where hotel authorities
entered the room of married persons, wrongfully charging
them with occupying the premises for immoral purposes, reA factor which is today recognized as parasitic will, forsooth, tomorrow be
recognized as an independent basis of liability. It is merely a question of
social, economic and industrial needs as those needs are reflected in the organic
law."
Whether or not this growth pattern reflected thus far in psychic stimuli
cases is to continue into the future has been the subject of some controversy.
Thus Prof. Magruder seems to feel that negligent disturbances of peace of
mind may be in the future held to result in liability, even where no physical
harm results just as today wilful invasions of peace of mind are held actionable. Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in thw Law of Torts,
49 HARv. L. REv. 1033 (1936). Dr. Smith feels otherwise, however. "It
seems to us that redress of willful invasions of mental tranquillity is not a
seed destined to burst forth into a more luxuriant growth but rather an exotic
plant which has already reached full bloom. First, even if disturbing the
placidity of another's psyche is a bad thing and a real injury, no objective
standard exists or ever will, for measuring its value. The trier of fact cannot
possibly escape the psychological urge to make damages correspond to the
actor's culpability, and this makes the award punitive even though in theory
it is still compensatory. Second, the prime mover in society would be unduly
penalized and prevalent neurotic patterns in the populace encouraged and we
think that neither result is desirable. Psychic stimuli multiply as society becomes more complex and people are crowded together, but this is part and
parcel of existence. Our concern should be with conditioning the citizen, and
with breeding more toughness by pampering the psyche less." Smith, Relation
of Emotions to Injury at Disease, 30 VA. L. REv. 193, 228, 229 (1944). On
Dr. Smith's point that psychic stimuli multiply as society becomes more complex and people are crowded together, an item in Time, November 29, 1948,
p. 72, is interesting: "More and more U. S. old folks are ending up in mental
institutions. In 1922, only 9,229 patients over 65 were admitted to mental hospitals; in 1939, there were 18,227; in 1946 the figure had climbed to 29,987.
These statistics look 'appalling' to Dr. Riley H. Guthrie, who last week settled
into his new job as a special mental hospital consultant to the U. S. Public
Health Service. One reason for the increase is obvious, Dr. Guthrie believes:
'As the span of life increases, more people reach the senile period . . . .The
incidence of illness increases anyway with the aging process, and mental illness
is one of them.' Another factor is the growth of cities. 'City dwellers can't
tolerate little aberrations [among members of their families] as well as country
people.' City life, too, is more complicated for the mentally ill. (A Guthrie
example: 'A shepherd in Wyoming might be as schizophrenic as can be. He
wouldn't last five minutes in Times Square.')"
It should be noted that the oft-referred to "recent tendency" towards allowance of recovery for intentional infliction of mental disturbance (see, e.g.,
PROSSER, TORTS 54 [1941]), is perhaps more an invention of the writers than
of the courts. Except in the technical assault, common carrier, innkeeper, and
burial right cases there seems to be no such important tendency. The cases
cited for the proposition in PROSSER, TORTS 61 (1941) and in Prof. Magruder's
article, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARv. L.
REv. 1033 (1936), all seem to fit into these well recognized categories or involve physical and mental injury both, with the possible exception of Barnett
v. Collection Service Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N. W. 25 (1932).
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covery was allowed. 0 Liability was also imposed in the
analogous situation where employees of common carriers intentionally mistreated or insulted passengers. 3 1 In recognition of the same principle a number of cases saw fit to apply
a similar rule to possessors of land who held such land open
2
to the public for business purposes.
Practical jokes, when obviously carried beyond the rea33
sonable bounds of propriety, have also resulted in liability,

as have unnecessarily abusive activities of landlords in evict30

Emmke v. De Silva, 293 Fed. 17 (C. C. A. 8th 1923); Dixon v. Hotel

Tutwiler Operating Co., 214 Ala. 396, 108 So. 26 (1926).
The Restatement
apparently decides in favor of liability in the hotel cases on the ground that a
technical trespass has been committed. See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 47, illustration 3 (1934): "A hotelkeeper intrudes into a room in his hotel occupied
by two guests, B and his wife. He accuses them of being unmarried and using
the room for improper purposes and orders them to leave the hotel. The
hotelkeeper, having committed a trespass in entering the room, is liable also
for the humiliation which his conduct has caused to B and his wife." If the
Restatement means to restrict liability to those situations where a trespass has
occurred, its view seems clearly unsound. It would be manifestly unjust to
permit a different result merely because the hotelkeeper stands outside the room
and shouts his imprecations without crossing the threshold. See, on this point,
Magruder, Mental and Enwtional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARv.

L. Rv. 1033, 1051 (1936).

31 May v. Shreveport Traction Co., 127 La. 420, 53 So. 671 (1910)
(unjustified attempt to put plaintiff in "Jim Crow" car); Lamson v. Great Northern
R., 114 Minn. 182, 130 N. W. 945 (1911) (insult to passenger); Humphrey
v. Michigan United Rys., 166 Mich. 645, 132 N. W. 447 (1911) (vociferous
argument over fare, humiliating plaintiff).
The Restatement's position is a good summary of the existing law.
RESTATEMENT, TORTS

§ 48 (1934) : "Special Liability of Carrier for Insults by

Servants. A common carrier is subject to liability to members of the public
who are entitled to and are utilizing its facilities as passengers for the offense
reasonably suffered by them through the insulting conduct of its servants while
otherwise acting within the scope of their employment.
"Caveat: The Institute expresses no opinion as to whether the rule stated
in this Section is not also applicable to public utilities other than common
carriers and to possessors of land who for their business purposes hold it open
as a place of public resort."
32 Smith v. Leo, 92 Hun 242, 36 N. Y. Supp. 949 (N. Y. 1895) (dancing
school) ; Weber-Stair Co. v. Fisher, 119 S. W. 195 (Ky. 1909) (theater)
Boswell v. Barnum & Bailey, 135 Tenn. 35, 185 S. W. 692 (1916) (circus)
Davis v. Tacoma Ry. & Power Co., 35 Wash. 203, 77 Pac. 209 (1904) (amusement park). These cases cover the area marked out in the Restatement's
Caveat to § 48. See note 31 supra.
3 Wilkinson v. Downton, [1897] 2 Q. B. 57 (woman falsely informed that
her husband had been injured); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Roch,
160 Md. 189, 153 Ati. 22 (1931) (dead rat included by defendant's servant in
grocery package) ; Nickerson v. Hodges, 146 La. 735, 84 So. 37 (1920) (plaintiff encouraged to search for alleged pot of gold, great humiliation of plaintiff
involved).
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ing their tenants.14 Holding creditors for outrageous actions
of their debts is an illustration of the
in seeking collection
35
tendency.
same
A limitation upon the right of recovery for intentional
infliction of mental suffering has oftentimes been imposed
where the act causing the mental suffering was intended to
30
The
affect not the plaintiff but rather some third party.
present state of the law seems to restrict recovery in such
situations to flagrant cases involving violent attack perpeparticularly likely to cause shock to
trated under conditions
37
a third person.

C.

Development of Modern, Ride on Negligent Injury

As would be expected, the courts have been more reluctant to permit recovery for interferences with peace of mind
38

that are merely negligent as distinguished from purposeful.

3
4 Preiser v. Wielandt, 48 App. Div. 569, 62 N. Y. Supp. 890 (2d Dep't
1900) ; Nordgren v. Lawrence, 74 Wash. 305, 133 Pac. 436 (1913).
35 Barnett v. Collection Service Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N. W. 25 (1932)
(insulting collection letters); Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores Corp., 210 N. C.
808, 188 S. E. 625 (1936) (verbal reflections on plaintiff's credit made loudly
and in hearing of the public) ; Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men of Wash.,
D. C., 70 App. D. C. 183 105 F. 2d 62 (1939) (threats to ruin plaintiff). The
problem is dealt with in Borda, One's Right to Enjoy Mental Peace and Tranquillity, 28 GEo. L. J. 55 (1939).
Along the same lines are cases dealing with defendants in authoritative
positions who have abused the authority granted them. E.g., Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 208 N. W. 814 (1926) (authorities of school accused girl
pupil of unchastity and threatened to send her to reform school unless she
confessed); Janvier v. Sweeney, [1919] 2 K. B. 316 (defendant's private detectives attempted to get possession of certain letters of plaintiff by threats).
36But cf., Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 13 S. W. 59 (1890); Duncan v.
Donnell, 12 S. W. 2d 811 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929). These cases allowed recovery on the ground that the result was reasonably foreseeable. Similarly,
in Lambert v. Brewster, 97 W. Va. 124, 125 S. E. 244 (1924), the court refused to apply the foreseeability rule as a limitation on recovery. There the
plaintiff, a pregnant woman, suffered injury through sight of an attack on her
father; the plaintiff herself was at a perfectly safe distance from the attack.

Said the court:

".

.

. defendant says he did not know of plaintiff's presence

and was not aware of her condition; that therefore he could not be responsible
for injuries which he could not anticipate or foresee. It is a sufficient answer
to this to say that if defendant's wrongful act is the proximate cause of injury
to plaintiff, of the character for which the law allows compensation, then the
question whether defendant could or should have foreseen the result becomes
immaterial." Lambert v. Brewster, supra at 127, 125 S. E. at 245.
37 Lambert v. Bnewster, supra. note 36 (battery committed on father of
pregnant woman). See also, Jeppsen v. Jensen, 47 Utah 536, 155 Pac. 429
(1916) (assault committed on husband of pregnant woman).
38 For generalized discussion of the objections voiced by courts refusing to
allow recovery, see Burdick, Tort Liability for Mental Disturbance and Ner-
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Where Physical Harm Results

Where the negligent conduct of the defendant results in immediate physical harm, courts have not hesitated to allow recovery for the mental injuries accompany-

ing the physical hurt.3 9 It is only when the physical
injury comes later as a result of the earlier psychic stimulus that disagreement in

such circumstances

the holdings appears.

Under

many jurisdictions, 40 including New

vous Shock, 5 CoL. L. REv. 179 (1905); Throckmorton, Damages for Fright,
34 HARV. L. Rv. 260 (1921); Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal
Damage, 20 MicH. L. REv. 497 (1922); Wilson, The New York Ride as to
Nervous Shock, 11 CoRd. L. Q. 512 (1926); Hallen, Hill v. Kimball-A Milepost in. the Law, 12 TEx. L. REv. 1 (1933); Green, Fright Cases, 27 ILL L.
REv. 761 (1933); Edgar, Foreseeability in Torts, 9 ST. JOHN'S L. Rav. 84
(1934) ; Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts,
49 HARV. L. REv. 1033 (1936); Smith and Solomon, Trramatic Neuroses in
Court, 30 VA. L. REv. 87 (1943); Smith, Relation of Emnotions to Injury and
Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REv. 193 (1944).
39 Erie R. v. Collins, 253 U. S. 77 (1920)
(recovery permitted for mental
injury in the form of humiliation and shame at disfigurement caused by physical
injury in an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act); Easton v.
United Trade School Contracting Co., 173 Cal. 199, 159 Pac. 597 (1916) (recovery permitted for fright suffered at the time of the physical injury);
Halloran v. New England Telephone & Tel. Co., ,95 Vt. 273, 115 At. 143
(1921) (recovery permitted for plaintiff's fears as to the effect of the physical

injury).

40 jurisdictions denying recovery in the psychic stimuli cases, at least in the
absence of "impact," include: Arkansas, Rogers v. Williard, 144 Ark. 587,
223 S. W. 15 (1920) (plaintiff won because the act was wilful, but the court
recognized the general rule as denying recovery) ; Illinois, Elgin A. & S. Traction Co. v. Wilson, 217 Ill. 47, 75 N. E. 436 (1905) (plaintiff won under an
exception, but the court recognized the general rule as denying recovery);
Indiana, Kalen v. Terra Haute & I. R. R., 18 Ind. App. 202, 47 N. E. 694
(1897) ; Boden v. Del-Mar Garage, 205 Ind. 59, 185 N. E. 860 (1932) ; Iowa,
Kramer v. Ricksmeier, 159 Iowa 48, 139 N. W. 1091 (1913); Kentucky,
Kentucky Traction, etc., Co. v. Roman's Guardian, 232 Ky. 285, 23 S. W. 2d
272 (1929) (plaintiff won under an exception, but the court recognized the
general rule as denying recovery); Maine, Herrick v. Evening Pub. Co., 120
Me. 138, 113 Ati. 16 (1921); Massachusetts, Spade v. Lynn & B. R, 168
Mass. 285, 47 N. E. 88 (1897); Smith v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., 174
Mass. 576, 55 N. E. 380 (1899); Michigan, Alexander v. Pacholek, 222 Mich.
157, 192 N. W. 652 (1923); Missouri, McArdle v. Peck Dry Goods Co., 191
Mo. App. 263, 177 S. W. 1095 (1915) (plaintiff won under an exception but
the court recognized the general rule as denying recovery) ; New Jersey,
Porter v. Del. & W. R. R., 73 N. 3. L. 405, 63 Atl. 860 (Sup. Ct. 1906)
(plaintiff won under an exception, but the court recognized the general rule
as denying recovery); New York, Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N. Y. 107,
45 N. E. 354 (1896); Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N. Y. 231, 177 N. E. 431
(1931) (plaintiff won under an exception but the court recognized the general
rule as denying recovery) ; Ohio, Miller v. Baltimore, etc., R. R., 78 Ohio St.
309, 85 N. E. 499 (1908); Pennsylvania, Ewing v. Pittsburgh, etc., R. R., 147
Pa. St. 40, 23 Atl. 340 (1892) (this case cited by New York court in Mitchell
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york, 4 1 have demanded that some physical impact, how-

ever slight, occur before recovery will be granted; the
impact is regarded as the guaranty of trustworthiness
for the claim. 42 The majority of courts have repudiated the requirement of impact, and allow recovery for
physical injuries negligently caused through the effects of

psychic stimuli whether or not any physical touching
case, supra, as one of precedents denying recovery) ; Howarth v. Adams Exp.
Co., 269 Pa. 280, 112 Atl. 536 (1921) (plaintiff won under an exception but
the court recognized the general rule as denying recovery).
The federal courts seem to agree with the no-liability rule, Chicago B. &
Q. R. R. v. Gelvin, 238 Fed. 14 (C. C. A. 8th 1916); Baltimore and 0. R. R.
v. McBride, 36 F. 2d 841 (C. C. A. 6th 1930) (case held not within rule, but
rule recognized). Smith in Relation of Emotions to InJury and Disease: Legal
Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. Rtv. 193, 207 (1944), classifies Iowa
as upholding the majority position allowing liability on the -basis of Watson v.
Dilts, 116 Iowa 249, 89 N. W. 1068 (1902). While it is true that the Watson
case and Cowan v. Tel. Co., 122 Iowa 379, 98 N. W. 281 (1904), do show
tendencies towards the majority position, it is believed the rule of no-liability
still prevails, as exemplified in Mahoney v. Dankwart, 108 Iowa 321, 79 N. W.
134 (1899), and Kramer v. Ricksmeier, 159 Iowa 48, 139 N. W. 1091 (1913).
Interestingly enough the jurisdictions denying liability include most of the
important industrial states (Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New
York, Ohio and Pennsylvania) ; there seems, however, no direct causal relation
between the economic industrialization and the development of the rule of law.
Personal communication to author from John V. Thornton, Department of
Economics, Yale University, May 15, 1948. A better explanation is probably
that these courts, because of their greater volume of litigation, had to deal with
the question when it first arose (most of their pioneer cases date from the
beginning of this century or earlier) and before the later liberalizing tendencies
had set in. See on the same point, Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 HARV.
L. REv. 725, 733 (1937).
It may well be, however, that the large concentration of urban areas in
many of the minority rule jurisdictions has caused them to retain the impact
rule as originally laid down. All the jurisdictions which have cities in excess
of one million population have the impact rule, except California which adopted
its law on the subject before Los Angeles became a great city. Since "ambulance chasing" is preeminently an urban problem, it may be that these jurisdictions have retained the impact rule as a preventative against the false claims
of ambulance chasers. However, as is discussed subsequently, the alleged protection furnished by the impact rule is more illusory than real.
4' Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N. Y. 107, 45 N. E. 354 (1896); Coinstock v. Wilson, 257 N. Y. 231, 177 N. E. 431 (1931).
42 That the guaranty of trustworthiness is more supposed than real is shown
by the fact that courts have indicated that the most trivial impact is sufficient
and such an impact may be readily feigned. See, e.g., Porter v. Delaware, L.
& W. R. R., 73 N. J. L. 405, 63 Atl. 860 (1906) (dust adequate impact);
Morton v. Stack, 122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N. E. 869 (1930) (smoke adequate
impact); McArdle v. George B. Peck Dry Goods Co., 191 Mo. App. 263, 177
S. W. 1095 (1915) (slight jar adequate impact); Homans v. Boston Elev.
R. R., 180 Mass. 456, 62 N. W. 737 (1902) (slight battery adequate impact) ;
Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga. App. 581, 144 S. E. 680 (1928)
(evacuation of bowels by horse adequate impact).
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occurs.4 3 The tendency in the workmen's compensation field
44
has also been towards liability.

2.

Where Mental Harm Results

In those few cases which have involved only mental injury from a psychic stimulus, the almost universal view is to
deny recovery where mere negligence, with no element of intentional harm, appears. 45 The only significant exception
seems to be in the telegraph company cases where a few
courts have permitted recovery for mental anguish alone

43 Leading cases upholding the majority position are: Alabama, Alabama
Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 73 So. 205 (1916); Central
of Ga. Ry. v. Kimber, 212 Ala. 102, 101 So. 827 (1924); California, Lindley
v. Knowlton, 179 Cal. 298, 176 Pac. 440 (1918); Connecticut, Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, 21 A. 2d 402 (1941) ; Georgia, Williamson v.
Central Ry., 127 Ga. 125, 56 S. E. 119 (1906); Goddard v. Watters, 14 Ga.
App. 722, 82 S. E. 304 (1914) ; Kansas, Clemm v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.,
126 Kan. 181, 268 Pac. 103 (1928) ; Louisiana, Laird v. Natchitoches Oil Mill,
Inc., 10 La. App. 191, 120 So. 692 (1929); Maryland, Bowman v. Williams,
164 Md. 397, 165 Atl. 182 (1933) ; Minnesota, Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn.
203, 208 N. W. 814 (1926); Montana, Cashin v. Northern P. R. R., 96 Mont.
92, 28 P. 2d 862 (1934) ; Nebraska, Netusil v. Novak, 120 Neb. 751, 235 N. W.
335 (1931); New Hampshire, Chiuchiolo v. New England Wholesale Tailors,
84 N. H. 329, 150 Atl. 540 (1930); North Carolina, Arthur v. Henry, 157
N. C. 438; 73 S. E. 211 (1911); Oregon, Salmi v. Columbia & N. R. R., 75
Ore. 200, 146 Pac. 819 (1915); Rhode Island, Simone v. Rhode Island Co.,
28 R. I. 186, 66 At. 202 (1907); South Carolina, Mack v. South-Bound R. R.,
52 S. C. 323, 29 S. E. 905 (1897) ; South Dakota, Sternhagen v. Kozel, 40 S. D.
396, 167 N. W. 398 (1918); Tennessee, Memphis St. R. R. v. Bernstein, 137
Tenn. 637, 194 S. W. 902 (1917); Texas, St. L. S. W. Ry. of Tex. v. Alexander, 106 Tex. 518, 172 S. W. 709 (1915); Virginia, Bowles v. May, 159
Va. 419, 166 S. E. 550 (1932); Washington, Cherry v. Gen. Petroleum Corp.,
172 Wash. 688, 21 P. 2d 520 (1933) ; West Virginia, Lambert v. Brewster, 97
W. Va. 124, 125 S. E. 244 (1924); Wisconsin, Pankopf v. Hinkley, 141 Wis.
146, 123 N. W. 625 (1909).
The remaining jurisdictions (i.e., other than those cited in footnotes 40 and
43) seem not to have taken any definite stand on the question. In Jeppsen v.
Jensen, 47 Utah 536, 155 Pac. 429 (1916), the court failed to pass on the question, having decided that case on the theory of wilful wrongdoing. The English, Irish, and Scottish rules, as previously discussed, favor liability, see notes
11, 17, 18, and 19 mepra.
44 Even those states which require impact in the common law cases have
generally allowed recovery without impact under the Compensation statutes.
Pickerell v. Schumacher, 215 App. Div. 745, 212 N. Y. Supp. 899 (3d Dep't
1925), af'd, 242 N. Y. 577, 152 N. E. 434 (1926) ; Klein v. Len H. Darling
Co., 217 Mich. 485, 187 N. W. 400 (1922).
45 Representative of this line of eases is Kalen v. Terre Haute & I. R. R.,
18 Ind. App. 202, 47 N. E. 694 (1897); Memphis St. R. R. v. Bernstein, 137
Tenn. 637, 194 S. W. 902 (1917); Williamson v. Central of Ga. R. R., 127
Ga. 125, 56 S. E. 119 (1906).
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when caused by the46 negligent transmission of an obviously
important message.
IV.

BACKGROUND OF THE NEW YORK RULE

Prior to the birth of the modern rule in Mitchell v.
Rochester Ry., 4 7 there was a mixed and indecisive series of

New York cases which, though rarely enunciating legal principles with clarity, nonetheless pointed the way towards the
final formulation of the rule in later years. Their importance lies not in their own reasoning, but in their formative
and moulding effect upon the later judicial mind.
A.

Early Cases Denying Recovery

The oldest case dealing directly with the question of
psychic disturbance was an action of trespass brought by a
father for an assault and battery committed by a schoolteacher upon plaintiff's son. 48 There the wounded feelings
of the parent were held .not compensable in damages, the
court distinguishing the principle of the seduction cases
46
Mentzer v. Western Union Tel. Co., 93 Iowa 752, 62 N. W. 1 (1895);
Wadsworth v. Western Union Tel. Co., 86 Tenn. 695, 8 S. W. 574 (1888);
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Redding, 100 Fla. 495, 129 So. 743 (1930).
The federal rule denies liability in such cases, Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Speight, 254 U. S. 17 (1920), as does the majority state rule, Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Chouteau, 28 Okla. 664, 115 Pac. 879 (1911); Francis v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 58 Minn. 252, 59 N. W. 1078 (1894); Morton v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 53 Ohio St. 431, 41 N. E. 689 (1895). The existence of a
federal rule becomes largely academic as to intrastate messages under Erie
R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938), requiring federal courts to follow
state decisions on matters of general law, but the federal rule would still be
of importance as to interstate messages.
The English courts have moved much further than the American in allowing recovery for mental shock. Thus Owens v. Liverpool Corporation,
[1939] 1 K. B. 394 (discussed in note 21 supra), allowed mourners at a)
funeral to recover damages for mental shock in an action for negligence, the
negligence being the operation of a tramcar so as to damage the hearse and
overturn the coffin. American cases exhibiting the same trend in permitting
recovery for mental distress caused by negligent handling of dead bodies are
Clemm v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R., 126 Kan. 181, 268 Pac. 103 (1928) ; and
Klumbach v. Silver Mount Cemetery Association, 242 App. Div. 843, 275 N. Y.
Supp. 180 (2d Dep't 1934).
47 151 N. Y. 107, 45 N. E. 354 (1896).
48 Cowden v. Wright, 24 Wend. 429 (N. Y. 1840). The action was trespass per quod servitium amisit.
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which had permitted recovery for the injury to parental
49
feelings.
A similar trend towards denial of liability was manifested in an early fright caseA0 There plaintiff, a pregnant
woman, was standing in the doorway of her home with her
five year old child, when the defendant's run-away horse
dashed toward her and was halted only by the presence of
a heavy post. The plaintiff sustained a severe shock which
brought on a long train of nervous diseases, but the court
refused to allow any recovery. 5 1 In line with that decision,
it was also held 52 that the erection of a memorial statue
49 Nelson, C. J., in Cowden v. Wright, supra note 48, said:
"It is true
that in the action for the seduction of a daughter, the jury, in fixing upon
the damages, may regard the wounded feelings of the family; but that case
has always been considered sni generis, and inconsistent with the fundamental
principle of the action (i.e., loss of services). Besides, there is a marked distinction between that and the present case. There the only remedy for the
injury is the action by the parent; the daughter is without redress, however
aggravated the seduction. It is not therefore surprising that the courts should
have been indulgent in the measure of damages in the particular case. But
here the child may also maintain an action against the defendant, in which the
measure of redress depends very much upon the sound discretion of the jury
because his personal injury and suffering then constitute the gravamen of the
suit."
That Chief Judge Nelson's opinion in the Wright case represented the
definite opinion of the judiciary at the time is indicated in a similar observation
made by Chief Judge Bronson a few years later in Bartley v. Richtmyer,
4 N. Y. 38, 43 (1850) : "It is obvious from the nature of the case, that the
master ought not, in point of principle, to recover anything more than a 'compensation for the pecuniary loss which he has sustained: and such was formerly the rule in this action, as it is still where the master sues for the
battery of a servant. (Cowden v. Wright, 24 Wend. 429; Whitney v. Hitchcock, 4 Denio 461.)
But it is now settled, that a father may recover exemplary damages for the seduction of his daughter; and very large, not to say
outrageous verdicts, have become a part of the fashion of the times."
To the same effect, see Knight v. Wilcox, 15 Barb. 279 (N. Y. 1853),
where judge Strong commented: "In all such cases, loss of services is the
only ground upon which an action can be supported. (Bartley v. Richtmyer,
4 Comst. 38, and cases there cited.) In respect to the damages which may be
recovered, where a right of action exists, there is an important distinction between cases of debauching female servants, and other injuries to servants; in
the former, the loss of services is not the measure of damages, but the entire
wrong to the master, to his character and feelings, as well as in respect to his
right to services, may be considered, and exemplary damages allowed; but in
the latter the damages must be measured by the pecuniary loss." (Citing inter
alia the Wright case, supra note 48.)
50 Lehman v. Brooklyn City R. R., 47 Hun 355 (N. Y. 1888).
51 The court made no particular effort to reason out the theory of the action. Dykman, J., in affirming a dismissal of the complaint, remarked simply:
"We have been unable to find either principle or authority for the maintenance
of this action and we have been referred to none by the counsel." Lehman v.
Brooklyn City K. R., supra note 50 at 356.
52 Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N. Y. 434, 42 N. E. 22 (1895).
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honoring a prominent decedent did not warrant injunctive
relief in favor of a relative since there was nothing in the
statue calculated to offend any but the abnormally sensitive. 53 A vigorous dissent foreshadowed later development
of the right of privacy. 54
B.

Early Cases AZlowing Recovery

Another series of cases held the other way and permitted
recovery for emotional distress. It is important to note,
however, that this latter series was consistently marked by
some sort of slight impact or already recognized legal injury
to which the psychic harm could by very tenuous reasoning
be somehow affixed.5 5 Thus, where defendaht came upon
plaintiff's sidewalk and piazza on numerous occasions and
expressed his opinion of the plaintiff in "low, vulgar, vile,
and abusive language," plaintiff was allowed to recover on
the notion that defendant had committed a trespass to plaintiff as an abutting owner, although it was obvious to all that
the real injury was the vilification. 56
In the same fashion where an impact could be found in
defendant's hitting plaintiff's horse while it was drawing
t3 Peckham, J., in Schuyler v. Curtis, supra note 52 at 448, 42 N. E. at 26,
said: "We cannot assent to the proposition that one situated as the plaintiff
in this case can properly enjoin such action as the defendants propose on the
ground that as mere matter of fact his feelings would be thereby injured. We
hold that in this class of cases there must in addition be some reasonable and
plausible ground for the existence of this mental distress and injury. It must
not be the creation of mere caprice nor of pure fancy, nor the result of a
supersensitive and morbid mental organization, dwelling with. undue emphasis
upon the exclusive and sacred character of this right of privacy. . . . Feelings
that are thus easily and unnaturally injured and distressed under such circumstances are much too sensitive to be recognized by any purely earthly tribunal."
54 Id. at 453, 42 N. E. at 27, per Gray, J.: "Upon the findings in this case,
I think we are bound to say that the purpose of the defendants was to commit
an act which vas an unauthorized invasion of the plaintiff's right to the preservation of the name and memory of Mrs. Schuyler intact from public comment
and criticism."
55 This again is the notion of "parasitic" damages. See the discussion in
note 29 supra concerning the theory of "parasitic" damages as a transitional
step in the evolution of an independent cause of action.
56 Adams v. Rivers, 11 Barb. 390, 397 (N. Y. 1851).
Williard, P. J.,
worked out the trespass rationale in this manner: "The defendant had no
right to be upon the plaintiff's piazza after he was ordered to depart. Perhaps
he had no right to be there at all. That was a distinct act of trespass. The
language of the defendant while committing a trespass was proper to qualify
the act, and show with what spirit it was done."

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 24

plaintiff's wagon, the court considered the attack an assault

upon plaintiff himself. 57 Another holding 8 indicated that
a psychic stimulus could be a valid link in the chain of causation. It there appeared that plaintiff was a passenger in one
of defendant's horse cars which was negligently driven almost in front of an express train; to avoid the anticipated

danger of being struck, plaintiff jumped from the horse car
and sustained slight physical injury. Recovery was permitted despite the fact that the injuries were caused through

plaintiff's frightened act.5 9 In a "rescue" case, 60 the same
trend was followed in the situation where a plaintiff-rescuer

was injured while saving a person imperiled by defendant's
negligence. The plaintiff's injury was clearly the result of
the psychic stimulus manifested by the urge to rescue, but
the defendant was nonetheless held liable."'
Two dis-

senters, however, felt that plaintiff's injury was within the
maxim volenti non fit injuria, so as to destroy the chain of
62

causation.

57 Bull. v. Colton, 22 Barb. 94, 95 (N. Y. 1856). The defendant whipped
and beat plaintiff's horse, so that the horse became frightened and reared up.
Plaintiff claimed only for damages to the horse, but, Balcom, J., indicated that
such a set of facts would have also sustained a cause of action for an assault
upon the plaintiff himself. "There can be np doubt but that the plaintiff could
have sustained an action in the Supreme Court for an assault upon his person
and recovered damages therefor and for the injury to his horse."
5s Twomley v. C. P. N. & E. R. R. R., 69 N. Y. 158 (1877).
-5Objectively speaking, plaintiff was in fact not in danger, since the horse
car driver succeeded in getting the car across the tracks in time to escape the
train, the engineer thereon having reversed his engine and put on the brakes.
However, Allen, J., felt that "the jury having found the plaintiff was placed
by the reckless or careless act of . . .the defendant, in such a position as compelled her to choose upon the instant, and in the face of an apparently great
and impending peril, between two hazards, a dangerous leap from the moving
car, or to remain in the car at certain peril. They have also found that her
action was such as might have been taken by any one of ordinary prudence,
placed in the same situation, and was not the result of such enforced action."
Id. at 160. That plaintiff's conduct was in fact eminently "reasonable" is perhaps best indicated by the fact that all the passengers on the horse car, save
one, did exactly as she did.
6o Eckert v. The Long Island R. R., 43 N. Y. 502 (1871).
61 It should be noted, however, that it is not necessary in rescue cases that
the rescuer act on the basis of a spur-of-the-moment impulse. Recovery is
allowed even though the rescuer deliberates before acting. See, e.g., Wagner
v. International Ry., 232 N. Y. 176, 133 N. E. 437 (1921).
62 "The act of the intestate in attempting to save the child was lawful as
well as meritorious, and he was not a trespasser upon the property of the defendant, but it was not in the performance of any duty imposed by law, or
growing out of his relation to the child, or the result of any necessity. There
is nothing to relieve it from the character of a voluntary act, the performance
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The final holding looking in the direction of liability
for invasions of peace of mind was Foley v. Phelps. 63 There

plaintiff's husband died in Bellevue Hospital where he was
taken after an accident, and, despite plaintiff's protestations,
the hospital performed an autopsy. The court held that a
cause of action would lie on the theory of invasion of the
legal right to perform the duty of burial, 64 and seemed favorably disposed towards the allowance of recovery for the mental suffering sustained.6 5

of a self-imposed duty, with full knowledge and apprehension of the risk
incurred." Id. at 50 (dissenting opinion by Allen, J.). The effect of Judge
Allen's reasoning would be to break the chain of causation which the majority
recognized, and to hold that the psychic urge to rescue was not a valid link in
that chain.
63 1 App. Div. 551, 37 N. Y. Supp. 471 (1st Dep't 1896).
64 "Irrespective of any claim of property [in the dead body], the right
which inhered in the plaintiff as the decedent's widow, and in one sense his
nearest relative, was a right to the possession of the body for the purpose of
burying it . . . ." Id. at 555, 37 N. Y. Supp. at 473. To the same effect, see
Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 50 N. W. 238 (1891); Burney v. Children's
Hospital in Boston, 169 Mass. 57, 47 N. E. 401 (1897). A similar theory has
been invoked to permit recovery for the unauthorized disinterment of a dead
body. Gostkowski v. Roman Catholic Church, 262 N. Y. 320, 186 N. E. 798
(1933); England v. Central Pocahontas Coal Co., 86 W. Va. 575, 104 S. E.
46 (1920).
65 After commenting that the Foley case was one of first impression in
New York, the court went on to comment with favor on the leading Minnesota
case, Larson v. Chase, supra note 64, saying: "It is there [in the Larson case]
also held that the rule of damages would allow a recovery for mental suffering
and for injury to the feelings occasioned directly by the unlawful mutilation
and that although no actual pecuniary loss or damage was proven. It is not
for us at this time to express any opinion with respect to the measure of
damages in a case of this kind; but we are satisfied that the action will
lie .
" Foley v. Phelps, supra note 63 at 556, 37 N. Y. Supp. at 474.
While virtually all courts have allowed recovery for intentional mishandling
of corpses through unauthorized autopsy, disinterment, or other cause, there is
a strong tendency not to permit recovery where the interference is merely
negligent. Kneass v. Cremation Society, 103 Wash. 521, 175 Pac. 172 (1918).
But cf. Clemm v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 126 Kan. 181, 268 Pac. 103 (1928) ;
Owens v. Liverpool Corp., [1929] 1 K. B. 394. On the same point see also
cases cited note 46 supra.
In an analogous situation, most courts deny recovery for mental anguish
caused by negligent delay in delivering a message telling of death in the family.
Chapman v. Western Union Tel. Co., 88 Ga. 763, 15 S. E. 901 (1892) ; Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Ferguson, 157 Ind. 64, 60 N. E. 674 (1901); Summerfield
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 87 Wis. 1, 57 N. W. 973 (1894). The minority
rule in the telegraph cases is represented by Mentzer v. Western Union Tel.
Co., 93 Iowa 752, 62 N. W. 1 (1895); Green v. Telegraph Co., 136 N. C.
489, 49 S. E. 165 (1904). On the same point see also cases cited note 46 supra.
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Prior to the Mitchell case, therefore, it would seem that
the New York law, while unsettled and at best hazy in the

outlines of its reasoning, was leading to the position which
the Court of Appeals was finally to take, namely that negligently caused emotional disturbance would not support a
recovery even where it consequentially resulted in physical
injury. The line of cases going the other way had all contained some extra consideration, such as an impact, however

minute, or a relational legal interest or an immediate and
spur-of-the-moment, as it were, physical harm.
V.

A.

THE MITCHELL CASE

The Holding Itself

What is commonly regarded as the leading New York

case on emotional disturbance was decided in 1896 by the
Court of Appeals, Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. 68

There it ap-

peared that defendant's employee drove his horses so negligently that plaintiff, a pregnant woman, was put in extreme
peril of being run down. Plaintiff was standing on a crosswalk waiting to board defendant's horse car; and, although
plaintiff was not touched by the horses, so close did they
come to her that she was standing between their heads when

the horses were finally reined up. Terrified and excited,
plaintiff fell, and shortly afterwards developed sickness
which culminated in a miscarriage.

7

When the case reached the Court of Appeals, the highest
tribunal saw fit to reverse both the Special Term's decision s
N. Y. 107, 45 N. E. 354 (1896).
The opinion of the circuit court described the injuries in these words:
"The fright and excitement of the occurrence made the plaintiff unconscious.
As the result of the shock she then sustained she suffered a miscarriage, and
was sick for a long time. It appeared from the testimony of the physicians
that the mental shock which she then received was a sufficient cause for all the
physical ailments from which she subsequently suffered." Mitchell v. Rochester
Ry., 4 Misc. 575, 25 N. Y. Supp. 744 (1893).
68 Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., supra note 67.
In a well-considered opinion,
Rumsey, J., pointed out: "There is no doubt that if the horses of the defendant had struck the plaintiff, and broken her leg, she could recover for that
injury. So if, to avoid the impending collision between herself and the horses,
she had sprung aside, and fallen and broken her leg, she could undoubtedly
66 151
67
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and the unanimous holding of the General Term, 69 and to

affirm the order of the Trial Term granting the non-suit. The
decision was put upon several grounds. It was reasoned
that, first of all, since a plaintiff cannot recover damages for
mere fright negligently caused, it follows that ho recovery
7
can be had for the physical consequences of such fright.

0

Secondly, the court felt that the miscarriage was not a natural and probable consequence of defendant's negligence but
was due to an accidental and highly unusual combination of
circumstances.

This meant that defendant had not in a

legal sense proximately caused the damages, and hence they
were too remote for recovery. 71 Finally, on grounds of public
policy, it was imperative to deny recoVery in order to forestall fictitious suits, feigned injuries, and proof conjectural
72
and highly speculative in nature.

B.

Analysis of Arguments in the Mitchell Case

Since the Mitchell case is the primary foundation stone
upon which the New York law rests, it is well to conduct a
recover; but in the last case the immediate cause of the injury was her instinctive action caused by her conclusion that it was necessary to escape. The
injury which she actually received was quite as serious a physical injury as
though she had broken her leg. The fact that there was a mental cause for
the injury, clearly traceable to the negligent act, ought not to relieve the defendant from the consequences of its wrongful act ....
It is not intended here
to impugn the well-settled and wholesome rule that no damages can be recovered against a negligent pjerson for purely mental suffering, unaccompanied
by any physical injury. Itis decided simply that where a physical injury is
the natural result of the negligence, although it proceeds from a mental shock
caused directly by the negligent act, the defendant is liable, if the jury might
find from the evidence that the shock caused the injury."
09 Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 77 Hun 607, 28 N. Y. Supp. 1136 (Gen. Term,
5th Dep't 1894), affirming the Special Term's holding that liability could exist
against defendant. Dwight, P. J., Lewis, Haight and Bradley, JJ., were the
members of the court.
0 Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N. Y. 107, 45 N. E. 354 (1896). "Assuming that fright cannot form the basis of an action, it is obvious that no recovery can be had for injuries resulting therefrom." Id. at 109, 45 N. E. at
354.
-1 "Moreover it cannot be properly said that the plaintiff's miscarriage was
the proximate result of defendant's negligence ....
The plaintiff's injuries do
not fall within the rule as to proximate damages." Id. at 110, 45 N. E. at 355.
See also note 23 supra.
,2 "If the right of recovery in this class of cases should be once established,
it would naturally result in a flood of litigation in cases where the injuries
complained of may be easily feigned without detection, and where the damages
must rest upon mere conjecture and speculation." Id. at 110, 45 N. E. at 354.
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rather searching analysis of the opinion to determine just

how solid or infirm this foundation may be.
1.

The Argument from Precedent

While the Court of Appeals did not discuss the factual
background of any of the cases cited as precedents, it did

seem to rely especially on three cases, Victorian Railways
Comnvissioners v. Coultas,73 an English case already discussed in a previous section; 7 4 a Pennsylvania case, Eming
v. Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. B.; 75 and a lower court case
decided in New York, Lemazan v. Brooklyn City By.76

The English precedent even then had been severely attacked, 77 and five years later it was absolutely overruled. 78
73 13 App. Cas. 222 (1888).
74 See text, supra page 5.

In the Coultas case plaintiff suffered shock
when defendant's employee negligently admitted her buggy on the railroad
tracks in the path of an onrushing train. The Privy Council denied recovery,
basing its decisions on arguments virtually identical with those of the Court
of Appeals in the Mitchell case.
75 147 Pa. 40, 23 AtI. 340 (1892).
The circuit court in the Mitchcll case
felt that the Esing case was not a valid precedent for the Mitchell factual
situation. See Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 4 Misc.. 575, 25 N. Y. Supp. 744
(1893), where the circuit judge commented: "It may be conceded that where
no physical injury whatever has been suffered by the plaintiff, but only a severe
fright, followed by no serious consequences, an action will not lie for damages
on account of the negligence of the defendant. The rule in that regard is laid
down in the case of Canning v. Inhabitants of Williamstown, 1 Cush. 451, to
the effect that damages are not recoverable on account of a risk or peril which
causes only fright and mental suffering, but, where any actual injury to the
plaintiff is sustained, the accompanying mental suffering is a part of the injury, for which damages may be recovered. The case of Ezwing v. Railroad
Co...
seems to have been decided by the court upon that principle, for it
is said there that the plaintiff's 'only injury proceeded from fright, alarm,
fear, and nervous excitement and distress, and there was no allegation that she
had received any bodily injury'; and the court say [sic] that there is no case
'in which it has been held that mere fright, unaccompanied by some injury to
the person, has been held actionable.' But in this case the jury might have
found that the serious bodily sickness from which the plaintiff afterwards
suffered was the result of the mental shock caused by the negligence of the
defendant."
76 47 Hun 355 (Gen. Term, 2d Dep't 1888). There plaintiff was frightened
by a runaway horse whose dash towards her was only arrested by a heavy
post; and the injury suffered was a train of nervous diseases. The opinion
was not closely reasoned, the court simply remarking: "We have been unable
to find either principle or authority for the maintenance of this action and we
have been referred to none by the counsel."
77 By Bell v. Great Northern Ry., L. R. 26 Ir. 428 (1890) ; in an opinion
of the noted Baron Palles. Pugh v. London, B. & S. C. Ry., [1896] 2 Q. B.
248, also tended to erode the authority of the Coidtas case.
78 The overruling case was Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K. B. 669.
See text, page 7 mtpra, for discussion of the facts in the Dulie case which,
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The New York case was of doubtful persuasiveness since it
had come only from a lower court and contained no analysis
at all of the problem.79 The Ewing decision was from a foreign jurisdiction, and, as indicated by the lower court's opinion in the Mitchell case,8 0 was by no means an unequivocal
holding that physical injuries resulting from fright were not
compensable.8 1 It is apparent, therefore, that the precedents
relied on were of exceedingly doubtful character and in no
sense compelled the court to decide as it did.
2.

The Argument from Analogy to Fright Cases

The reasoning of the court in this argument is summarized by Martin, J., in these words:
If it be admitted that no recovery can be had for fright occasioned
by the negligence of another, it is somewhat difficult to understand
how a defendant would be liable for its consequences. Assuming that
fright cannot form the basis of an action, it is obvious that no re82
covery can be had for injuries resulting therefrom.

But is the answer quite so obvious as the court would
have us believe? It is true that fright alone, at least in most
jurisdictions, cannot form the basis of an action,8 3 but the
in overruling the prior English authorities, considered the contentions of the
Court of Appeals in the Mitchell case, and rejected them as without merit.
79 See comment, note 76 supra."
80 Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 4 Misc. 575, 25 N. Y. Supp. 744 (1893).
s1 For the Mitchell circuit court's analysis of the Ewing decision see note
75 supra.
82 Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N. Y. 107, 109, 45 N. E. 354, 355 (1896).
The full statement of Judge Martin's argument runs as follows: "If it be
admitted that no recovery can be had for fright occasioned by the negligence
of another, it is somewhat difficult to understand how a defendant would be
liable for its consequences. Assuming that fright cannot form the basis of an
action, it is obvious that no recovery can be had for injuries resulting therefrom. That the result may be nervous disease, blindness, insanity, or even a
miscarriage, in no way changes the principle. These results merely show the
degree of fright or the extent of the damages. The right of action must still
depend upon the question whether a recovery may be had for fright. If it can,
then an action may be maintained, however slight the injury. If not, then
there can be no recovery, no matter how grave or serious the consequences.
Therefore, the logical result of the respondent's concession would seem to be,
not only that no recovery can be had for mere fright, but also that none can
be had for injuries which are the direct consequences of it."
83 For example, see Memphis St. R. R. v. Bernstein, 137 Tenn. 637, 194
S. W. 902 (1917); Williamson v. Central of Georgia R. R., 127 Ga. 125,
56 S. E. 119 (1906).
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reason why that is so is that it involves no measurable dam-

ages to plaintiff.8

4

As has been pointed out by several noted

writers, the court's somewhat glib statement upon analysis

comes down to a complete non sequitur. s5 Professor Bohlen
rightly indicates that the "fundamental vice" in the court's

opinion is that it assumes that the plaintiff is alleging fright
as the basis of recovery and the physical injury merely in

aggravation of damages.8 6 Actually, of course, the fright is
84 Smith points out that "this erroneous argument proceeds as follows:
First the court assumes correctly that mere fright negligently caused is not
actionable; ergo injury which is a consequence of fright being one step further
removed from defendant's conduct is a fortiori too remote to be compensable.
But the true reason for not compensating simple fright is that it involves no
measurable damage and this reason vanishes if physical injury ensues." Smith,
Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic
Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REv. 193, 208 (1944).
85 See Bohlen, Right to Recover for Injury Residting from Negligence
Without Inpact, 41 Am. L. REG. (N. s.) 141 (1902); reprinted in part in
STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1926) ; the pertinent discussion is at page 265
of the latter. To the same effect is Throckmorton, Damages for Fright,
34 HARV. L. REv. 260, 266 (1921) : "Of this reasoning [the analogy to fright
in the Mitchell case] it is to be said that the premise is admitted, but not the
conclusion. The reason that negligence causing mere fright is not actionable
is for want of damage. De minimis non curat lex. The mere temporary emotion of fright not resulting in physical injury is, in contemplation of law, no
injury at all, and hence no foundation of an action. In like manner negligence
per se is not actionable, but negligence causing injury is. In each case the
gist of the action is the injury flowing from defendant's wrongful act. Physical injury, therefore, caused by defendant's wrongful act is actionable, whether
the wrongful act operates through the medium of impact or of nervous shock."
The fallacy in the Mitchell reasoning has also been recognized by the more
enlightened courts. Illustrative of this recognition is the opinion of Evans, J.,
in Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 320, 73 So. 205,
207 (1916): "Damages, when confined to fright alone, is [sic] dealing with
a metaphysical, as contradistinguished from a physical, condition, with something subjective instead of objective, and entirely within the realm of speculation. So the damages suffered where the only manifestation is fright are too
subtle and speculative to be capable of admeasurement by any standard known
to the law; but when the damages are physical and objective as consequent
upon the physical pain and incapacity manifested by and ensuing upon a miscarriage, the damages are quite as capable of being measured by a jury as if
they had ensued from an impact or blow."
8 Bohlen, supra note 85 at 265: "While the court (in the Mitchell case)
was correct in holding that no recovery may be had for 'mere fright,' it is
submitted that it was clearly wrong in its opinion that the 'logical result' of
such a holding is that no recovery 'can be had for injuries which are the direct
consequence of it.' The court overlooks the fact that no recovery is allowed
for mere fright because fright is not of itself such an injury as must be shown
to maintain an action for negligence and that where physical injury is shown
to have resulted, the plaintiff has proved an injury sufficient to sustain the
action, the only question being whether or not the injury is the legal consequence of the negligence which caused the fright.
"The fundamental vice of the court's opinion is that it assumes that the
plaintiff is alleging her fright as the ground for her recovery, and is alleging
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proved merely in an effort to show the chain of causation

extant between the physical injury and the defendant's act
of negligence. The court's mistake lies in the failure to distinguish between fright as the primary injury for which recovery is sought and fright as a mere link in the causal

relationship.
3.

The Argument from Proximate Cause.

Moreover, it cannot be properly said that the plaintiff's miscarriage
was the proximate result of the defendant's negligence. Proximate
damages are such as are the ordinary and natural results of the negligence charged, and those that are usual and may, therefore, be expected .... The injuries to the plaintiff were plainly the result of an
accidental or unusual combination of circumstances, which could not
have been reasonably anticipated, and over which the defendant had
no control, and, hence, her damages were too remote to justify a
recovery in this action.8 7

That reasoning is untenable, for so to hold as a matter
of law is clearly opposed to modern scientific evidence.""
the physical consequences merely in aggravation of the damages, whereas the
fact is that she has alleged and proved her physical injury as her ground of
action and has alleged and proved the fright merely to show the causal connection between the defendant's negligence and her physical injury. The opinion shows a complete inability to distinguish between fright as the injury for
which an action is brought and fright as a necessary link in the chain of causation between the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's physical injury for
which recovery is sought."
See also Goodrich, Emotioital Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MIcH. L.
REv. 497 (1922) (seeking to show that fear, itself, since it is manifested in
physiological changes, may be considered a "physical" injury).
87 Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N. Y. 107, 110, 45 N. E. 354, 355 (1896).
88 See note 24 supra for an extensive listing of the clinical disorders which

can be produced or aggravated by psychic stimuli. It is clear from medical
evidence that a variety of injuries can and do occur merely through the effects
of nervous shock, and a glance at the New York cases themselves shows a
variety of injuries: miscarriages, Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N. Y. 107,
45 N. E. 354 (1896); Preiser v. Wielandt, 48 App. Div. 569, 62 N. Y. Supp.
890 (2d Dep't 1900); Hutchinson v. Stem, 115 App. Div. 791, 101 N. Y. Supp.
145 (4th Dep't 1906); Hack v. Dady, 134 App. Div. 253, 118 N. Y. Supp. 906
(2d Dep't 1909); Pareti v. New York Railways Co., 172 N. Y. Supp. 621, 388
(App. Term 1918) ; O'Brien v. Moss, 220 App. Div. 464, 221 N. Y. Supp. 621
(4th Dep't 1927); general nervous diseases, Lehman v. The Brooklyn Ry.,
47 Hun 355, 14 N. Y. St. Rep. 575 (1888); Powell v. Hudson Valley Ry., 88
App. Div. 133, 84 N. Y. Supp. 337 (3d Dep't 1903); Lofink v. Interborough,
etc., 102 App. Div. 275, 92 N. Y. Supp. 386 (2d Dep't 1905); Garrison v.
Sun Publishing Co., 207 N. Y. 1, 100 N. E. 430 (1912); Carrol v. New York
Pie Baking Co., 215 App. Div. 240, 213 N. Y. Supp. 553 (2d Dep't 1926);
and even heart failure, Newton v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 106 App. Div.
415, 94 N. Y. Supp. 825 (1st Dep't 1905).
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"That serious physical disorder is the every-day consequence

of fright or nervous shock is a fact, not only established by
modern science, but one which has long been accepted by the
ordinary man." 89 It logically follows that, since shock does

have this undoubted propensity for causing physical injuries,
anyone who unreasonably subjects another to a fright of such
a character as to be likely to result in physical injury is
subjecting that other to an unreasonable risk of bodily
harm.9 0 When bodily injury in fact follows upon the fright,
the risk to which the plaintiff was subjected has come to
fruition, and defendant should be held accountable."

It is interesting to discover that many of the jurisdictions, including New York, which deny recovery for injuries

resulting from fright alone, permit a recovery where the
fright was accompanied by some impact in itself insignificant
as compared with the injuries produced by the shock.92 Certainly no better evidence than that could be found to indicate

the flimsiness of the conclusion that damages resulting from
fright or shock cannot be considered as proximate.9

3

89 Burdick, Tort Liability for Mental Disturbance and Nervous Shock,
5 Cor. L. REv. 179, 186 (1905). Prof. Burdick's conclusion is that "It
[physical disorder from nervous shock] would seem, therefore, to fall within
the category of natural and probable consequences."
Even the Massachusetts court, while denying recovery on public policy
grounds to forestall fictitious and speculative claims, did not subscribe to the
proximate cause argument, pointing out that, "Great emotion may and sometimes does produce physical effects. A physical injury may be directly traceable
to fright and so may be caused by it." Spade v. Lynn & Boston R. R., 168
Mass. 285, 288, 47 N. E. 88 (1897).
90 This reasoning would seem to be thoroughly consonant with § 306 of the
Restatement: "Acts Likely to Cause Physical Harm Through Mental Disturbance. An act may be negligent, as creating an unreasonable risk of bodily
harm to another, if the actor intends to subject, or realizes or should realize
that his act involves an unreasonable risk of subjecting, the other to an emotional disturbance of such a character as to be likely to result in illness or

other bodily harm."

RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 306 (1934).
91 See Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, 34 HARv. L. REv. 260, 268, 269

(1921).
For general discussions of the "natural and probable" as a test of
causation in tort, see Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HARV. L. REv.
103 (1911).
92 Porter v. Delaware, L. & W. R. R., 73 N. J. L. 405, 63 Atl. 860 (1906)
(dust the impact) ; Morton v. Stack, 122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N. E. 869 (1930)
(smoke the impact); McArdle v. George B. Peck Dry Goods Co., 191 Mo.
App. 263, 177 S. W. 1095 (1915) (slight jar the impact) ; Comstock v. Wilson,
257 N. Y. 231, 177 N. E. 431 (1931) (slight jar the impact).
93 Throckmorton, supra note 91 at 270.
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The Argument from Public Policy.9 4

The Mitchell decision, so far as its legal reasoning is
concerned, must rest primarily upon the argument advanced
by the court on the ground of public policy:
If the right of recovery in this class of cases should be once established, it would naturally result in a flood of litigation in cases where
the injury complained of may be easily feigned without detection and
where the damages must rest upon mere conjecture or speculation.
The difficulty which often exists in cases of alleged physical injury,
in determining whether they exist, and if so, whether they were
caused by the negligent act of the defendant, would not only be
greatly increased, but a wide field would be opened for fictitious or
speculative claims. To establish such a doctrine would be contrary
to principles of public policy.9 5

That argument is not at once either refutable or sanctionable on a purely logical level, and the answer to it lies
more within the realm of statistical data.

It is impossible,

94 Another guise, not here taken up in the text, in which the public policy
argument is sometimes cloaked is "the lack of precedent argument"--i.e., the
argument that the fact that courts have not allowed liability for such a cause
of action in past years indicates a general recognition by bench and bar that
the harms constituting such cause are not, on grounds of public policy, of a
compensable type.
The argument is specious, and if at any time accurate, clearly is inapplicable to the instant situation because there has never been any general
acquiescence in the no-liability rule, and the reports are filled with cases seeking
to circumvent it. It may be pointed out also that the common law does not
proceed on the theory that a case of first impression presents a situation for
the exercise of legislative rather than judicial power.
Prof. Throckmorton dismisses this alleged public policy reason as "... no
reason at all. If it were, every case of first instance would be decided against
the party invoking the new rule of law or the new application of an old rule.
It would put an end to all growth or progress of the law through judicial
decision." Throckmorton, supra note 91 at 274. The same view is expressed
judicially in Lambert v. Brewster, 97 W. Va. 124, 138, 125 S. E. 244, 249
(1924), "As for public policy, the strongest policy which appeals to us is that
fundamental theory of the common law that for every wrong there should be
a remedy."
95 Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N. Y. 107, 110, 45 N. E. 354, 355 (1896).
The denial of liability in such cases by the Massachusetts court was also placed
on the public policy argument. See Spade v. Lynn & Boston R. R., 168 Mass.
285, 47 N. E. 88 (1897). Justice Holmes viewed the decision in the Lynn
case as not ". . . a logical deduction from the general principles of liability in
tort, but as a limitation of those principles upon purely practical grounds."
Smith v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 174 Mass. 576, 577, 578, 55 N. E. 380 (1899),
and in another connection characterized the denial of liability in the psychic
stimuli cases as ". . . an arbitrary exception, based upon a notion of what is
practicable." Homans v. Boston Elev. R. R., 180 Mass. 456, 457, 62 N. E.
737 (1902).
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of course, to make an exact count of the number of cases
which have arisen in the trial courts of jurisdictions permitting recovery as opposed to the number arising in the states
denying liability. It is possible, however, to check the views
of the appellate courts themselves since presumably they
would be familiar with the volume of litigation in their own
jurisdictions.
Proceeding on this basis, it is at once obvious that the
fear of the successful prosecution of fraudulent claims has
not impressed the vast majority of appellate judges in the
United States,96 as shown by the fact that the states which
have laid down rules of law on the question during the present century have almost uniformly held that injury from
psychic disturbance is actionable.9 7 The courts of these
states agree with a noted jurist of the English Court of
Appeal who in a leading case commented that he had been
able to find

".

. . only about half a dozen cases of direct

shock reported in about thirty years .... ,,98
As with the argument from proximate cause, probably
one of the best refutations of the public policy argument lies
in the fact that in the trivial impact cases all the alleged
96 The Supreme Court of Texas has well expressed the majority view's
conclusion that the fear of increased litigation is without foundation in fact.
"The reported cases would indicate that the litigations arising from injuries
inflicted through a mental shock are not so numerous as to cause any considerable increase of litigation." Gulf, etc., Ry. v. Hayter, 93 Tex. 239, 242,
54 S. W. 944, 945 (1900). The opinion of most courts seems to be that it
is a harsh doctrine indeed absolutely to deny recovery in all cases merely because an occasional non-meritorious claim might succeed. "The institution
and maintenance of suits for false claims is recognized, but to what extent in
comparison with honest ones is not a matter of judicial notice; nor is it a
matter of such notice in what measure false claims are successful. To hold
that all honest claims should be barred merely because otherwise some dishonest ones will prevail, is not enough to make out a case of public policy."
Chiuchiolo v. New England Wholesale Tailors, 84 N. H. 329, 335, 150 At.
540, 543 (1930). To the same effect is Dulieu v. White, [1901] 2 K. B. 669,
681, wherein Kennedy, J., commented ". . . I should be sorry to adopt a rule
which would bar all such claims on grounds of public policy alone, and in
order to prevent the possible success of unrighteous or groundless actions.
Such a course involves the denial or redress in meritorious cases, and it necessarily implies a certain degree of distrust, which I do not share, in the capacity
of legal tribunals to get at the truth in this class of claim."
97 The ratio during the present century of states allowing recovery to those
denying it is approximately 6 to 1. For the exact line-up of the jurisdictions
on this question, see notes 40, 43 supra.
98 Atkin, L. J., in Hambrook v. Stokes Bros., [1925] 1 K. B. 141, 158.
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hazards of fabricated claims are present, 9 9 and yet almost all

jurisdictions allow the plaintiff to recover in the trivial impact cases.1 00

There seems no reason to think that a jury

would find it more difficult to weigh medical evidence as to
the effects of nervous shock through fright than to weigh
precisely the same type of evidence as to effects of nervous
shock through an automobile collision or other accident

where a very slight battery has occurred. 1°1
To hold that all honest claims should be barred merely
because otherwise some dishonest ones would prevail is
stretching the public policy concept very close to the breaking point, especially since it is quite as simple to feign emotional disturbance plus slight impact and get in "under the
wire" of one of the exceptions as it is to feign emotional disturbance sans impact. The arbitrary denial of recovery in
all cases not falling within the realm of one or another of
the exceptions discourages the bringing of meritorious actions and at the same time allows the prosecution of fabricated claims, for surely those capable of perjuring evidence
will not hesitate to manufacture one additional feature of
the occurrence-a slight impact-to insure recovery.
The final straw to break the back of the "flood of liti-

gation" argument is the fact that the reported cases reveal
that the volume of litigation has been heaviest in those states
always condenying recovery due to the extensive exceptions
10 2
structed by the courts of such states.
99 It would seem no more difficult to make out a false case of slight impact
than to fabricate a claim involving no impact at all.
10oFor cases involving recoveries for slight impact, see note 92 supra indicating that a slight battery, smoke, and even mere dust have been held to
satisfy the impact requirement.
101 The sounder view in the physical injury through psychic cause case
seems to be that of Evans, J., in Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, 15
Ala. App. 316, 321, 73 So. 205, 207 (1916): "It may be that physical injuries
springing out of fright are easily simulated and relief granted in such instances would open the door to fraud and imposture; but this is a matter involving the proof of the case and is addressed rather to the good sense and
honesty of purpose of our juries than to the courts." Gaines, J., in Hill v.
Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 215, 13 S. W. 59 (1890), took a similar position: "It
may be more difficult (in the psychic disturbance case) to prove the connection
between the alleged cause and the injury, but if it be proved, and the injury
be the proximate result of the cause, we cannot say that a recovery should
not be had."
102 Study Relating to Liability for Injurles Resulting from Fright or Shock,
LEG. Doc. No. 65(E) p. 47 (1936), 1936 REPORT, N. Y. LAw REvisio.x Cot-
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It should be noted, however, that a possible public policy argument exists in favor of the impact rule in some jurisdictions which may not exist in others. It is a singular
fact that all of the American jurisdictions having a city with
a population in excess of one million have the impact rule
with the exception of California, and California adopted its
rule before Los Angeles became a great city. Inasmuch as
"ambulance chasing" with its concomitant evil of fabricated
claims is essentially an urban problem, it may well be that
courts of the large city jurisdictions have regarded the impact rule as some safeguard against false claims. While it is
true that England does not have the impact rule despite the
fact that London is one of the greatest world metropolises,
England, because of the semi-aristocratic nature of its bar,
does not have the "ambulance chasing" problem that large
American cities have.
It is submitted that the "ambulance chasing" argument
is of very doubtful validity. The impact rule has been so
shredded as to be satisfied by the slightest impact, and any
disreputable attorney or litigant, if he wishes to falsify a
claim, may by perjured testimony prove a slight impact just
as easily as no impact at all.
VI.

EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL RULE OF NON-LIABILITY

Having examined the New York general rule as laid
down in the Mitchell case, 10 3 it now becomes relevant to discuss the actual state of the New York law at present before
pressing on to develop a rationale for the psychic stimuli
cases which is consonant with modern medical thought. 0 4
The Commission, after analyzing the situation in New York, concluded that Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N. Y. 107, 45 N. E. 354 (1896),
could be best overruled by a statute. It proposed to amend § 37a of Laws of
1909, c. 27 (The General Construction Law) by adding the following subdivision: "Action to recover for injuries resulting from fright or shock. In
an action to recover damages for bodily injury or wrongful death hereafter
caused, recovery shall not be denied merely because such bodily injury or
wrongful death was brought about through fright or shock without physical
contact or impact." The amendment was never adopted.
103 Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N. Y. 107, 45 N. E. 354 (1896) ;; see
mISSION.

THE MITCHELL CASE,
104The rationale is

Part IV supra, for full discussion of it.
discussed and outlined in THE REAL PROBLEm-THE

QUESTION oF EVIDENCE, Part VIII infra.

1949 ]

PSYCHIC INJURY AND LIABILITY IN N. Y.

33

The Mitchell case itself is not truly representative of the
present status of the New York view, and, in order to determine how well or how poorly the New York holdings meet
the requirements of a sound jurisprudence, it is necessary to
discuss the multitude of exceptions to the rule of the Mitchell
case.
The New York cases which have arisen since the Mitchell
decision are difficult to classify into any consistent pattern;
they form a Joseph's coat in which no one constant thread
of legal theory is visible. There have been a series of cases
allowing and a companion series denying liability for psychic
stimuli, and alternately there has been a confirming and a
whittling away of the strict rule declared in the Mitchell
case.
In considering the broad classifications of cases in which
recoveries have been allowed, the following general grouping
may be discerned: the burial right cases, the contract relationship cases, the immediate physical injury cases, the slight
impact cases, the Workmen's Compensation cases, the food
cases, the wilful or wanton injury cases, and the right of
privacy cases.
A.

The Burial Right Cases

These decisions seem to represent a direct exception to
the general rule of no liability for psychic stimuli. It may
be that their true rationale for recovery is a relational theory
-i.e., the plaintiff has a right to the possession of the corpse
for burial purposes; and, that right having been violated, the
cause of action is established, and all damages flowing proximately from the cause of action are recoverable. Certain it
is that the courts have not always spoken in such clear-cut
language, and any such rationale, while perhaps logical, is
difficult to deduce from the cases.
In 1896, even before the Mitchell decision, it was held
that a wife had a right of action for the dissection of the
body of her deceased husband without permission, 10 5 and
105 Foley v. Phelps, 1 App. Div. 551, 555, 37 N. Y. Supp. 471, 473 (lst Dep't
1896). The court commented: "Irrespective of any claim of property [in
the dead body], the right which inhered in the plaintiff as the decedent's
widow, and in one sense his nearest relative, was a right to the possession of
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later this same right was held to exist in the case of a husband for dissection of his wife's body, 10 6 and in a mother for
dissection of her son's body. 1° 7 Apparently such rights are
the body for the purpose of burying it ....
" For other cases reaching similar
conclusions, see note 64 supra. On the question of a "property" right in the
dead body of a decedent, see Note, 18 MINN. L. REV. 204 (1934).
Hasselbach v. Mt. Sinai Hospital, 173 App. Div. 89, 159 N. Y. Sulp. 376
(1st Dep't 1916), was also an action by a widow for damages by reason of
an unauthorized autopsy performed upon her husband's body. The court recognized the principle of Foley v. Phelps, sipra, and the similar holding in
Darcy v. Presbyterian Hospital, 202 N. Y. 259, 95 N. E. 695 (1911), but held
that on the facts the defendant hospital was not liable since the autopsy was
not performed by its employees or by anyone acting under its direction.
106Jackson v. Savage, 109 App. Div. 556, 96 N. Y. Supp. 366 (1st Dep't
1905). The allegation was that the defendant's autopsy caused this plaintiff
great suffering in mind and body, was a great shock to him, and deprived him
of his natural right to inter the body of his deceased wife in as perfect a condition as her sickness and the due course of nature that led to her death would
permit, and greatly outraged his religious feeling in respect to the mutilation
of the corpse of his deceased wife, to his damage in the sum of $25,000. The
court held the complaint stated a cause of action on the authority of Foley
v. Phelps, supra note 105.
107 Hassard v. Lehane, 143 App. Div. 424, 425, 128 N. Y. Supp. 161, 162
(1st Dep't 1911). The court followed the line of reasoning in Foley v. Phelps,
supra note 105, and Jackson v. Savage, supra note 106, citing them as controlling authorities. Laughlin, J., stated: "The plaintiff . . . had a legal
right to the possession of the corpse of her son in the condition it was in at
the instant of death for the purpose of preserving and burying the remains,
and without her consent, or statutory authority therefor, no one had a right to
deprive her of such possession, or to dissect or otherwise mutilate the body
of her son, and the law gives her a cause of action to recover damages, which
are measured by the injury to her feelings, caused by the invasion or violation
of this right."
A defense frequently raised in the autopsy cases was relied on in Hassard
v. Lehane, mpra, namely the defense of statutory authority. The statute was
held no defense since the defendant was unable to bring himself within its
terms. The statute, § 1773, Laws of N. Y. 1882, c. 410, read: "When in the
City of New York any person shall die from criminal violence or by a casualty, or suddenly, when in apparent health, or when unattended by a physician, or in prison, or in a suspicious or unusual manner, the coroner shall
subpoena one of the coroner's physicians, who shall view the body of such
deceased person externally, or make an autopsy thereon as may be required.
It shall be the duty of the physician to whom such subpoena is so issued, to
make the inspection and autopsy required and to give evidence in relation
thereto at the coroner's inquest. The testimony of such physician and that of
any other witnesses that the coroner shall find necessary shall constitute an
inquest." The present day statute is much the same. See N. Y. City Charter
§ 878: "The chief medical examiner shall have such powers and perform such
duties as may be provided by law in respect to the bodies of persons dying
from criminal violence, by a casualty, by suicide, suddenly when in apparent
health, when unattended by a physician, in prison or in any suspicious or
unusual manner," and the ADMINISTRATIVE CoDE § 878-3.0, "If the cause of
such death shall be established beyond a reasonable doubt, the medical examiner
in charge shall so report to his office. If, however, in the opinion of such
medical examiner, an autopsy is necessary, the same shall be performed by a
medical examiner. A detailed description of the findings written during the
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not unlimited however, for in an analogous case it has been

held that a brother cannot recover for mental suffering
caused by the negligence of a cemetery company in permitting the body of a deceased brother to be stolen, because no
duty was owed to protect against theft.1 08 But recovery
was allowed where a steamship passenger died, and the body
was embalmed and buried at sea. 109

It was said that the

common-law duty of the shipping company was to carry the
body to port for delivery to the next-of-kin, and for breach
of that duty
the decedent's son had an action for mental
0
anguish."1
progress of such autopsy and the conclusions therefrom shall thereupon be
filed in his office." For a late case construing these provisions, see Trammel
v. City of New York, 82 N. Y. S. 2d 762 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
108 Coleman v. St. Michael's Protestant Episcopal Church, 170 App. Div.
658, 659, 155 N. Y. Supp. 1036, 1037 (1st Dep't 1915). The appellate division
expressed its view in this fashion: "The complaint does not allege any contract by the defendant corporation to guard and protect the graves ill its
cemetery; the statute under which the defendant is incorporated and permitted
to bold such lands and sell plots therefrom imposes no such duty; and the
plaintiff's cause of action, if any, must rest upon some implied duty of any
corporation selling lots for burial purposes to protect from theft the graves
placed therein. The theft of a dead body is an unusual occurrence. Such a
duty would involve a large expenditure of money in order to secure the graves
from molestation by outsiders. Without contract obligation to protect these
graves, and without statutory duty so to do, it is difficult to conceive any reasonable grounds from which such a duty can be implied. We are referred to
no authority, and are able to find none, in which such a duty has been declared
to exist, and in our opinion so to hold would cast an unreasonable burden upon
such corporation, entirely out of proportion to any compensation that they
would be able to charge for the sale of burial plots." In so holding the
appellate division reversed the lower court decision. Coleman v. St. Michael's
Protestant Episcopal Church, 90 Misc. 118, 153 N. Y. Supp. 445 (Sup. Ct.
1915), which had held that the complaint was sufficient.
On the broad question of the immunities enjoyed by charitable organizations such as the defendant in this case consult Feezer, The Tort Liability of
Charities, 77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 191 (1928).
209 Finley v. Atlantic Transport Co., 220 N. Y. 249, 115 N. E. 715 (1917).
But cf. Norton v. Kull, 74 Misc. 476, 132 N. Y. Supp. 387 (App. Term 1911),
where recovery for injury to feelings was disallowed. There defendant undertakers contracted to bury the body of plaintiff's husband in a particular cemetery and in the best vacant burial lot and with the best materials, but instead
used poor materials and a public grave, so that plaintiff had to rebury at her
own expense.
110 Finley v. Atlantic Transport Co., supra note 109 at 257, 115 N. E. at 717.
"Under the circumstances and the facts alleged in the complaint a reasonable
discharge of the common-law duty required defendant to transport the body
to the port of New York and deliver it to the parties entitled to the possession
of same for burial." The facts were that after the decedent's death the defendant's employees had had the body embalmed so that there was no danger
to passengers or crew from retaining it on board. They carried it for four
and one-half days on the ship before suddenly burying it at sea near Nantucket
Shoals, only twenty-four hours out of New York, the port of destination.
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Later cases indicate no intention to back-track from the
relatively consistent allowance of recovery in such cases.
In more recent years it has been held that a husband has an
action in trespass for damages for mental anguish because

of interference with the right of possession of his wife's
corpse where cemetery owners moved it to another grave
without permission,"' and that damages for mental anguish
are recoverable from a burial association by reason of the
loss of the body of a stillborn baby entrusted to it for
burial. 1 12 In another case a hospital was held liable where
plaintiff was delivered of the calcified body of a child and
unsuccessfully demanded it for burial."13 There the court
made the broad assertion that unlawful invasion of the right
Pound, J., concurred in the result because the allegations of the complaint
were to the effect that the body was needlessly and wantonly cast into the sea,
in disregard of the feelings of the next-of-kin. However, he felt the holding
of the case too broad because ". . . it cannot be said that under ordinary circumstances the next of kin of a person who dies on shipboard have such a
legal right to the possession of the body that they may recover damages because the burial is at sea. A decent committal of the body to the deep in
accordance with the custom in such matters ordinarily discharges the duty
which the law imposes." Id. at 259, 115 N. E. at 718.
III Gostowski v. Roman Catholic Church, etc., 262 N. Y. 320, 323, 186 N. E.
798, 799, afirining 237 App. Div. 640, 262 N. Y. Supp. 104 (2d Dep't 1933).
Shortly after the funeral the parish priest who supervised the cemetery ordered
the body removed to a different grave. When plaintiff discovered the removal
he inquired of the priest who in abusive and harsh language indicated to plaintiff that, "You Polish people should be glad to bury any old way. Any place
is good enough for you. You have no cemetery of your own. If you don't
like the place which is good enough for her and you too, you can go somewhere else and buy a plot."
The husband recovered a jury verdict of $2,000 which was reduced by the
Appellate Division to $1,000. The son had also brought an action, but his
complaint was dismissed and the dismissal sustained on the theory that only
the surviving spouse, whose duty it was to bury the deceased, had the right
to sue. The damages awarded were punitive since the jury found that the
disinterment was done maliciously and wantonly.
112 Klumbach v. Silver Mount Cemetery Ass'n, 242 App. Div. 843, 275 N. Y.
Supp. 180 (2d Dep't 1934), aff'd ,nero., 268 N. Y. 525, 198 N. E. 386 (1935).
The Appellate Division reduced the judgment to $500, and the judgment as so
modified was affirmed.
113 Lubin v. Sydenham Hospital, 181 Misc. 870, 42 N. Y. S. 2d 654 (Sup.
Ct. 1943). The facts were that plaintiff was delivered by one of defendant's
doctors of the calcified body of a child-a so-called "stone baby"-and fifteen
days later, upon being discharged from the hospital, plaintiff demanded possession of the body for the purpose of burying, which request was refused. To
complicate the case still further, plaintiff died, and the question was whether
her death abated the action. The court held that the action survived, relying
on the DECEDENT EsT. LAW § 119, which in general provides that no cause of
action for injury to person or property shall be lost because of the death of
the person in whose favor the cause of action existed.
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of funeral, interment, or disposition of remains was com114
pensable even though the damages were purely mental.
Two recent cases reaffirm this exception to the general rule,
one involving an autopsy on the deceased inmate of a state
institution 11 and the other concerned with a similar autopsy
1 16
in a city hospital.
B.

The Contract Relationship Cases

A second exception to the strict rule of no recovery lies
in the contract relationship cases.

There seems to be a di-

rect connection logically between the allowance of recovery
here and in the burial right cases. In both there is an underlying right-in one the right to burial and in the other the
contract right; and the emotional disturbance, while really
the gravamen of the action, can be "tacked on" to something
external so that the court does not get the judicially embar114 "It is well settled that an unlawful invasion of the right of funeral, interment or other lawful disposition of the remains is a tort and is subject of an
action for damages." Lubin v. Sydenham Hospital, supra note 113 at 871,
42 N. Y. S. 2d at 656. See also 24 C. J. S. § 8, p. 1025 (1941): "It is now
well settled that an unlawful invasion or violation of the right to bury a corpse
and preserve the remains is a tort, and is the subject of an action for damages."
Other New York cases to the same effect are Stahl v. William Necker, Inc.,
184 App. Div. 85, 171 N. Y. Supp. 728 (1st Dep't 1918); Apostle v. Pappas,
154 Misc. 497, 277 N. Y. Supp. 400 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
I1' Gould v. State, 181 Misc. 882, 42 N. Y. S. 2d 357 (Ct. Cl. 1943). This
was an action in the Court of Claims. The facts showed that claimant's husband, while an inmate of Rockland State Hospital, met with injuries resulting
in his death, shortly following which an autopsy was performed. Upon burial

of the deceased, certain of the organs previously removed had not been replaced. Since the claimant was suing as executrix, the court found that the
claims for unlawful autopsy and return of certain organs of the decedent's
body could not be asserted by her, but the court did grant permission for her
to assert these claims individually and to add the decedent's children as parties
claimant.
116 Belier v. City of New York, 269 App. Div. 642, 58 N. Y. S. 2d 112 (1st
Dep't 1945). The Appellate Division reversed the trial court's direction of a
verdict for defendant, holding that whether there was an unnecessary mutilation of the decedent's remains and whether the act was unauthorized were both
questions for the jury. On the authority of Darcy v. Presbyterian Hospital,
202 N. Y. 259, 95 N. E. 695 (1911), the court reaffirmed per curiarn the rule
to be as follows: "In the absence of a testamentary disposition, the right to
the possession of the body of one who has died belongs to the surviving husband or wife or next of kin for the purpose of preservation and burial. Any
one infringing upon such right by mutilating the remains without the consent
of the person or persons entitled to the possession thereof may be required to
pay damages for the injury to the feelings and for mental suffering resulting
from such unlawful act, even though no pecuniary damage is alleged or proved."
Beller v. City of N. Y., supra'at 643, 58 N. Y. S. 2d at 113.
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rassing feeling that it is allowing recovery for psychic

stimulus alone.
Thus, recovery for abusive language and insulting con-

duct by employees of a carrier towards a passenger has been
allowed, 117 and ejecting a patron without cause may create
liability for mental anguish on the part of the proprietor of
a public resort even though there is no impact. 118 Similarly,
117 Gillespie v. Brooklyn Heights R. R., 178 N. Y. 347, 70 N. E. 857 (1904).
The case was one of particularly insolent activity by the defendant's conductor. It appeared that the plaintiff, a woman doctor, tendered the conductor
a quarter of a dollar which was more than the exact fare, and asked for a
transfer. After the conductor had attended to another passenger, the plaintiff
demanded her change, whereupon the conductor denied having received any
amount in excess of her fare. In an abusive and impudent manner, the conductor not only refused to return the change but grossly insulted the plaintiff
by calling her a "dead beat" and a "swindler." A fellow passenger informed
the conductor that plaintiff's story was true, but he continued his tirade.
The court through Martin, J. (the same jurist who laid down the general
rule of no recovery in the Mitchell case), held that plaintiff could recover.

The court cited favorably the rule in

BOOTH, STREET RAiLWAYS

§ 372 to the

effect that "The contract on the part of the company is to safely carry its
passengers and to compensate them for all unlawful and tortious injuries inflicted by its servants. It calls for safe carriage, for safe and respectful treatment from the carrier's servants, and for immunity from assaults by them,
or by other persons if it can be prevented by them. No matter what the motive
is which incites the servant of the carrier to commit an improper act towards
the passenger during the existence of the relation, the master is liable for the
act and its natural and legitimate consequences. Hence, it is responsible for
the insulting conduct of its servants, which stops short of actual violence."
Gillespie v. Brooklyn Heights R. R., supra at 353, 70 N. E. at 859.
the
As to the damages involved, the court was of the opinion that "...
elements of compensatory damages for such an injury are the humiliation and
injury to her feelings which the plaintiff suffered by reason of the insulting
and abusive language and treatment she received, not, however, including any
injury to her character resulting therefrom. She was entitled to recover only
such compensatory damages as she sustained by reason of the humiliation and
injury to her feelings, not including punitive or exemplary damages." Id. at
359, 70 N. E. at 861.
The majority American position is in accord with New York on this point.
See May v. Shreveport Traction Co., 127 La. 420, 53 So. 671 (1910) (recovery
allowed for attempt to put plaintiff in "Jim Crow" car); Lamson v. Great
Northern R. R., 114 Minn. 182, 130 N. W. 945 (1911) (recovery allowed for
insult to passenger); Humphrey v. Michigan Rys., 166 Mich. 645, 132 N. W.
447 (1911) (recovery allowed for abusive argument over fare). The Restatement takes the same view, RFSTATEmzNT, TORTS § 48 (1934), set out in note
31 supra.
The plaintiff pur1 8 Aaron v. Ward, 203 N. Y. 351, 96 N. E. 736 (1911).
chased her ticket and took her position in a line of the defendant's patrons
leading to a window at which the ticket entitled her to receive a key admitting
her to a bathhouse. When she approached the window a dispute arose between
her and the defendant's employees as to the right of another person not in the
line to have a key given to him in advance of the plaintiff. As a result of this
dispute plaintiff was ejected from the defendant's premises, the agents of the
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humiliation and shame suffered by a hotel patron because of
insults of employees is compensable because the contract relation of the parties entitled the guest as a legal right to
respectful and decent treatment. 119

The same rationale has

latter refusing to furnish her with the accommodations for which she had
contracted.
The plaintiff was awarded damages for $250, the court overruling the defendant's contention that her recovery could only be for the price of the ticket.
The court held ". . . there is a distinction between common carriers and innkeepers, who are obliged to serve all persons who seek accommodation from
them, and the keepers of public places of amusement or resort, such as the
bathhouse of the defendant, theaters and the like. That the distinction exists
is undeniable, and in the absence of legislation the keeper of such an establishment may discriminate and serve whom he pleases. Therefore, in such a
case a refusal would give no cause of action. So, also, it is the general rule
of law that a ticket for admission to a place of public amusement is but a
license and revocable. . . . But granting both propositions, that the defendant
might have refused the plaintiff a bath ticket and access to his premises, and
that even after selling her a ticket he might have revoked the license to use
the premises for the purpose of bathing, which the ticket imported, neither
proposition necessarily determines that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover
damages for the indignity inflicted upon her by the revocation." Aaron v.
Ward, supra at 355, 96 N. E. at 737. The court then went on to hold that
".... the defendant having voluntarily entered into a contract with her admitting her to the premises and agreeing to afford facilities for bathing, her status
became similar to that of a passenger of a common carrier or a guest of an
innkeeper, and in case of her improper expulsion she should be entitled to the
same measure of damages as obtains in actions against carriers or innkeepers
when brought for breach of their contracts." Id. at 357, 96 N. E. at 738.
Other states have tended to agree with the New York position and allowed
damages for insulting and abusive treatment by possessors of land who hold
such land open for public purposes. See Weber-Stair Co. v. Fisher, 119 S. W.
195 (Ky. 1909) (applying rule to theater) ; Boswell v. Barnum & Bailey, 135
Tenn. 35, 185 S. W. 692 (1916) (applying rule to circus); Davis v. Tacoma
Ry. & Power Co., 35 Wash. 203, 77 Pac. 209 (1904) (applying rule to amusement park).
Another New York case on the same question is Smith v. Leo, 92 Hun
242, 36 N. Y. Supp. 949 (Sup. Ct. 1895) (applying the rule to a dancing
school). The Restatement straddles the problem with a caveat, "The Institute expresses no opinion as to whether the rule stated in this Section [allowing
recovery for insulting conduct] is not also applicable to public utilities other
than common carriers and to the possessors of land who for their business
purposes hold it open as a place of public resort." RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 48
(1934).
119 De Wolf v. Ford, 193 N. Y. 397, 86 N. E. 527 (1908). It appeared that
plaintiff, in company with her daughter and her brother, called at the defendant's Grand Union Hotel in New York City and applied for rooms, explaining the family relationship. The plaintiff was assigned a room, and about one
o'clock in the morning one of the defendant's employees, in the course of his
regular employment, forced his way into plaintiff's room despite her protests.
She was then wearing only a night gown. In the presence of several persons
the defendant's servant charged plaintiff with being a disreputable person and
occupying the room for improper purposes. The plaintiff was ordered to leave
the hotel and threatened xith the publication of her name in the daily papers
as a disreputable person.
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been applied to allow recovery by negro guests against 120a
hotel-restaurant corporation which refused them service.
It is not every contract relationship that will entitle one
to recover. Where plaintiff's photograph of his deceased
mother was damaged by defendants who had been entrusted
with it for purposes of reproduction, plaintiff could not recover for physical and mental anguish caused by the mutilation. 12 ' The court (a trial court) went further than it
needed to decide the case, and made rather sweeping statements to the effect that an injury to feelings, independently
and alone, apart from corporeal or personal injury, is not in
any judicial sense a natural and proximate consequence of
the negligent act, and that mental suffering resulting from
breach of contract is not the subject of compensation in
While admitting that a hotelkeeper must necessarily have access to the
rooms of the guests for purposes of fulfilling his contract to furnish convenience and comfort, the court pointed out that such entries must be made
with due regard to the occasion and in such manner as is consistent with the
rights of the guest. "One of the things which a guest for hire at a public inn
has the right to insist upon is respectful and decent treatment at the hands of
the innkeeper and his servants. That is an essential part of the contract
whether it is express or implied." De Wolf v. Ford, supra at 404, 86 N. E.
at 530.
The court held the action would lie and that the damages would include
injury to feelings and personal humiliation. The judges seemed quite incensed
at the actions of defendant's servant, pointing out indignantly ". . . the servant
of the defendants forced his way into the plaintiff's room under conditions
which would have caused any woman, except the most shameless harlot, a
degree of humiliation and suffering that only a pure and modest woman can
properly describe." Id. at 405, 86 N. E. at 531.
The majority rule is in accord with the New York position. Emmke v.
De Silva, 293 Fed. 17 (C. C. A. 8th 1923); Dixon v. Hotel Tutwiler Operation Co., 214 Ala. 396, 108 So. 26 (1926). But cf. Jenkins v. Kentucky Hotel
Co., 261 Ky. 419, 87 S. W. 2d 951 (1935) ; Hurd v. Hotel Astor Co., 182 App.
See also RESTATEmENT,
Div. 49, 169 N. Y. Supp. 359 (2d Dep't 1918).
TORTS § 47, illustration 3 (1934), and note 30 supra, for criticism of Restatement's apparent requirement of a technical trespass. On the trespass rationale,
see Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts,
49 HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1051 (1936).
120 Odom v. East Avenue Corp., 178 Misc. 363, 34 N. Y. S. 2d 312 (Sup. Ct.
1942), aff'd ,nero., 264 App. Div. 985, 37 N. Y. S. 2d 491 (4th Dep't 1942).
Plaintiffs were guests in defendant's hotel. They went to the dining room of
the hotel and were denied service, in the presence of a number of other people,
on the ground that they were of the colored race. The court held that the
plaintiffs had a common law cause of action for breach of the defendant's
duty as an innkeeper and also an action to recover the statutory penalty under
the NEw YORK CIVIL RIGHTs LAW §§ 40, 41.
121 Furlan v. Rayan Photo Works, 171 Misc. 839, 12 N. Y. S. 2d 921 (Munic.
Ct. 1939). The recovery was limited to nominal damages in the sum of five
dollars.
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damages. 1 22 The true situation seems to be that it depends
on the facts of the particular situation-the "stomach reaction" of the court to the type of mental anguish caused

and the type of contract relationship existing. For example,
where the stimulus was shame and mental anguish resulting
from a charge of immorality and the wrong was a simultaneous trespass on the right to possession of a hotel room, it
was held that recovery could be had.12 3 This was one of the
not unfamiliar cases in which overzealous hotel authorities
erroneously charged guests who were husband and wife with
being unmarried and occupying a room for immoral purposes. 1 24 The case suggests that where there is the special
contract relationship a different duty is owed than there
would be to a stranger, and conduct which would not other25
wise confer a right of action may do so as to the guest.
The breach of the special duty provides a primary cause of
action to which the court will allow the tacking on of
"parasitic" damages for mental anguish or injury by
fright. 126
22

The court quoted approvingly from Curtin v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
13 App. Div. 253, 256, 42 N. Y. Supp. 1109, 1111 (1st Dep't 1897), to the
effect that "'An injury to the feelings, independently and alone, is something
too vague to enter into the domain of pecuniary damages-too elusive to be
left, in assessing compensation therefor, to the discretion of a jury. The extent and intensity of such injuries depend largely upon individual temperament
and physical, mental, and nervous conditions. These conditions are shadowy,
unequal, and uncertain in the extreme. When they exist, in connection with
physical injuries, they can be examined and tested. Existing alone and independently, they are easily simulated, and the simulation is hard to detect.
there is no certain means whereby such mental pain can be fairly and
- .
Furlan v. Photo Works, supra note 121 at 841,
accurately compensated.'"
12 N. Y. S. 2d at 924.
123 Boyce v. Greeley Square Hotel Co., 228 N. Y. 106, 126 N. E. 647 (1920).
See note 119 supra for similar cases.
124 The case was a particularly flagrant one. The defendant's servant forced
his way into the room occupied by plaintiff and her husband, and addressed
insulting and abusive language to plaintiff. The hotel authorities also caused
the arrest of the husband and his removal from the hotel. Plaintiff claimed
both for mental anguish and for physical disturbance consisting of weakness,
pains, loss of appetite, and difficulty in sleeping.
125 "The acts of the servant were violative of its (the defendant corporation's) obligation to refrain and to use reasonable care that its servant refrained from unreasonably interfering with the privacy of the plaintiff in the
room assigned to her and from abusing or insulting her or indulging in any
conduct or speech that might necessarily bring upon her physical discomfort
or distress of mind." Boyce v. Greeley Square Hotel Co., supra note 123 at
109, 126 N. E. at 648.
1261n this connection see RESTATEENT, TORTS §47(b)
(1934): "if the
actor has by his tortious conduct become liable for an invasion of any legally
1
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Examples of actions in which the courts have not reacted
favorably to the allowance of damages even though there was
a basic underlying contract are seen in many fields of endeavor. It has been held that there is no recovery for grief
and mental anguish caused by negligent delay in delivering
a message of death or illness, though defendant had reason
to know of the character of the message, 12 7 and, where defenprotected interest of another, emotional distress caused by the invasion or by
the tortious conduct which is the cause thereof is taken into account in assessing the damages recoverable by the other."
The main question in Boyce v. Greeley Square Hotel Co., supra note 123,
was that of damages. The plaintiff alleged both physical and mental injuries,
and the court held that recovery for both was possible. "The injury to her
feelings and her mental distress and anguish, at least, flowed directly and naturally from the wrongs committed by the defendant. The physical ills, which
were caused by the wrongs or were direct effects of the mental distress and
anguish, were likewise sources of damage for which the defendant must compensate the plaintiff. They were in a direct and uninterfered with line of
causation." Boyce v. Greeley Square Hotel Co., supra note 123 at 112, 126
N. E. at 650. Cf. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N. Y. 107, 110, 45 N. E. 354,
355 (1896), where the court said of physical injuries flowing from mental
stimuli, "It cannot be properly said that the plaintiff's miscarriage was the
proximate result of defendant's negligence. . . . The plaintiff's injuries do not
fall within the rule as to proximate damages."
127 Curtin v. Western Union Tel. Co., supra note 122. Plaintiff's brother in
St. Louis, Missouri, sent a telegram to plaintiff in New York announcing the
death of another brother. The telegram was delivered four days late.
Barrett, J., referring to the Mitchell case, supra note 126, found that "The
principle of this case is a fortiori applicable here. The plaintiff's recovery
rests solely upon the defendant's negligence in the performance of a duty which
it owed to her as the 'addressee' of the telegram .... The contract was made
in St. Louis, Missouri, with the plaintiff's brother. He was the sender of the
dispatch, and he there paid for the service. There certainly could be no recovery for mental distress occasioned by a breach of that contract." Curtin
v. Western Union Tel. Co., supra at 254, 42 N. Y. Supp. at 1110. It may be
argued that, strictly speaking, the Curtin case is not a contract relationship
case because plaintiff, as the mere addressee of the telegram, could hardly be
called in privity with the parties to the contract of transmission. However, it
is included under the discussion of the contract relationship exception because
of the obvious kinship to the true contract situation.
The majority rule in the telegraph cases takes the same position as the

Curtin decision. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Speight, 254 U. S. 17
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Chouteau, 28 Okla. 664, 115 Pac. 879
Francis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 58 Minn. 252, 59 N. W. 1078
Morton v. Western Union Tel. Co., 53 Ohio St. 431, 41 N. E. 689
A few states do permit recovery for mental anguish in such cases.

(1920);
(1911);
(1894);
(1895).
Mentzer

v. Western Union Tel. Co., 93 Iowa 752, 62 N. W. 1 (1895); Wadsworth v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 86 Tenn. 695, 8 S. W. 574 (1888); Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Redding, 100 Fla. 495, 129 So. 743 (1930).
Telegraph cases disallowing recovery have sometimes called on the authority of Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., supra note 126. Thus in Jones v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 233 Fed. 301 (1916), the Federal District Court of the Southern
District of California cited the Mitchell case approvingly and denied recovery
for obvious negligence by the telegraph company. There the message as sent
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dant undertakers contracted to bury the body of plaintiff's

husband in a particular cemetery and in the best vacant
burial lot to be had and with the best materials, but instead

used poor materials and a public grave, so that plaintiff had
to rebury at her own expense,
there could be no recovery for
28

injury to her feelings.1
Late holdings on the question seems to be tending toward
limitation of the right of recovery in contract relationship
cases. Thus, a parent's complaint against a hospital and
doctor for mental pain and suffering resulting from negligence in reporting that a male child was female did not state
a cause of action; 129 and in a tenant's cross-action for injuries against the landlord because of vermin in rented premises, it was held error to admit testimony as to expenditures
of the tenant for medical attention for treatment for an alleged nervous condition in view of the lack of physical contact." 0 Similarly, no recovery for mental anguish could be
read "Norman died this A. M., will be buried to-morrow," and, as delivered,
read "Father died this morning, will be buried tomorrow." Similar sanction
for the Mitchell case was Western Union Tel. Co. v. Sklar, 126 Fed. 295, 301
(C. C. A. 6th 1903), which cited the Mitchell holding and went on to decide
that "Damages for mental pain, grief, disappointment, etc., are recoverable at
the common law only when the inseparable accompaniment and result of some
bodily pain." In that case the death message was delayed in transmission so
that the remains of the decedent were interred without plaintiff's having an
opportunity to view the body.
128

Norton v. Kull, 74 Misc. 476, 132 N. Y. Supp. 387 (Sup. Ct. 1911).

The

appellate term was of the opinion that plaintiff's damage was limited to
"... such an amount as will repay for the money loss she has suffered because of the failure of the defendant to do as he agreed. In actions of this
nature injuries to the feelings are not to be considered." Norton v. Kull,
supra at 477, 132 N. Y. Supp. at 388.
Query whether this case is still good law in view of the recent substantial
development of the "burial right" theory? See Finley v. Atlantic Transport
Co., 220 N. Y. 249, 115 N. E. 715 (1917); Gostkowski v. Roman Catholic
Church, etc., 262 N. Y. 320, 186 N. E. 798 (1933), and cases, discussed in
notes 110-116 supra.
129 Kaufman v. Israel Zion Hosp., 183 Misc. 714, 715, 51 N. Y. S. 2d 412,
413 (1944).
Daly, J., was of the view that ". . . it is settled by a long line
of cases in this State that in the absence of accompanying physical or corporeal injury there can be no recovery for mental suffering or the consequences
of such disturbance resulting from a negligent or careless act, as distinguished
from one that is willful." [Citing inter alia Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N. Y.
107, 45 N. E. 354 (1896); Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N. Y. 231, 177 N. E.
431 (1931).] The complaint as drawn in the case was a "catch-all" pleading,
alleging "physical and mental pain and suffering" resulting from "carelessness,
negligence and breach of contract," but was nonetheless held insufficient.
130 Coronal Realty Corp. v. Smith, 187 Misc. 401, 402, 63 N. Y. S. 2d 684,
685 (Sup. Ct 1946). The opinion of the appellate term was per curiam,
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had by a plaintiff who discovered upon arrival at a hotel that
his previously reserved room had been assigned to another
guest. 131
C.

The Immediate Physica Injury Cases

Another exception engrafted on the rule of non-liability
is exemplified by the case where recovery was allowed to a
plaintiff who suffered immediate personal injury by leaping
from defendant's horse car in order to avoid the anticipated
danger of being struck by an express train.13 2 In this line
of cases there exists a psychic stimulus producing a startle
reaction on an automatic level resulting directly and immediately in a physical injury from without. Another early case
involving the injury through fright of a child who was steal-

holding, "It was error to permit testimony as to expenditure for medical attention. No physical contact or physical injury was sustained. There could,
therefore, be no recovery for the alleged nervous condition."
131 Kellogg v. Commodore Hotel, 187 Misc. 319, 64 N. Y. S. 2d 131 (Sup.
Ct. 1946). As a result of correspondence plaintiff contracted with defendant
for defendant to furnish lodging for three days. Plaintiff alleged $5,000 damage by reason of the cancellation of his reservation and further alleged that
he was upset in both mind and body by waiting around the hotel lobby for
more than an hour, trying to straighten things out and to obtain lodgings
elsewhere.
The court struck out the allegations concerning injuries to plaintiff's nerves,
and, in an excellent illustration of the important effect of extrinsic national
policy factors, remarked: "We are compelled to interpret the law relative to
innkeeper and guest, as it has been handed down over a period of four hundred
years, reasonably, as applied to the very unusual conditions existing during
and since the late war. . . . Would it not be contrary to both good conscience
and public policy to recognize a cause of action for injury to nerves and depression to all persons who found, because of emergency or other unusual
conditions, the hotel proprietor could not deliver a room previously assigned?"
Kellogg v. Commodore Hotel, supra at 327, 328, 64 N. Y. S. 2d at 138.
132 Twomley v. C. P. N. & E. R. R. R., 69 N. Y. 158 (1877).
Plaintiff was
a passenger in defendant's horse car which was negligently driven almost in
front of an express train. In fact the horse car succeeded in getting across
the tracks in time, but plaintiff, leaping from it to avoid the danger, was injured. Despite the fact that plaintiff's injury was the result of the physical
consequences of a psychic stimulus, recovery was allowed. The court felt that
" . . the plaintiff was placed by the reckless or careless act of . . . the defendant, in such a position as compelled her to choose upon the instant, and in
the face of an apparently great and impending peril, between two hazards, a
dangerous leap from the moving car, or to remain in the car at certain peril."
Twomley v. C. P. N. & E. R. R. R., supra at 160. The court went on to
conclude that plaintiff's action was reasonable and that her injuries were the
result of defendant's negligent conduct.
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ing a ride on a street car also resulted in a plaintiff's
verdict. 133

In many immediate physical injury cases the court had
occasion to distinguish away the Mitchell case.'3 4 For instance, where plaintiff was injured in the rush of persons
fleeing from a building in which defendant had negligently
caused a panic, the court permitted recovery' 35 and said of
the Mitchell decision: "I think the court in that case
meant to discourage actions for damages for fright alone,
and to apply it too closely in a case like this would work
injustice." 13
Another excellent illustration of the immediate physical
injury exception occurred in an appellate division case just
prior to the first World War.137 There a mother saw her
small children going up in an apartment house elevator without an operator, and the fright caused her to faint, so that
she fell through an open door of the shaft and was injured. 138
In allowing recovery the court rejected a dictum of a famous
English case 139 to the effect that fear must be of immediate
13 Ansteth v. B. R. R., 145 N. Y. 210, 39 N. E. 708 (1895).
Plaintiff, a
boy of ten, was stealing a ride on the front platform of defendant's street
railroad car. The conductor reached out towards plaintiff with his hand and
cried "hey," whereupon plaintiff let go his grip and fell, the car crushing one
of his legs. The court said that plaintiff was a trespasser, but still defendant's
servant had no right to frighten him off while the car was in motion.
134 See notes 135, 149, 152, 154 infra.
'35Schachter v. Interborough R. T. Co., 70 Misc. 558, 127 N. Y. Supp. 308
(Sup. Ct. 1911), rev'd on other grounds, 146 App. Div. 139, 130 N. Y. Supp.
549 (1st Dep't 1911). A loud explosion, caused by the negligence of defendant railroad, accompanied the passage of a train on an elevated road near the
windows of a building where girls were working. The explosion shook the
building and was attended by flame and smoke. Frightened, the girls rushed
panic-stricken for the stairway, trampling upon and injuring plaintiff. In distinguishing the Mitchell case, and allowing recovery, the court remarked: "I
do not think the case of Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N. Y. 107, is controlling in this case. There the plaintiff while waiting for a car vas suddenly
confronted with a dangerous situation and fainted, the fall and shock causing
a miscarriage. There was no physical contact nor any combination of circumstances which inflicted violent bodily injuries. That case was decided upon
public policy and because it was the result of an accidental and unusual combination of circumstances." Schachter v. Interborough R. T. Co., supra at
560, 561, 127 N. Y. Supp. at 310.
136 Ibid.
137 Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co., 162 App. Div. 791, 148 N. Y. Supp. 39 (1st
Dep't 1914).
138 It appeared that the elevator operator was responsible for leaving open
the door which gave entrance to the shaft.
"19Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K. B. 669.
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personal injury to oneself 140 and went on to rationalize in
this way: since defendant had created a frightening stimulus,
and plaintiff had reacted spontaneously and virtually automatically in a not unforeseeable manner, fainting or in some
other way receiving injury "from without," it was just for
plaintiff to recover for the physical injuries plus the shock
141

and fright.

In a case four years later, 142 a similar holding was made
where it appeared that defendant's railway car arose above
the tracks and came down with a severe jolt, shocking plaintiff's nervous system and causing hemorrhage and incomplete
abortion. 1 43

The appellate term did not choose to rest its

holding upon the physical contact which could have readily
been spelled out, but chose to hold that if the physical injuries complained of were the immediate result of a nervous
shock produced by the operation of defendant's railroad then
that alone would constitute a prima facie case for plaintiff.'4 4
The court cited with approval the elevator case discussed

140 The English courts have now gone far beyond the restrictive view that
to allow recovery fear must be of immediate personal injury to oneself. See,
e.g., Owens v. Liverpool Corp., [1939] 1 K. B. 394, holding that fear for the
safety of a coffin containing a deceased relative will allow recovery where
mental distress results.
141 Briefly summarized, the holding was to this effect:
"For fright alone,
unconnected with physical injury it is true that no recovery can be had, but
when the fright results in an actual physical injury a different rule prevails."
[Citing Jones v. Brooklyn Heights R. R., 23 App. Div. 141, 48 N. Y. Supp.
914 (2d Dep't 1897), and Wood v. N. Y. Central & H. R. R. R., 83 App. Div.
604, 82 N. Y. Supp. 160 (4th Dep't 1903), aff'd iner., 179 N. Y. 557, 71 N. E.
1142 (1904).]
McLaughlin, J., dissented in a 4 to 1 holding on the authority of the
Mitchell case, supra note 126. "Defendant owed plaintiff no duty to protect
her from fright or from fainting by reason of it. The defendant was not
bound to anticipate that the plaintiff, upon seeing her children going up in the
car without an operator, would faint, and by reason thereof fall and sustain
the injuries which she did." Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co., supra note 137 at
794, 148 N. Y. Supp. at 41.
142 Pareti v. New York Rys., 172 N. Y. Supp. 388 (Sup. Ct. 1918).
143 As to the improbability of spontaneous abortion being in fact induced by
trauma or psychic disturbance, see Hertig and Sheldon, Minimum Criteria
Required to Prove Prima Facie Case of Traumatic Abortion or Miscarriage,
117 ANN. SURG. 596 (1943), discussd in note 258 infra.
144 "If
it appeared, when plaintiff rested, that the physical injuries complained of were the result of a shock produced by the negligent operation of
defendant's railroad, a prima facie case would have been made out." Pareti
v. New York Rys., 172 N. Y. Supp. 388, 389 (1918).
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and did not at any time seek a concurrent physical

14 6
injury in the form of contact or impact.

1 47
It
Shortly thereafter a case of the same type arose.
appeared that the female plaintiff was standing with one
hand resting on the wall of an elevator shaft in defendant's
apartment house waiting for the elevator when a one hundred fifty pound door fell from the fifth floor to the bottom
of the shaft. The fall of the door, the noise and vibration

caused the plaintiff to lose her balance and fall, resulting in
a miscarriage. Again the court did not choose to distinguish the Mitchell case on the ground that here there was
physical disturbance of plaintiff'ssupport,148 but instead preferred the distinction that there was immediate personal injury. 49 The court pointed out that the plaintiff sought re
covery not for fright or physical ailments resulting from
fright, but for physical injuries to her person which were the
natural and immediate result of defendant's negligence. The
court stressed the difference between physical ailments due
146 Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co., 162 App. Div. 791, 148 N. Y. Supp. 39
(1st Dep't 1914).
148 The type of testimony in the case is worth noting as typical of the evidence in these actions. Plaintiff testified that after she boarded the car she
stood outside on the platform, "because I could not stay in the car, I had a
stomach"; that when the car turned into a particular street, "It switched like
an automobile, and the car jumped up, and I held myself on the railing; and
I went on the other side, just a little bit, and the car jumped up, and the
whole frame of the window fell right in back of me; and then I went inside
of the car-I went and sat down. The conductor asked me if I got hurted.
I said, 'No, I got shocked.'" From the character of the testimony, it seems
reasonably certain that the court could have with little difficulty constructed an
"impact." However, it did not see fit to do so, preferring rather to declare
under the immediate physical injury exception of the Cohn case, supra note
145.
147
M undy v. Levy Brothers Realty Co., 184 App. Div. 467, 170 N. Y. Supp.
994 (2d Dep't 1918).
148 It was, however, pointed out that there was "...
testimony by plaintiff
that her fall was the result of the physical disturbance of her support, caused
by the fall of the door. . . " Id. at 469, 170 N. Y. Supp. at 994. The court
neither stressed nor relied on this possible impact, but instead commented that
"No case is presented for a charge to the jury that if fright caused the plaintiff
to fall she cannot recover." Id. at 470, 170 N. Y. Supp. at 995.
149 Blackmar, J.:
"In the Mitchell case, where the doctrine is enunciated
and laid down, it is limited to cases 'where there is no immediate personal
injury.' Obviously the fall of the elevator door caused the injury; and the
Cohn (supra note 141) and Wood (supra note 141) cases . . . are authority
that the chain of cause and effect is not broken because one link is the present
effect upon the mind and nerves of the plaintiff without trespass on her
person." Ibid.
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to fright and actual physical injuries and especially the immediacy of the harm. 15 0
A decade later another case 151 held exactly the same way
where plaintiff, frightened by defendant's runaway horse and
1 52
seeking to avoid injury, turned sharply and broke his leg.
Finally, in 1931, a case of the immediate injury type reached
the Court of Appeals. 15 3 It appeared that plaintiff was
slightly shaken by defendant's car bumping against her husband's parked auto. The jar was trivial, but the plaintiff got
out of the car in a very excited condition to see if any damage had been done. While writing down defendant's license
number the plaintiff fainted and fell, fracturing her skull
and dying in a matter of a few minutes. The court allowed
recovery, indicating that the only reason for ever denying
recovery in such psychic stimuli cases is the fear of fabrication of evidence, 1 54 and that such fear is never present when
150 "The claim of the plaintiff is not to recover damages for fright or physical ailments due to fright, but for the physical injuries to her person which
were the natural immediate result of defendant's negligence." Id. at 470, 170
N. Y. Supp. at 996.
151 Maloney v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 229 App. Div. 317, 241 N. Y. Supp.
160 (1st Dep't 1930).
152 The court distinguished the Mitchell case:
"But the distinction is apparent. Plaintiff's condition there was induced solely by fright without any
immediate personal injury. Here plaintiff does not claim damages for a condition directly caused by any consequent upon fright, but for the fracture of
his leg which was not the result of mere fright but may have been du6 either
to contact with the horse or to his effort to avoid being struck by it.
"Under such circumstances though he were actually frightened, and that
state of mind impelled him to attempt to escape the impending danger, he may
recover damages." Id. at 318, 241 N. Y. Supp. at 161. Cf. Ansteth v. B. R.
Co., 145 N. Y. 210, 39 N. E. 708 (1895).
153 Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N. Y. 231, 177 N. E. 431 (1931).
It is possible
also to view this case as within the "slight impact" exception, since there was
a very trivial impact involved. It is believed, however, that a more functional
classification is to put it in the "immediate injury" grouping, since the court
seems to regard the immediacy of the harm, and the consequent safeguard
against fabrication, as the most important factor.
154 Lehman, J.:
"In the case of Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co. and Spade
v. Lynn & Boston R. R. Co. [infra] the courts decided that for practical reasons there is ordinarily no duty to exercise care to avoid causing mental disturbance, and no legal right to mental security. . . . The conclusion is fortified by the practical consideration that where there has been no physical
contact there is danger that fictitious claims may be fabricated. Therefore,
where no wrong was claimed other than a mental disturbance, the courts refused to sanction a recovery for the consequences of that disturbance."
Comstock v. Wilson, supra note 153 at 238, 239, 177 N. E. at 433.
Mr. Justice Holmes in Spade v. Lynn & Boston R. R., 168 Mass. 285,
288, 47 N. E. 88 (1897), based his decision denying recovery on the same
puhlic policy consideration of preventing fabricated claims, saying of the no-
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the injury occurs on the spur of the moment right after the
accident. The court does mention the matter of the impact,
saying "The collision itself, the consequent jar to the passengers in the car, was a battery and an invasion of their legal
right. Their cause of action is complete when they suffered
consequent damages," 155 but it is clear that the holding rests
on the court's belief that the only social policy which can
prevent recovery in such cases, fear of fabrication of damages, is not applicable because of the immediacy of the
I 6
harm. G
A very similar case had been, surprisingly enough, decided exactly the opposite way just four years prior in the
appellate division. 57 In that case plaintiff was a passenger
in an auto with which defendant's truck negligently collided,
causing a slight impact. It appeared according to plaintiff's
evidence that the chassis received a "good bump" and that
plaintiff "thought we were going to be crushed and I was
badly frightened." 158 The damage was a miscarriage allegedly caused by the fright. The court said that a physical
impact was required to sustain the action and refused to acliability rule, "As has been explained repeatedly, it is an arbitrary exception,
based upon a notion of what is practicable, that prevents recovery for visible
illness resulting from nervous shock alone."
155 Comstock v. Wilson, mpra iiote 153 at 239, 177 N. E. at 434.
156 It would seem that the Comstock case commits the New York courts to
the view that the only argument of validity in the Mitchell case is the public
policy one-the fear of fabrication of claims. Typical of the appraisal of the
Comstock case in these terms is Bohlen & Polikoff, Liability in New York
for the Physical Consequences of Emotional Disturbance, 32 COL. L. REv. 409,
417 (1932) : "It may be said with some confidence that Comstock v. Wilson

does recognize that the only reason for denying recovery is fear of fabricated
claims. Therefore, it may be predicated that recovery will be allowed in situations where the defendant's act is negligent as threatening physical harm to
the plaintiff and the plaintiff sustains physical harm through the immediate
effect upon him of fright caused by the peril to which he is exposed, if such
effects are external and apparent and, therefore, susceptible of proof by those

present at the time-not gradual, internal and susceptible of proof only by expert testimony.

Furthermore, it may be safely said that the opinion of Judge

Lehman, concurred in by all the other judges of the court, leaves little doubt
that no distinction will be made between physical effects of shock resulting
from the actionable injury, and like effects of shock concurrent with actionable
injury and produced by the wrong which causes the actionable injury."
157 O'Brien v. Moss, 220 App. Div. 464, 221 N. Y. Supp. 621 (4th Dep't
1927).
is Id. at 465, 221 N. Y. Supp. at 622.
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cept the trivial impact as enough to warrant a recovery for
plaintiff's damages. 159
The immediate injury exception also applies to injuries
to animals, though not, of course, on the same rationale since

even the most conservative New York court would hardly
find it necessary to protect against the falsification of claims

by animals.

60

The important consideration in the animal

cases is to have some way of telling that the injury actually

was caused by fright. Thus, where a horse burst a blood vessel immediately- after being frightened due to defendant's

negligence, it was held that this consideration was satisfied
and recovery was allowed.1

61

A later case, however, denied

recovery for injuries to the psychic equipment of a horse by
fright induced through sight of defendant's formidable
62
Stanley Steamer.1
159 The opinion was per curiam. "Fright alone, neither preceded, accompanied nor followed by any sort of actual physical molestation, will not support
an action for damages resulting from negligence." (Citing the Mitchell case.)
O'Brien v. Moss, supra note 157 at 465, 221 N. Y. Supp. at 623.
160A federal court, however, did apply the Mitchell rule, without distinction
or discussion to an animal case. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. Gelvin, 238 Fed.
14, 25 (C. C. A. 8th 1916). There because of defendant's negligence fire
escaped from one of its locomotives. The fire ignited brush and weeds on the

defendant's right of way and spread to plaintiff's pasture. The fire did not
reach plaintiff's cattle but frightened them into stampeding and causing consequent physical injury. The court held there could be no recovery for injuries
by the cattle as a result of their fright, remarking after citing inter alia the
Mitchell case, that "The foregoing cases apply the rule to persons, but we can
see no good reason for failure to apply the same rule to animals."
161 Moskier v. The Utica & Sch. R. R., 8 Barb. 427, 434 (N. Y. 1850).
"Whether the death be occasioned by external violence to the animal, or by
an internal rupture, can make no difference in principle, if the fear which is
the proximate cause of the injury was excited by an unlawful act of the
defendants, or by an act in itself innocent, but performed in an unlawful
place, without the precaution which prudence requires."
162 Nason v. West, 31 Misc. 583, 65 N. Y. Supp. 651 (Sup. Ct. 1900), rev'd
sub. nom. on other grounds, Mason v. West, 61 App. Div. 40, 70 N. Y. Supp.
478 (4th Dep't 1901). Defendant's steam motor carriage frightened plaintiff's
horse which ran away, and the experience allegedly induced in the horse an
increased propensity to become frightened. The court cited the Mitchell case,
and found that since the vehicle was similar in construction to ordinary carriages, no recovery could be had for damages to the psyche of the horse. In
a masterpiece of understatement the court sagely noted that ". . . it would
require a very nice insight to determine, without speculation or mere guesswork, what effect this scare had upon its (the horse's) permanent psychic
equipment." Id. at 585, 65 N. Y. Supp. at 651.
Upon reading the description of defendant's automobile one is inclined to
feel that the plaintiff's horse acted as a reasonably prudent horse in becoming
frightened. "It runs on four wheels, with pneumatic tires; has a canopy top
and is about the size of a one-horse delivery wagon. The motive power is
steam, generated by a gasoline burner. A smokestack, connecting with the
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In summary it may be stated that if, as seems to be the
case, the only meritorious argument against recovery for the

effects of fright or shock is that to permit the action would
facilitate prosecution of fabricated claims, then the immediate injury exception is a proper one. Since the injury is immediate and therefore presumably unfeigned, there can be
little fear of fabrication.16 3

D.

The Slight Impact Cases

Closely allied to the immediate injury exception are the
slight impact cases. The latter represent a path the New

York courts have found to allow recovery for stimuli which,
factually speaking, are purely psychic, but which are surrounded by a concomitant battery of some slight nature.

This gives the court the opportunity to do equity but at the
same time to "save face" by giving lip service to the impact

rule.
Just as the immediate injury exception, the slight impact exception is grounded in the phrase in the Mitchell case
to the effect that "...
no recovery can be had for injuries
sustained by fright occasioned by the negligence of another,
where there is no immediate personal injury." 164 By turn-

ing that phrase around, it is easy enough to reason that recovery can be had where there is an immediate injury, which
combustion chamber, extends to the top of the canopy in the rear. There are
sinuations in the stacks through which the escaping vapor and the exhaust
steam pass, and the design is that the exhaust steam shall be condensed inside
the stack." Id. at 585, 65 N. Y. Supp. at 65. Cf. the amusing case of Scribner
v. Kelly, 38 Barb. 14 (N. Y. 1862), where recovery was denied for an injury
caused by the fright of the plaintiff's horse at the sight of an elephant of the
defendant's on a highway. The court concluded that "The injury which resuited from his (the horse's) fright is more fairly attributable to a lack of
ordinary courage and discipline in himself, than to the fact that the object
which he saw was an elephant."
In both the Mason and Scribner cases the courts evidently felt that the
situations were simply damnum absque injuria.
163 Bohlen & Polikoff in Liability in New York for the Physical Consequences of Emotional Disturbance, 32 CoL L. REv. 409, 416 (1932), express
the opinion that "It is practically impossible to fabricate on the spur of the
moment a fainting spell merely to create a future right of action for injuries
not yet received. (Referring to the immediate injuries from fainting in the
Cohn and Comstock cases.) The result of the fainting was an immediate and
clearly perceptible injury. The whole incident denies the possibility of
fabrication."
164 Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N. Y. 107, 110, 45 N. E. 354 (1896).
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can mean either an injury from "without" as in the true immediate injury exception or an injury from the defendant
himself as in the slight impact exception.
By a process of evolution the relationship which the
slight impact must bear to the fright or its consequences has
come to be this: it need not be a cause at all, so long as its
presence is shown. If it be shown that some slight battery
or contact was coincident in point of time with the fright,
recovery will be allowed for the injuries resulting from the
fright without inquiry as to whether these injuries were
caused by the concurrence of fright and injury or by fright
alone. 1 65 A Missouri court has well characterized this
exception:
• . .the courts which deny relief for injuries following fright, are

so impressed with the injustice of the rule that they seize on any
pretext to allow a recovery even the most frivolous legal wrong and
however slight the immediate harm may be.'"It is not necessary that the injury be upon the surface of
the body; a small internal injury will suffice. 16 7
But, though the courts have often given recovery in
slight impact cases, 18 they have not always in the past gone
165 Thus the statement of Judge Lehman in Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N. Y.
231, 238, 177 N. E. 431, 433 (1931), "The courts in such case attempt no'differentiation between the direct physical injury caused by the impact and the
damage caused by the fright, even where the fright preceded the impact....
[quoting Mr. Justice Holmes in Homans v. Boston Elev. R. 1R, 180 Mass.
456, 62 N. E. 737 (1902)] 'But when there has been a battery and the nervous
shock results from the same wrongful management as the battery, it is at least
equally impracticable to go further and to inquire whether the shock comes
through the battery or along with it.' "
166 Hickey v. Welch, 91 Mo. App. 4, 12 (1901). This remark coming from
a Missouri court is somewhat startling inasmuch as Missouri, like New York,
follows the minority rule and denies liability in the psychic injury cases. See
note 40 supra.
167 No New York cases have considered this precise question, but there seems
no reason to suppose that New York would not follow the Massachusetts cases
which have held internal injury sufficient. See Steverman v. Boston Elev.
R. 6R.,
205 Mass. 508, 91 N. E. 919 (1910).
1 8 See Jones v. Brooklyn Heights R. R., 23 App. Div. 141, 48 N. Y. Supp.
914 (2d Dep't 1897). Plaintiff, five months pregnant, was struck on the temple
by a small incandescent light bulb which fell from a lamp attached to the roof
of one of defendant's cars in which plaintiff was riding. There was conflict
in testimony as to whether the bulb also struck her abdomen. Plaintiff was
immediately taken ill, confined for the most part to bed, and miscarried three
weeks later. The court distinguished the Mitchell case: "In that case there
was no physical injury and no physical contact with the person of the plaintiff;
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such injury as was sustained arose solely from fright. The court held that
mere fright, disassociated from physical injury, would not create a cause of
action. The court so charged in the present case. An injury, however, sufficiently severe to produce shock, or which, in fact, produces a shock, presents
an entirely different question. Shock is not fright; the latter may be a producing cause of the former, and where it is the sole producing cause there can
be no recovery; but when it is associated with actual injury it may be considered, and where the injury and the fright concur and result in producing
shock, out of which arises damage, it is sufficient upon which to base a recovery." Jones v. Brooklyn Heights R. R., sztpra at 143, 48 N. Y. Supp. at
915. Medical testimony in the case was that the miscarriage was caused by
shock produced by the injury, and the court felt that the jury could have found
for the plaintiff on the theory that the bulb at least struck plaintiff's temple,
producing the shock and consequent miscarriage.
Wood v. N. Y. Central & H. R. R. R., 83 App. Div. 604, 82 N. Y. Supp.
160 (4th Dep't 1903), aff'd ner., 179 N. Y. 557, 71 N. E. 1142 (1904), reached
a similar conclusion. There plaintiff was driving in a buggy across defendant's
railroad tracks at a crossing where the view was obstructed. An engine appearing suddenly, plaintiff jerked his horse back, but the horse started across
the tracks, throwing plaintiff against the seat of the buggy. Immediately after
the horse stopped the plaintiff spat blood freely, his condition grew steadily
worse, and at the -time of the trial he was suffering from tuberculosis. Physicians agreed that plaintiff's condition was not the result of fright but of the
physical strain. Again the court had occasion to distinguish the Mitchell case,
saying: "That case is not akin to the present one. . . . The shock due to the
severe physical exertion with the attendant rapid jolting ride over the defendant's tracks and the sudden impact with the buggy seat, is wholly disconnected from fright, and affords adequate cause for the injuries." Wood v.
N. Y. Central & H. R. R. R., supra at 607, 82 N. Y. Supp. at 162. The court
did not decide the specific question of proximate causation between the injury
and the disease, but simply assumed that the jury on the new trial could reasonably find such connection.
Along similar lines was Buckbee v. Third Avenue R. R., 64 App. Div.
360, 72 N. Y. Supp. 217 (2d Dep't 1901). Plaintiff was a passenger on defendant's street car. She became alarmed at the sight of flames shooting from
the controller box and left the car. In stepping on or over the metal door sill
at the rear of the car she received an electric shock. Plaintiff testified that
immediate severe pain resulted from the shock, and a physician who examined
her two hours later stated that an electric shock received under such circumstances was adequate to cause the injuries which resulted. Distressing
symptoms appeared immediately after the occurrence. The Mitchell case was
distinguished on the ground that ". . . the shock occasioned by contact with
an electric current must be regarded as a direct physical and personal assault
for which a negligent defendant may be held liable." Buckbee v. Third Avenue
R. R., supra at 364, 72 N. Y. Supp. at 220.
To the same effect was Powell v. Hudson Valley R. R., 88 App. Div. 133,
84 N. Y. Supp. 337 (3d Dep't 1903), wherein plaintiff was injured by fire
communicated to her feet and dress while riding on defendant's street car.
The fire was caused by friction resulting from a contact between a wheel of
the car and an iron plate over the same, drawn together by the overcrowded
condition of the car. Shortly thereafter plaintiff suffered from nervous prostration. The burns were very slight; but the court held that, "While, from
the cross-examination of Dr. Sanford, some expressions, read by themselves,
might seem to indicate that the burns themselves had no connection with the
present nervous condition of the plaintiff, the inference is irresistible from the
evidence taken as a whole that the nervous condition of the plaintiff was in
part due to the shock caused by the burns themselves." Powell v. Hudson
Valley R. R., supra at 137, 84 N. Y. Supp. at 340. The court distinguished the
Mitchell case, saying in reference to it that "Our courts have never held, how-

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 24

"all-out" on that limb and have sometimes refused to allow
recovery even where impact can be found. 1 6 9 Thus, a woman
ever, that where there is a physical injury for which a party is legally responsible, that that party is not responsible for any damages which follow from
the shock or fright incident thereto." Id. at 137, 84 N. Y. Supp. at 340.
See also Lofink v. Interborough, etc., 102 App. Div. 275, 92 N. Y. Supp.
386 (2d Dep't 1905). There plaintiff, a child of four years, in consequence
of a collision between two railroad trains operated by defendant, was thrown
from her seat forward against the glass at the side of the car and then to the
floor between the seats. She was picked up, crying and screaming, by a fellow
passenger. The court felt that the rule of the Mitchell case was not applicable
because "The medical evidence, and the testimony in reference to the child's
exclamations indicative of bodily pain, fully justify the inference that an abnormal nervous condition, partly manifested by 'night terrors,' was produced
in the plaintiff by the physical shock which she suffered in consequence of the
collision, and the right to recover for such injuries inflicted by the negligence
of the defendant cannot seriously be questioned. Fright may properly be considered as an element of damage when it is associated with actual bodily
injury." Lofink v. Interborough, etc., supra at 276, 92 N. Y. Supp. at 386.
169 Newton v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 106 App. Div. 415, 94 N. Y.
Supp. 825 (1st Dep't 1905), is a good example of denial of recovery even
where there was a slight impact. It appeared that a train operated by the
defendant railroad company collided with a train of another railroad company,
upon which latter train plaintiff was a passenger. At the time of the collision
plaintiff was sitting in the smoking car playing cards with three companions
upon a board which plaintiff held in his lap. Plaintiff testified: "it was quite
a heavy crash, a very heavy crash. It just threw me over in the seat. I did
not think much of it at the time. The board was in our laps and it did not
upset or anything in that way, but just a heavy crash and threw me forward.
.. . I felt no pain or anything that day. I did nothing that day at all. I was
kind of nervous and stayed around the office for a while and then went out
and went home. . . . I began to feel shaky that day right after I got to the
office, and my comrades in the office advised me to go home. I was glad to
get home. When I got there I felt nervous and shaky. . . . I kept getting
worse and worse." Newton v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., supra at 418,
94 N. Y. Supp. at 826. Plaintiff called two physicians, one of whom had exanined him about four months after the accident, and the other of whom had
examined him just before the trial. These physicians testified that plaintiff
was suffering from dilatation of the heart and from a valvular disease thereof.
They further expressed the opinion that the condition could have been produced by a nervous shock but they did not testify that such nervous shock did
in fact result from the crash or that it resulted from any physical injury which
was the result of the collision.
The court, citing the Mitchell case, found that "...
in the absence of evidence to show that there was caused by the accident a physical injury to the
plaintiff's testator [the original plaintiff died pending the appeal], there was
no cause of action." Newton v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., supra at 420,
94 N. Y. Supp. at 827. The court held that the evidence did not sustain a
finding that any physical injury had been done to the plaintiff, and it regarded
the evidence of the physicians to the effect that plaintiff's condition could have
been produced by a nervous shock experienced by him in consequence of what
happened at the time of the collision as purely speculative. A dissent by
Laughlin, J., argued: "The case of Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. (151 N. Y.
107), upon which the appellant relies, should, I think, be confined strictly to
cases of injuries from fright without any direct physical injury or shock caused
by the negligence of the parties sued," and pointed out that here the plaintiff
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was denied damages where it appeared that defendant had
taken her by the arm as she was about to board a street car
and urged her to have sexual intercourse with him.170 It
is difficult to see why the court did not employ the offensive
touching as a springboard from which to jump over to the
allowance of recovery. 17 The decision was apparently put
on the basis that the male does not reasonably expect from
experience that non-violent proposals of sexual intercourse
2
will produce nervous shock to the average femaleY
Several earlier lower court decisions have taken a very
strict notion as to the causal relation required between the
slight impact and the shock or fright, though this strictness
has been since repudiated.' 7 3 Jones v. Brooklyn Heights
"... received as a direct consequence of the negligent collision which caused
'a very heavy crash' a physical jar which threw him over in the seat and at
the same time he sustained a nervous shock as the direct result of the physical
jar. . . ." Id. at 428, 94 N. Y. Supp. at 833.
This case seems clearly aberrational and under the more modern holdings
such as Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N. Y. 231, 177 N. E. 431 (1931), plaintiff
would almost certainly recover in a fact situation of this sort.
170 Prince v. Ridge, 32 Misc. 666, 66 N. Y. Supp. 454 (Sup. Ct. 1900).
171 In affirming dismissal of the complaint, the court indicated that "Mere
words cannot amount to an assault .... This [the complaint as drawn] seems
to fairly exclude any idea of physical injury or damages for a battery...
This so-called complaint bears no resemblance to a complaint for a wrongful
battery." Id. at 667, 668, 66 N. Y. Supp. at 455. Query whether the court is
intimating that had the complaint been more artfully drawn in the form of a
complaint for a battery, it would have been sufficient?
172 In accord with the New York view that no action will lie for inviting
a woman to illicit intercourse is Davis v. Richardson, 76 Ark. 348, 89 S. W.
318 (1905).
A case in the same pattern is Shepard v. Lamphier, 84 Misc. 498, 146 N. Y.
Supp. 745 (1914), wherein defendant by letter invited plaintiff, a married
woman, to meet for immoral purposes. The letter was not libelous since the
words amounted only to a proposal and since plaintiff herself had caused their
publication, and the court went on to hold that no action of any kind could
lie. "It is well established in this state that an action to recover for the utterance of defamatory words, not actionable in themselves, cannot be sustained by
proof of mental distress and physical pain suffered by the complainant as a
result thereof." Shepard v. Lamphier, supra at 504, 505, 146 N. Y. Supp. at

749. Accord: Garrison v. Sun Publishing Co., 207 N. Y. 1, 100 N. E. 430

(1912).
373 See, e.g., Newton v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 106 App. Div. 415,
94 (N. Y. Supp. 825 (1st Dep't 1905). A federal case involving much the same
problem was Lehigh & H. R. Ry. v. Marchant, 84 Fed. 870 (C. C. A. 2d 1898).
There a passenger was thrown from his berth in a sleeping car by a collision
between trains, sustaining a slight physical injury. Afterwards serious nervous
injuries developed which plaintiff claimed practically ruined his active life.
There was evidence that plaintiff suffered a severe fright, and a medical expert testified that his present condition might have resulted from the fright.
The court, citing the Mitchell case, and also Ewing v. Pittsburg, etc., R. R.,
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R. R. 1 74 intimated that where the fright was the sole producing cause of the consequences for which recovery was sought,
there could not be damages for such consequences even
though there was an immediate physical injury occasioned by
the wrongful act, unless the injury and the fright actually
did concur in causing shock out of which damage arose. 7 5
A later case 176 held the same way. There it appeared that
plaintiff and her two children were passing in a city street
where defendant was laying mains. A pot for melting lead
exploded and cast a few drops of lead upon plaintiff's hand
and clothes. The burn was very slight,1 77 and on the first
trial of the action a judgment in plaintiff's favor was reversed in the appellate division on the ground that the injuries were not due to the physical injury but to the fright
which was not compensable. 1 78 On a re-trial plaintiff obtained a new "expert" who testified that the slight physical
injury might have caused the shock which resulted in the
long train of disorders, 17 and this time the appellate division
sustained on the ground that ". . . there was some causal
supra note 40, held that ".

. . unless there was a direct causal connection between the existing condition and the trifling injuries which immediately followed the fall, there could be no recovery for the serious injuries existing at
the time of the trial." Lehigh & H. R. Ry. v. Marchant, supra at 873.
174 23 App. Div. 141, 48 N. Y. Supp. 914 (2d Dep't 1897).
175 The case itself, however, sustained a recovery. See note 168 suprd.
176 Hack v. Dady, 134 App. Div. 253, 118 N. Y. Supp. 906 (2d Dep't 1909),
on second appeal, 142 App. Div. 510, 127 N. Y. Supp. 22 (2d Dep't 1911).
177 Plaintiff's physician had prescribed a little ointment for the burn on her
hand, but it was so slight as not to call for any further treatment, and at the
time of the trial it was with difficulty that a faint scar was found. Plaintiff
did, however, suffer nervous troubles and general debility of body, including
disarrangement of her generative organs, manifested in a miscarriage 3Y2
weeks after the accident, a second miscarriage 6 months later after a two
months' pregnancy, and a third miscarriage 3 months thereafter when in the
third month of pregnancy.
178 Hack v. Dady, supra note 176 at 254, 118 N. Y. Supp. at 907:
"If they
[plaintiff's ailments] are at all consequent to the accident, I would rather
ascribe them to the fright therefrom. The explosion, her proximity to it with
two small children, may well account for her consequent fright, shock and
nervousness. But as she cannot recover damages for her fright, she cannot
recover for any physical consequences of her fright."
179 The gist of the expert testimony was that "If a woman pregnant were
struck by a pea, for instance, a pea or a bean, any small object where there
would be no violent attack, the sudden nervous shock to her system might
cause it." Hack v. Dady, 142 App. Div. 510, 511, 127 N. Y. Supp. 22 (2d
Dep't 1911).
The expert's testimony is highly improbable. See Hertig &
Sheldon, Minitmum. CriteriaRequired to Prove Prima Facie Case of Traumatic
Abortion or Miscarriage, 117 ANN. SURG. 596 (1943).
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injury and the fright or

shock." 180 Still another case evincing a tendency on the
part of the court to require actual causation contained facts
indicating that plaintiff had been seated in her husband's
auto when the defendant's truck backed into the auto.

The

court found no evidence of real physical injury to which the
plaintiff's later sufferings could be traced, and a judgment
found by the jury for plaintiff was reversed. 8 1
The later interpretations of the impact exception have
been considerably more liberal in allowing recovery. In
Tracy v. HoteZ Wellington Corporation I'2 plaintiff was

about to leave an elevator at the suggestion of the operator
who preceded her when the elevator began to ascend without
control.

When the car was about four feet above the land-

ing the operator seized the plaintiff and pulled her to the
landing, the fall resulting in very slight bruises to her knees,

shoulder and neck. The judgment for plaintiff was upheld
on the ground that it was a jury question whether the neurotic condition and impaired physical health were caused by
a nervous shock coming from fright only, or by a physical
injury and fright concurring. 8

3

180 Hack v. Dady, 142 App. Div. 510, 513, 127 N. Y. Supp. 22, 25 (2d Dep't
1911).
181 O'Brien v. Moss, 220 App. Div. 464, 221 N. Y. Supp. 621 (4th Dep't

1927).

175 N. Y. Supp. 100 (App. Term. 1919).
Tracy v. Hotel Wellington Corp., supra note 182 at 101: "The rule of
law is that while there may be no recovery for mere fright, or for injuries
that are the direct consequences of it, there may be a recovery, where bodily
injury and fright concur in producing shock, giving rise to damage. . . . In
the case of Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co .... it would seem that if the plaintiff had been knocked down by, or come in physical contact with, the horses,
so as to have sustained some immediate personal injury, a recovery would have
been sustained. The cases in which no recovery is allowed are cases where
there is no concurrent bodily injury."
The injury here was a neurotic condition and impaired physical health,
diagnosed by plaintiff's physician as post-traumatic neurosis. Lehman, J., dissented from the allowance of recovery on the ground that it was not shown
that the nervous shock from which the neurosis developed was caused by the
impact, saying: "It seems to me that the decisions in this state clearly establish that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover for the physical results caused
by the fright or nervous shock of the accident, even though she may have suffered some scratches and bruises in addition to the physical shock; but she is
entitled to recover for the damages caused by the nervous shock, if that nervous
shock was the direct result of the physical impact." Tracy v. Hotel Wellington
Corp., supra note 182 at 105.
182
183
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The latest Court of Appeals holding on the question,1 8

4

which was also an example of the immediate injury exception, is clearly in line with the modern tendency to regard

the most trivial impact as a sufficient basis for the imposition
of liability, even though the court did not base its entire ruling on that theory.1 85 The farthest extreme to which this
impact exception has been pushed occurred in an unreported

New York case which held that the impact required
could be
86
received through any one of the five senses.1
E.

The Workmen's Compensation Cases

In Workmen's Compensation claims the requirement of

impact has been done away with completely since compensation rules do not require "natural and probable conse-

quences" but only actual injury traceable to an accident in
the course of employment.
184

185

1s

Furthermore, the claims come

Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N. Y. 231, 177 N. E. 431 (1931).
For fuller discussion of this case see note 153 supra and accompanying

text.

186 Gregory v. Wallabout Service Laundry, Inc., 77 N. Y. L. J. 607 (City
Ct. May 5, 1927). Defendant, pursuant to a contract for the doing of laundry, delivered a package of laundered wash in which plaintiff found a dead
mouse. Plaintiff alleged that she was rendered ill and unable to follow her
usual vocation, wherefore she demanded damages of $3,000. The court said

that ".

.

. the most recent cases holding that recovery may be had where any

physical contact has been established have proceeded upon the theory that
such physical contact may be asserted through any of the five senses, whether
touch, feeling, taste, smell or sight." The court cited for the sense of smell,
Carroll v. N. Y. Pie Baking Co., 215 App. Div. 240, 213 N. Y. Supp. 553 (2d
Dep't 1926); for sight, Sider v. Reid Ice Cream Co., 125 Misc. 835, 211 N. Y.
Supp. 582 (Sup. Ct. 1925) ; for hearing, Matter of Thompson v. Binghamton,
218 App. Div. 451, 218 N. Y. Supp. 355 (3d Dep't 1926).
187 In O'Connell v. Adirondack Electric Power Corp., 193 App. Div. 582,
185 N. Y. Supp. 455 (3d Dep't 1920), the chief operator of the electrical
system of an electric power company died from acute dilation of the heart,
precipitated by worry, nervousness or excitement while directing restoration
of the current interrupted by a storm which had damaged the wires. The
court held there was no accidental injury because no accident of any sort had
occurred to the decedent.
However, the later case of Thompson v. City of Binghamton, 218 App.
Div. 451, 218 N. Y. Supp. 355 (3d Dep't 1926), effectively overruled the
O'Connell case. There the death of a school janitor was occasioned through
acute dilation of the heart caused by the exertion and excitement of answering
a false fire alarm at the schoolhouse. The court did not specifically overrule
the O'Connell case, saying: "Whether or not there is in principle a substantial distinction between that case and the present case, we think, under the authority of later cases, both in this court and in the Court of Appeals, there
was in the present case an accidental injury sustained by deceased." Thompson
v. City of Binghamton, sup-a at 357, 218 N. Y. Supp. at 453.
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before experts familiar with the problem, and the supposed
danger of falsification is not as great as when an untrained
188
lay jury is utilized.
F.

The Food Cases

Another exception to the non-liability rule has been developed in a series of food cases. In one of the earliest the
plaintiff guest claimed violent illness from being exposed to
a kidney saute indelicately seasoned with a field mouse which
had been neatly cut into two portions. 189 Apparently plaintiff's illness was caused not by the food, but by sight of the
mouse, but the court seemingly decided the case on the idea
of breach of warranty of fitness for human consumption. 190
The Mitchell case is nowhere cited in the opinion, which may
have been merely an oversight by the court but may also have
been a method used to avoid the difficult job of distinguishing it away.
The general pattern of the food cases is very much the
same, though the stimulus may vary, with cockroaches and
mice definitely in the lead. A typical case involved cockroaches in a charlotte russe. 191 In that case the appellate
The case relied on by the court in the Thompson case as its authority was
Pickerell v. Schumacher, 215 App. Div. 745, 212 N. Y. Supp. 899 (3d Dep't
1925), aff'd nim., 242 N. Y. 577, 152 N. E. 434 (1926). In the Pickerell case
the claimant was driving a hearse up a grade. He applied his emergency brake
to stop the hearse, but the brake failed to hold, and the hearse started to back
down the hill. Claimant turned the steering wheel, and, after going back
about twenty feet, the hearse ran against a bank at the side of the road, where
it stopped without further mishap. Claimant suffered cerebral apoplexy the
following morning. There was no physical injury to him, other than the
excitement, yet the court allowed recovery.
Iss See Bohlen & Polikoff, Liability in Pennsylvania for Physical Effects of
Fright, 80 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 627, 637 (1932).
19 Barrington v. Hotel Astor, 184 App. Div. 317, 171 N. Y. Supp. 840 (1st
Dep't 1918). Understandably enough the plaintiff claimed as part of his damages a "pronounced loss of appetite" for some weeks.
290 "A guest at a hotel, who orders a portion of kidney saute, has the right
to expect, and the hotel keeper impliedly warrants, that such dish will contain
no ingredients beyond those ordinarily placed therein. The hotel keeper also
impliedly warrants that the dish is wholesome and fit for human consumption,
and contains nothing rendering it unsuitable for use as human food. The defendant does not seek to justify the inclusion of the mouse in this dish as any
proper part of its menu." Barrington v. Hotel Astor, supra at 322, 171 N. Y.
Supp. at 843.
191 Sider v. Reid Ice Cream Co., 125 Misc. 835, 211 N. Y. Supp. 582 (Sup.
Ct. 1925).
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term reversed a judgment for defendant and per curiam
vigorously attacked the Mitchell decision, stating "there
seems to be no reason for the rule announced in the Mitchell
case. It is said that the rule was adopted as one of public
policy, or as one of necessity to avoid the perpetration of
fraud. Whatever may have been the prevailing conditions
when this rule was announced, there is now no need of it
on the score of public policy or necessity ....

We think this

whole subject should receive the further consideration of the
appellate courts." 192 Despite the vigorous wording of the
opinion, the case was not appealed, and the appellate courts
had no occasion to give "further consideration."
Another cockroach case (this time in pie) likewise rejected the Mitchell case but by way of distinguishing it rather
than denouncing it. 1 9 3

The court said that here, unlike the

Mitchell case, the plaintiff's illness was not the result of
fright, but resulted from the repulsive and nauseating character of the food sold by the defendant. 19 4 In fact that
amounts to distinguishing between forms of emotional disturbance which, while it may reach a just result, hardly
seems a tenable ground logically. It would seem better to
rationalize the food cases on the theory that they are analogous to the immediate physical injury cases in which recovery
is allowed. 195 In the one case there is an immediate physical
reaction-nausea resulting in injury, and in the other there
is an immediate physical reaction-fainting or weakness resulting in injury. It would seem that if recovery is permitted in one, it should be in both.19 6
Id. at 836, 211 N. Y. Supp. at 583.
Carroll v. New York Pie Baking Co., 215 App. Div. 240, 213 N. Y. Supp.
553 (2d Dep't 1926).
194 "The plaintiff in this case makes no claim that she was frightened. There
is nothing about a cockroach, or several cockroaches, that would cause fright,
especially when dead and crushed to such an extent that they resemble butterflies. The plaintiff's illness was not the result of fright, but resulted from the
repulsive and nauseating character of the food sold by the defendant." Id. at
241, 213 N. Y. Supp. at 554.
195 For the immediate physical injury exeption, see text, page 44 supra.
196 The most recent food case appears to be Copeland v. Woolworth Co.,
187 Misc. 456, 62 N. Y. S. 2d 660 (App. Term 1946). There plaintiff claimed
that as she ate two spoonfuls of mince pie she noticed the pie did not look or
taste good and had a bad odor, and suddenly she came upon a one and onequarter inch wire nail imbedded in the mince meat. The repulsive condition
nauseated her and made her ill. The appellate term in a per curiam opinion
192

193
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The Wilftlt or Wanton, Injwtry Cases

It is a general principle of tort law to extend and interpret more loosely rules of scope of liability when the tort
involved is one of wanton or wilful harm, and this tendency
is noticeable in the field of psychic stimuli.'9 7 It was early
held that a recovery for mental injuries and suffering alone
is not precluded in wilful torts even where there is no showing of impact. 98 Most of the early cases were in the appellate division, but the Court of Appeals soon had its say on
the matter in a case arising in 1912.190 There it was indicated that if the conduct of the actor is wilful and wanton
he in effect assumes the risk of his subject's special vulnerability. 20 0 The case involved a psychic stimulus other than
fear, namely shame and mental anguish with consequent
reversed a plaintiff's judgment for $50 and dismissed the complaint. Carroll
v. New York Pie Baking Co., notes 193, 194 supra, was distinguished because
".. . the inference that a nail in pie is a repulsive condition similar to crushed
cockroaches, is unwarranted. The metal nail can not be regarded in the same
Copeland
category as dead cockroaches which are subject to putrefaction."
v. Woolworth Co., supra at 457, 62 N. Y. S. 2d at 661.
197 Commenting on the attitude of the courts in wilful psychic injury cases,
the former chairman of the Insurance Law Section of the American Bar Association points out that ". . . the courts seem to be extremely willing to grant
a recovery of damages in favor of the plaintiff where there exists an element
of wilfulness in the conduct of a defendant. . . . About all that can be said
is that the courts seem to be willing to punish a man for that which he does
deliberately, whereas the tendency in many jurisdictions is to excuse that which
flows from an unintentional act which does not bring about physical contact."
Jones, Fright, 289 INs. L. J. 99, 107 (1947).
198 Ansteth v. B. R. R., 145 N. Y. 210, 39 N. E. 708 (1895)
(conductor
wilfully frightened boy off street car). See also Preiser v. Wielandt, 48 App.
Div. 569, 62 N. Y. Supp. 890 (2d Dep't 1900) ; Williams v. Underhill, 63 App.
Div. 223, 71 N. Y. Supp. 291 (1st Dep't 1901). But cf. Hutchinson v. Stern,
115 App. Div. 791, 101 N. Y. Supp. 145 (4th Dep't 1906), and Prince v. Ridge,
32 Misc. 666, 66 N. Y. Supp. 454 (1900), denying liability. The Ridge case
seems particularly exceptional in denying liability for a wilful and insulting
proposal of sexual intercourse made to a woman. The Stern case was also
somewhat unusual in refusing recovery. There the defendant committed an
assault and battery upon plaintiff with his fist and chased plaintiff with a drawn
knife, threatening to cut his heart out. Plaintiff's wife, pregnant, witnessed
the assault, and was greatly frightened, giving birth thereafter to a premature
and still-born child. The court relied on the Mitchell case for the proposition
that ". . . fright alone cannot form the basis of an action." Hutchinson v.
Stern, 115 App. Div. 791, 792, 101 N. Y. Supp. 145 (4th Dep't 1906).
199 Garrison v. Sun Publishing Co., 207 N. Y. 1, 100 N. E. 430 (1912).
200 Hiscock, J., commented that ". . . in an action brought for the redress
of a wrong intentionally, willfully and maliciously committed, the wrongdoer
will be held responsible for the injuries which he has directly caused even
though they lie beyond the limit of natural and apprehended results as established in cases where the injury was unintentional." Id. at 8, 100 N. E. at 431.
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sickness from a libelous charge, and it was held that the
mental anguish and resultant physical ills could be compensated. It appeared that because of the wilfulness the court
substituted the test of actual or direct causation for that of
20 1
foreseeability.
In that case the Court of Appeals was following a theory

well enunciated in a previous lower court decision. 20 2 There
the decedent, suffering from heart disease and five months
pregnant, notified defendant, her landlord, that she would

be unable because of poor health to move promptly upon expiration of the lease. Nonetheless one day after the lease
expired defendant began to tear down the house according
to plan. The noise and excitement caused nervous shock
which required decedent to go to a hospital where she died.
It was held that decedent's legal representative could re-

cover since the New York rule of impact applies only to injurious fright negligently
caused, and not to wanton and
20 3
wilful injuries.
In a later case it appeared that defendant fired his gun

several times through a window of plaintiff's apartment unaware that plaintiff was lying in bed in critical condition
after childbirth of a few minutes before. 20 4 The shooting
caused nervous shock and hysteria for which defendant, be-

cause of his wanton wrong, was liable even though he did
201 An interesting discussion of the general nature of "wilfulness" is found
in a recent Iowa case, Blakely v. Shortal's Estate, 236 Iowa 787, 20 N. W. 2d
28 (1945) (decedent committed suicide in plaintiff's kitchen and sight of his
body frightened her).
202 Preiser v. Wielandt, 48 App. Div. 569, 62 N. Y. Supp. 890 (2d Dep't
1900).
203 Id. at 573, 62 N. Y. Supp. at 892.
The Mitchell case, supra note 164,
. . applies only to actions based on negligence and not to cases of willful
tort .... In this case, however, the act of the defendants was in itself wrongful.
It was a willful and violent trespass upon the plaintiff's house for which an
action will lie. ..."
To the same effect was Williams v. Underhill, 63 App. Div. 223, 71 N. Y.
Supp. 291 (1st Dep't 1901). There plaintiff was employed as a nurse to defendant's children. Defendant assaulted and laid violent hands upon the plaintiff, and by reason of said assault the plaintiff was made sick and suffered
great mental anguish, becoming nervously prostrated and insane. Again the
court pointed out that ". . . the authority cited [i.e., the Mitchell case] applies
only to actions based on negligence, and not to cases of wilful tort." Williams
v. Underhill, .supra at 226, 71 N. Y. Supp. at 293.
204 Beck v. Libraro, 220 App. Div. 547, 221 N. Y. Supp. 737 (2d Dep't
1927).
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not know of plaintiff's idiosyncrasy and even though there
was no impact or technical assault.2 0

5

It might be questioned whether in legal theory there is
any justification for allowing recovery in psychic injury
cases of wilful tort and not in negligent ones.2 0 6 It has been
said that the denial of recovery has a sound basis in negligence actions, but that this should not be allowed to constitute a shield for the wilful wrongdoer. The feeling evidently
is that the wilful wrongdoer should, where practicable, have
his liability extended rather than restricted. The notion apparently still persists that tort law has in some contexts a
punitive as well as compensatory purpose, and that intentional wrongdoers should be held strictly accountable. Thus,
in view of the recognized tendency to interpret loosely rules
of liability where wilfulness is involved, this exception seems
to fit without difficulty into the general fabric of tort law.
H.

The Right of Privacy Cases

It was early held that compensatory damages for violation of the right of privacy established under the Civil Rights
Law 207 in New York include and are limited to the humilia205 In distinguishing the Mitchell case, the court indicated that "Here, however, there is a great deal more. The defendant's act of shooting this gun
ilir6ugh the lighted windows of plaintiff's apartment was so wanton, reckless
and mischievous as to constitute an apparent disregard of human life." Id. at
548, 549, 221 N. Y. Supp. at 738.
206 The most recent New York case shows no indication of back-tracking
on the consistent allowance of recovery in wilful injury cases. Bergman v.
Rubenfeld, 66 N. Y. S. 2d 895 (City Ct. 1946), involved a counterclaim which
alleged that plaintiff and another defendant acted in concert to obtain moneys
from defendant, and that the actions in furtherance of the conspiracy were
done for the purpose of forcing defendant to pay additional sums over and
above an agreed commission. The court sustained the counterclaim, indicating that defendant could recover for mental suffering and damages flowing
therefrom since the acts of the conspirators were wilful and malicious.
207 N. Y. CIV. RIGHTs LAW § 50.
"Right of privacy.-A person, firm or
corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade,
the name, portrait or picture of any living person without having first obtained
the written consent of such person, or if a minor of his or her parent or
guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor."
§ 51. "Action for injunction and for damages. Any person whose name,
portrait or picture is used within this state for advertising purposes or for the
purposes of trade without the written consent first obtained as above provided
may maintain an equitable action in the supreme court of this state against the
person, firm or corporation so using his name, portrait or picture, to prevent
and restrain the use thereof; and may also sue and recover damages for any
injuries sustained by reason of such use and if the defendant shall have know-
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tion, mortification, and mental distress which the plaintiff
suffered. 20 8

This right of privacy has sometimes been pro-

tected under the guise of the legal interest of the individual
in his reputation, 0 9 or under the guise of a defamation action where the rationale of defamation is used to redress an
injury to personal privacy and dignity, as where a creditor
uses a method of collection which is likely to affect adversely
the debtor's community standing.21 0 In addition to damages
for mental suffering in such cases, it has been suggested that
for preventing the
injunction may be the appropriate method
2 11
letters.
dunning
such
of
continuance
But mental suffering is not always recoverable in these
privacy cases especially if the plaintiff happens to be in public life. 21 2

Recovery has been denied where the picture of a

professional entertainer appeared without permission in one
issue of a weekly paper,2 13 where a woman lawyer was por-

trayed in a newsreel because of her work in solving a murder
ingly used such person's name, portrait or picture in such manner as is forbidden or declared to be unlawful by the last section, the jury, in its discretion,
may award exemplary damages ....
Some of the more prominent articles on the right of privacy generally
include Larremore, The Law of Privacy, 12 COL. L. REV. 693 (1912) ; Green,
The ancestor of all these
The Right of Privacy, 27 ILL. L. REV. 237 (1932).
writings is, of course, the famous and oftcited Warren & Brandeis, The Right
of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890).
208 Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of America, 71 Misc. 203, 130 N. Y. Supp. 876
(Co. Ct. 1911), rev'd, 147 App. Div. 783, 132 N. Y. Supp. 237 (1st Dep't 1911),
aff'd, 210 N. Y. 51, 103 N. E. 1108 (1913).
209 Merle v. Sociological Research Film Corp., 166 App. Div. 376, 152 N. Y.
Supp. 829 (1st Dep't 1915).
(letter
210 Keating v. Conviser, 127 Misc. 531, 217 N. Y. Supp. 117 (1926)
to telephone operator's employer, stating that she was delinquent in paying for
clothing bought on credit held not libelous per se but possibility of judicial
protection in such situations implied).
211 Williams v. O'Shaughnessy, 172 N. Y. Supp. 574 (Sup. Ct. 1918).
The
case actually held that an injunction would not issue to restrain plaintiff's
former attorney from writing letters to her, but the court indicated that, had
the writing been done solely for the purpose of engendering annoyance, the
writ would probably have issued.
Note that N. Y. CIv. lIGHTS LAW § 51 in note 207 supra does by its
terms provide for injunction as a remedy in the situations covered by the
statute.
212 See Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F. 2d 806 (C. C. A. 2d 1940) (the
court felt that since Sidis, as a youthful genius, had become a matter of public
interest, his future career was also a matter of public concern).
213 Colyer v. Richard K. Fox Pub. Co., 162 App. Div. 297, 146 N. Y. Supp.
999 (2d Dep't 1914).
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mystery, 2 14 and where a newspaper published the picture and
life story of a noted pugilist. 15 Peculiarly enough, however,
where a plaintiff appeared briefly and casually among other
unnamed persons in the street scene of a film, recovery was
probably because of the humiliating nature of the
permitted,
2 16
picture.
Closely akin, though distinct from the right of privacy
cases, was the theory of recovery in the now outlawed alienation of affections action in which the loss of affections was
the main damage and which was not maintainable if the defact the alienated spouse had not affecfense showed that21 in
7
tion for plaintiff.

VII. NEW YORK CASES SINCE THE MITCHELL DECISION
DENYING LIABILITY

Having looked at the exceptions to the general rule of
non-liability, it is worthwhile briefly to examine the principal
cases which have followed the Mitchell rule and refused to
impose liability.
First of all, liability has been denied in the situation
where there is little or no physical touching and where the
reaction is idiosyncratic and not within the scope of any of
the exceptions hereinbefore enumerated. An injury seems
to be considered idiosyncratic when the psychic stimulus is
patently inadequate to arouse excessive physiological manifestations in an average person. In such an instance, especially where the symptom-free time extends for a considerable
period after the accident, the courts have refused to impose
liability mainly on the ground that the risk was unforeseeable, and this even in the face of a showing of actual
causation. 218
214 Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 189 App. Div. 467, 178 N. Y.
Supp.
2 5 752 (1st Dep't 1919).
1 Jeffries v. New York Evening Journal Pub. Co., 67 Misc. 570, 124 N. Y.
Supp. 780 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
216 Blumenthal v. Picture Classics, 235 App. Div. 570, 257 N. Y. Supp. 800
(1st Dep't 1932).
217 Servis v. Servis, 172 N. Y. 438, 65 N. E. 270 (1902).
218 See Newton v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 106 App. Div. 415. 94
N. Y. Supp. 825 (1st Dep't 1905). There defendant's train collided with a
train of another railroad company upon which latter train plaintiff was a
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There is another series of cases which denies recovery

where the stimulus is not directed at plaintiff but at someone
else. Thus a plaintiff in an action for an assault committed
on him in the presence of his wife could not recover for injuries to the wife occasioned by fright resulting in loss of her
services to him. 2 19

Nor could damages be had for personal

injuries resulting from distress of mind at seeing plaintiff's
cat mangled by defendant's trespassing dog, the plaintiff herself being perfectly secure and seeing the incident only from
the window. 22 0

Recovery was also denied where the stimulus

was a fear of drowning felt by plaintiff's wife when defen221
dant negligently caused plaintiffs cellar to be flooded.
passenger. The impact of the collision threw plaintiff forward in his seat,
but did not otherwise injure him. A nervous condition, accompanied by dilation of the heart and a valvular disease thereof, was the claimed injury. The
court held that the evidence did not sustain a finding that any physical injury
had been done to the plaintiff, and denied recovery. Under the more modern
slight impact cases, such as Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N. Y. 231, 177 N. E.
431 (1931), a different result might well be reached today. See note 169
supra for a fuller discussion of the Newton case.
219 Hutchinson v. Stern, 115 App. Div. 791, 101 N. Y. Supp. 145 (4th Dep't
1906). The stimulus caused plaintiff's pregnant wife to give birth to a premature and stillborn child. It would seem that a more forward looking court
could have imposed liability under the wilful injury exception.
For a collection of cases from all jurisdictions dealing with the problem
of mental distress caused by an act intended to affect a third person and the
collateral question of "transferred intent" see PROssER, TORTS §§ 9, 11 (1941).
220 Buchanan v. Stout, 123 App. Div. 648, 649, 108 N. Y. Supp. 38 (2d Dep't
1908). "Th6 action then is in effect an action for negligence or nuisance;
and it seems plain that the rule stated in Mitchell v. Rochester Railway Co.
(151 N. Y. 107) is applicable . . . ." While recognizing that the Mitchell rule
had no application to a case of wilful wrong or wantonness, the court found
neither element present. Hence, plaintiff's only recovery was for the pecuniary
value of the cat.
221 Cook v. Village of Mohawk, 207 N. Y. 311, 100 N. E. 815 (1913).
The
defendant municipality wrongfully obstructed a natural waterway in such manner as to discharge its waters upon plaintiff's lands. One of the items of plaintiff's damages was the loss of his wife's services owing to her inability to do
her usual work on account of illness caused by the flooding of plaintiff's
premises. The wife was fearful that the water, which had flooded the cellar,
would continue to rise, and she became hysterical and nervous. Her ailment
was a "flowing" or hemorrhage due to a small fibroid tumor, and the nervousness which was caused by the tumor was aggravated by the flooding, the result
of all this being an increase in the gravity of the hemorrhage condition. The
court reasoned as follows: "The defendant should not be held liable for the
mental or nervous disturbance of plaintiff's wife due to a cause entirely separate from the flooding of plaintiff's premises. The wife had a fibroid tumor.
If this was responsible for a mental or nervous condition which made her
unnecessarily apprehensive of the flooding of the land, and this increased the
ailment, the defendant cannot be charged with the consequences. Mental suffering is not a legal element in such cases . . . and there can be no recovery
except for physical ills which can be ascribed directly and with reasonable
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It is to be noted that the cases which deny recovery do

not fall precisely within any of the exceptions already examined, and in them the courts are usually very careful to point
out that there can be no recovery for mental suffering in the
absence of some corporeal or personal injury or breach of
duty. 222 But where such a breach of duty can be found, recovery will be permitted as in a recent case where plaintiff
obtained recovery
for a nervous condition caused by defen223
dant's blasting.

VIII.

THE REAL PROBLEM--THE QUESTION OF EVIDENCE

Having analyzed, as typical of the New York view, the
Mitchell case, and the multitude of decisions which have followed it, and having found their arguments for denying recertainty to the defendant's wrongful act." Cook v. Village of Mohawk, supra
at 314, 100 N. E. at 817.
222 Stahl v. William Necker, Inc., 184 App. Div. 85, 171 N. Y. Supp. 728
(1st Dep't 1918). In that case plaintiff's husband died on May 5th, and a
crematory company returned his ashes with an erroneous inscription and certificate stating that the remains were cremated April 31st, an impossible date.
No recovery was permitted for mental suffering occasioned by the error in the
certificate, the court feeling that no breach of the plaintiff's burial right having
been committed. See alsa Smith v. Rector, etc., of Trinity Church, 140 Misc.
301, 252 N. Y. Supp. 53 (Sup. Ct. 1931), aff'd inem., 234 App. Div. 840, 254
N. Y. Supp. 922 (1st Dep't 1931), and cf. cases enumerated under the burial
right exception to the Mitchell rule in text, page 33 supra.
223 Recovery was denied in the appellate division. Dixon v. New York Trap
Rock Corp., 267 App. Div. 963, 47 N. Y. S. 2d 565 (2d Dep't 1944). There
the court did not discuss the issue of the nervous condition, preferring to rest
its decision simply on the authority of Cook v. Village of Mohawk, mpra note
221, but the Court of Appeals reversed in 293 N. Y. 509, 58 N. E. 2d 517

(1944).
See also Baumann v. Baumann, 250 N. Y. 382, 165 N. E. 819 (1929),
wherein plaintiff sued for a declaratory judgment establishing that she was
the wife of defendant C. Ludwig Baumann, that an alleged divorce was invalid, and that a subsequent alleged marriage between defendant C. Ludwig
Baumann and the defendant Ray Starr Einstein was invalid. The trial court,
affirmed unanimously by the appellate division, granted the declaratory judgment and also an injunction restraining defendants from representing that they
were husband and wife, enjoining them from going through any further marriage ceremony, and restraining defendant Einstein from assuming or using the
name "Baumann." However, Hubbs, J., speaking for the Court of Appeals,
modified the judgment by striking out the restraining clauses, holding that in
the last analysis the only injury alleged was an injury to plaintiff's feelings, it
not appearing that any property rights of plaintiff were being jeopardized.
"Equity cannot by injunction restrain conduct which merely injures a person's
feelings and causes mental anguish." Id. at 387, 165 N. E. at 821. Cf. the
statutory right to an injunction for violation of privacy rights under N. Y.
Civ. RIGHTs LAW § 51 in note 207 supra.
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covery lacking in soundness, attention may now be focused
on what is believed to be the real issue in the psychic injury
cases-the problem of evidence. Since it has been demonstrated that in legal theory there is no impediment to liability in such cases, the important question is how far the
zone of such liability shall radiate. The ensuing discussion
seeks not to lay down any flat rule in that regard, since it
must needs be that courts feel their way constantly as
medico-legal thought advances, but an effort is made to point
up the types of problems which will be paramount in the
ultimate demarcation of the liability zone.
A.

The Psychoneuroses

The main difficulty in the psychic injury cases is concerned with the mental condition of the plaintiff. If the
plaintiff be the victim of a pre-existing mental disorder, then
it is quite possible that his response to the psychic stimulus
was abnormal or idiosyncratic in the sense that "the reasonable, prudent man" would not have so reacted. This preexisting abnormality will usually be of the type designated
"psychoneurotic" and will fall, for purposes of classification,
within one of the four ordinarily recognized categories of the
psychoneuroses.

22 4

1. Hysteria. Hysteria is a neurotic condition characterized by symptoms referable to the sensory-motor nervous
system. 225 Motor weakness-paralysis of some sort-may be

present, or changes in ability to use the senses may occur.
Illustrations of hysteric conditions would be aphasia, 22

6

im-

224 The categorizations and discussions of the psychoneuroses herein contained are based in the main on the analysis of Dr. Smith and Dr. Solomon in
Traumatic Neuroses in Court, 30 VA. L. REv. 87 (1943).
225 For an early illustration of the use of the psychoanalytic technique in the
treatment of hysteria, see the well known work of KATZ, op. cit. supra note
224.
226 Aphasia is inability to talk or impairment of speech facilities in some
way. See Kupke v. St. Louis Transit Co., 122 Mo. App. 355, 99 S. W. 472
(1907).
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pairment of vision, 227 deafness,

paralytic manifestations.

2 30

22

8 amnesia

229

69

and various

2. Neurasthenia. Neurasthenia is a neurotic condition
23 1
characterized by a sense of weakness and exhaustion,

or various pains of the body, 232 all of which exist without apparent physiological explanation. Difficulty in concentration, 233 lack of interest in life,23 4 and worry over
sanity 235 may also be symptomatic of neurasthenia.
3.

Anxiety States.

The neurotic suffering attacks of

acute anxiety experiences the physical accompaniments of
anxiety feelings in the normal individual, such as rapid

pulse, 23 6 increased heart beat, 237 tremors,2 8 and often there
is the fear that physical and psychological collapse is
239
impending.
4.

Obsessive Compulsive Syndrome. 240

This neurotic

condition is manifested by fears or feelings on the part of
the patient that he is likely to be compelled to do something
which in his normal state he does not wish to do. 24' He may
feel that he will throw himself in front of a train, or he may
develop a phobia of being in open spaces 242 or of being in an
243
enclosed place.

227 Texas Utilities Co. v. Dear, 64 S. W. 2d 807 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
228 Waterman v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. M. R. R., 26 N. D. 540, 145 N. W.

19 (1913).

229 Morris v. Union Depot Bridge & T. R. Co., 320 Mo. 371, 8 S. W. 2d

11 (1928).
230
231
232

Louisville Southern R. R. v. Minogue, 90 Ky. 369, 14 S. W. 357 (1890).
Parr v. Detroit, 272 Mich. 659, 262 N. W. 443 (1935).
Mullery v. Missouri & K. Telephone Co., 191 Mo. App. 118, 177 S. W.

1098 (1915).

233 Tate v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 339 Mo. 262, 96 S. W. 2d 364
(1936).
234 Garthley v. Seattle Electric Co., 49 Wash. 616, 96 Pac. 155 (1908).
235 Borski v. Wakefield, 239 Mich. 656, 215 N. W. 19 (1927).
236 St. Louis & S. F. R. R. v. McFall, 63 Okla. 124, 163 Pac. 269 (1917).
237 Malloy v. Southern Cities Distributing Co., 142 So. 718 (La. App. 1932).
238 Summerskill v. Vermont Power & Mfg. Co., 91 Vt. 251, 99 Atl. 1017
(1917) ; McQuary v. Penketh, 194 Wash. 57, 76 Pac. 2d 1024 (1938).
239 Klein v. Medical Bldg. Realty Co., 147 So. 122 (La. App. 1933).
240 "Syndrome" refers to a group or set of symptoms which occur together.
241 Bartlett v. Pontiac Realty Co., 224 Mo. App. 1234, 31 S. W. 2d 279
(1930).
242 Agoraphobia is a morbid dread of crossing, or being in the midst of,
open spaces.
243 Fear of enclosed places is claustrophobia.
The recognized types of fears
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Liability Problems Presented by the Psychoneurotic
Plaintiff

The usual rule in tort, where an impact upon the person
of plaintiff has occurred, is that the tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds him, and is liable even for unforeseeable consequences. Thus when the impact aggravates some physical
condition of the plaintiff, such as a hidden disease 244 or pregnancy,2 45 the defendant is held responsible even though such
consequences could not have been reasonably anticipated.
Objection has been made to this rule on the ground that
it imposes liability which may be far greater than the slight
dereliction of the defendant seems to warrant. A defendant
guilty of a minor indiscretion may find his whole private
fortune destroyed because he has been unlucky enough to
strike an unusually vulnerable plaintiff.246

In effect his lia-

bility is extended far beyond the scope of the risk which he
has created. 247 The justification for such extension is stated
to be that, as between the tortfeasor who started the chain
of circumstances resulting in the injury and the entirely
innocent plaintiff, the tortfeasor should suffer the consequences.

248

are legion and include among others anglophobia (dread of England or the
English), bacteriophobia (morbid fear of bacteria), dermatophobia (morbid
dread of having some skin disease), doraphobia (morbid dread of touching the
fur or skin of animals), dysmorphobia (morbid dread of deformity), lyssophobia (morbid fear of rabies), neophobia (morbid dread of new things),
pharmacophobia (morbid dread of medicines), photophobia (abnormal intolerance of light), pyrophobia (morbid dread of fire), sitiophobia (morbid dread
of taking food), syphiolphobia (morbid fear of syphilis), thanatophobia (unfounded apprehension of imminent death), toxicophobia (morbid dread of
poisons), zoophobia (insane dread of animals) and-perhaps the oddest of all
-phobophobia, or fear of one's own fears.
244 Ross v. Great Northern R. R., 101 Minn. 122, 111 N. W. 951 (1907);
McCahill v. New York Transp. Co., 201 N. Y. 221, 94 N. E. 616 (1911)
(unusual in that the latent disease was alcoholism). Other cases have reached
the same result in regard to paralysis, Bishop v. St. Paul City Ry., 48 Minn.
26, 50 N. W. 927 (1892); pneumopia, Beauchamp v. Saginaw Mining Co., 50
Mich. 163, 15 N. W. 65 (1893); endocarditis, Keegan v. Minneapolis St. Ry.,
140 Minn. 248, 167 N. W. 1041 (1918).
245 Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N. W. 1034 (1892).
248 This is pointed out by the court in Ryan v. New York Cent. R. R., 35
N. Y. 210 (1866).
247 See on the question of scope of the risk in general, Seavey, Mr. Justice
Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 HARV. L. REv. 372, 48 YALE L. J. 390,
39 COL. L. REv. 20 (1939).
248 Fent v. Toledo, P. & W. R. R., 59 Ill. 349 (1871).
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Similar difficulties arise in the psychic injury cases, and

here they are, if possible, even more difficult of solution.
Suppose the plaintiff s neurotic background is aggravated by
the stimulus produced by defendant so as to create in plaintiff a severe neurosis, and the stimulus was such as to affect
a normal person little if at all. 249 Shall the defendant be
liable to compensate plaintiff for all the effects both physical
and mental flowing from the neurotic condition, or only for
some fractional part thereof? 250
249 The problem is pithily posed in Smith & Solomon, Traumatic Neuroses
in Court, 30 VA. L. REv. 87, 99 (1943) : "Assume for the moment that study
of the claimant's pre-traumatic personality shows a neurotic constitution or condition sufficient to make the subject an extreme reactor to stimuli which would
only mildly affect the average person, if at all. In his case a $5.00 touch may
become a $10,000 disability. Shall the law protect this fragile fellow to the
full, or where shall legal and social policy draw the lines limiting the compensation he may obtain?"
Smith & Solomon's solution to the problem is well stated in their metaphor
of the cracked vase at page 110: "Still again, we may compare the pretraumatic condition of such a neurotic to a cracked vase. The unobservant
or untrained eye may not notice the crack, but only that the vase will hold
water. It is only when the crack spreads and the vase will no longer hold
water that he is conscious of any defect. But the law of torts must follow
the rule of the market place and take cognizance that a cracked vase is not so
valuable as an intact one. If the defendant's conduct causes the crack to
spread, he may justly insist that he shall not make compensation on any
assumption that the vase was previously perfect. So here, traumatic neurosis
resulting from trivial stimuli should be treated as mere accession to, or aggravation of, a pre-existing impairment. Once this truth is grasped we can expect
to see the measure of damages lowered to more modest levels."
The same authors give a good illustration of the possibility of a slight
stimulus bringing into full flower a latent neurotic condition. They recite the
oft-seen wartime case of the soldier with neurotic tendencies. He is faced by
an unresolved conflict between self-preservation and doing his job faithfully.
Suddenly he is subjected at the front to a minor concussion or a purely psychic
disturbance. This accident leads to removal to a medical station and affords
an opportunity for the development of symptoms which result in removal from
the front and care in the hospital. Thus his symptoms solve his problem, even
though he is not a conscious malingerer. Smith & Solomon, op. cit. supra
at 98.
250 A very brief and undocumented article on this question is Stotter, Extent
of Liability for Injuries to Neurotic Person Yet to Be Decided, 16 CALIF. ST.
BAn J. 44 (1941). The article makes no attempt to offer any solution, but it
is a good illustration of the legal practitioner's recognition of the factors involved. Mr. Stotter comments: "Now, we are advised on fairly good authority that your chances of colliding with and injuring a neurotic person if
you have an unfortunate automobile accident is about one out of four or
five [the authority for the statement is not given]. Such a person develops
all manner of aches, pains and disabilities without much relation to actual
tissue and organ injury.
"What is going to be the attitude of the law as to these honestly felt pains
and really incapacitated persons? The law says you can recover for mental
pain, shock, excitement, etc., if you can show some physical (tissue) injury,
provided it is proximately the result of the negligent act.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 24

Thus, where the injury complained of is the result of
psychic stimuli, the problem inevitably arises of making an

analysis of the reaction of the injured plaintiff.

Some in-

dividuals can better stand stresses and vicissitudes than
others. Whereas one woman may faint and suffer injury
upon seeing her children riding in an elevator unaccompanied
by an attendant, 251 another more phlegmatic may not. While
all our tort law abounds in the concept of "the reasonable
man," the difficulties inherent in determining whether the
reaction of any one particular man to a situation is "reasonable" or "unreasonable" may become extremely complex.
Such questions enter as what was the man's personality and
constitutional make-up before the injury, and what part of
the total injury really represents a pre-existing weakened or
neurotic constitution merely aggravated by stimuli which
would cause no such symptoms in a normally constituted
person. If we follow the Freudian view 252 that the cause
of neurosis lies in emotional and mental conflicts which have
not been resolved but instead pushed into the so-called "subconscious" of the individual, it is easy to realize that much
of the distress resulting from sudden psychic stimuli may be
merely a reflection of the pre-existing conflicts suddenly
breaking out into the open.

"Whether such mental pain and incapacity to function is the proximate result of a specific act on the part of someone else is quite hard to answer.
There is always back of these cases a pre-disposition, a pre-existing cause. In
the words of the psychiatrist such would be termed only a precipitating cause,
real causes going back often to childhood experiences.
"The legal definition of proximate cause helps us but little, and would no
doubt be broad enough to cover what is meant in psychiatry by a precipitating
cause. If a delicate and frail person physically is struck by an automobile, he
is injured more than a robust person. The proximate cause of his injuries is
not the fact that his mother did not give him enough spinach when he was a
child. So we may collide with a neurotic and he may without the least malingering have back-ache, dizziness, insomnia, stomach trouble, head-ache, coma,
crossed eyes, loss of hearing, ringing in the ears, loss of appetite, and anesthesias galore. Can he not recover for these as being proximately caused if a
jury is of the opinion that he would have not had same but for the accident
and if he is not malingering?" Stotter, op. cit. supra at 45.
251 See Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co., 162 App. Div. 791, 148 N. Y. Supp. 39
(1st Dep't 1914).
252 A good resume of Freudian theory is found in a collection of his leading
articles by KATZ, FREUD: ON WAR, SEX AND NEUROSIS (1947).
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Problems of Expert Testimony

The essential reason why expert testimony is admissible
in any case is, of course, necessity. The proper administration of justice in tort cases, as in other fields of the law, requires that lay jurors shall receive the aid of qualified specialists in fields where the knowledge of the jurors is too
limited to enable them to reach sound conclusions. The
questions that arise in considering the admission of expert
testimony are then:
(1) Is the subject matter of the case one of peculiar
complexity?
(2) Is competent expert opinion available?
It is believed that the conclusion is irresistible that the
essential problem in the psychic injury cases is that of evidence. If the extent of the injury and the fact of causation
can be reliably established by competent evidence, recovery
should be allowed. If these factors cannot be reliably proved,
recovery should not be permitted. The nucleus of the question is then the reliability of the expert testimony in this
field inasmuch as the only even apparently valid method of
establishing the extent of injury and the fact of causation is
by expert testimony.
Based upon the analyses which have been made in this
article it is submitted that certain propositions, in regard to
expert neuropsychiatric testimony are well established. It
appears clear, for instance, that a high proportion of the
psychic disturbance cases involve plaintiffs who are victims
of pre-existing personality disorders. Pre-existing mental
disorders of mild and moderate nature are triggered by the
psychic trauma or physical trauma occurring at the time of
the accident and become so aggravated as to *be easily observable. As a corollary to this proposition, it can be stated
that so-called "normal" individuals will not suffer psychic
reactions from psychic or physical trauma unless such
trauma be of long duration or great intensity. However, in
the borderline cases no clear rule can be formulated to determine whether the reaction suffered by the plaintiff is a
"normal" one or an idiosyncratic one, and in the present
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state of psychiatric knowledge there inevitably must exist
this "shadow-land" area in which the experts themselves will
disagree. Since everything depends upon the pre-existing
personality make-up of the plaintiff, the force of the stimulus
(i.e., the extent of the "cerebral insult"), and the susceptibility of the plaintiff to the stimulus, a great possibility of
disagreement among experts exists in the borderline situations. It is here that the popular concept of psychiatry as
an exact science must fall before the onslaught of pure fact;
for psychiatry, at best, is a combination of science and art.
This is not to say that the use of expert testimony is not
at all feasible in psychic injury cases. On the contrary, such
testimony is extremely worthwhile in distinguishing the obviously neurotic reactions of plaintiffs from "normal" reactions, and, even in the close cases, opinion eyidence furnishes
a working context in which the triers of fact may operate.
With a complete case history and study of the patient, the
psychiatrist can resolve the "easy" case, and shed some light
in the "hard" cases. As would naturally be expected, the degree of insight which the psychiatrist can give to the triers
of fact is in direct proportion to the completeness and thoroughness of his analysis of the plaintiff-patient.
As to the danger of fraud in the psychic injury cases,
it would be naive to think that such danger does not exist.
Grave possibilities of fraud do exist because of the inherently
subjective nature of mental reactions. Certain it is that some
plaintiffs, spurred by the hope of compensation, and, unhappily, often aided by unscrupulous or overzealous attorneys, deliberately falsify and exaggerate symptoms. It is
probably true that the hope of compensation also acts to induce unconscious malingering in some situations through the
development of the so-called "compensation neurosis." The
best preventative of the danger of fraud lies in thorough examination and interrogation of the plaintiff-patient by expert witnesses and in a knowledge of psychiatric phenomena
by attorneys engaged in this type of litigation.
On the question of the utilization of objective criteria
for determining the nature and extent of psychic injuries it
can be said that such criteria simply do not exist. With the
possible exception of a few standardized psychometric tests
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of intelligence and broad personality categories and the electroencephalograph, useful in epilepsy cases, there are no reliable objective guides. Everything in the last analysis rests
upon the skill of the expert in examining the patient and the
technique of the attorney in questioning the expert in court.
An important phase of the expert testimony question is
that of cost. Many attorneys labor under the misapprehension that examination and testimony by a competent neuropsychiatrist is extremely expensive. Actually in the ordinary case it is not. The fee for neurological examination in
the typical psychic injury case ranges from twenty-five to
fifty dollars, while the fee for one day's testimony in court
approximates one hundred dollars. These figures are misleading in one sense, however. While such figures do cover
the types of examinations utilized in the ordinary case, they
by no means take into account the long-range studies which
may be required in difficult cases. A twenty-five or fifty
dollar examination is a cursory one, lasting one or two hours,
and consisting only of psychiatric interrogation of the patient coupled with utilization of a few standard tests. While
this is sufficient in many cases, others may require much
more protracted examinations and analyses with consequent
manifold multiplication of costs. It is undoubtedly true also
that many cases which at present are handled through the
cursory examination procedure might well receive longer and
more thorough studies if the additional cost factor were not
present.
A final difficulty with psychiatric testimony is that, like
most expert testimony, it is adversary in character. The
plaintiff hires his psychiatrist who has, of course, been
selected because his report is favorable to the plaintiff, and
the defendant employs a psychiatrist favorable to his side in
an effort to rebut the testimony of the plaintiff's expert. This
is not to impugn the character of the expert witnesses or to
imply that their opinions are swayed by the payment of a
fee. In the great majority of cases the experts are entirely
honest, and their disagreement is simply a typical illustration of reasonable minds differing in their opinions. Then
too, there is the further difficulty that at present the personality of the expert is so important a factor in deciding cases.
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The jury all too often is impressed by the erudite-appearing
expert who states his conclusions in a dogmatic manner, and
may well decide the case in favor of the party for whom such
an expert testifies while in reality the less sure-spoken expert
of the other side may have the better of the argument from
the strictly scientific point of view. It is common knowledge
that some psychiatric experts have an excellent "courtroom
presence" and a flair for the dramatic which is likely unduly
to impress the lay jury.
A possible answer to the problem of adversary witnesses
suggests itself, although it is beyond the scope of this article
to discuss in detail such a solution. The suggestion is that
some form of non-adversary procedure be provided such as a
board of experts paid by the state to testify in these cases.2 5 3
Objections exist to such a plan, but since the state clearly
has an interest in the proper administration of justice it is
perhaps not too much to ask that effort be made to protect
that interest through provision of state-paid experts.
D.

Recommended Rule

It is submitted that the better rule in psychic injury
cases is to allow compensation only for that part of the in253 See, for fuller discussion of such a proposal, note 268 infra. An interesting further problem in the medical testimony field is the evidence question
of the admissibility of hospital records, particularly where they involve psychoneurotic diagnosis. The federal rule apparently sharply limits the introduction
of such evidence under the federal entries in the regular course of business
statute, 49 STAT. 1561 (1936), 28 U. S. C. A. 695 (1946). See, e.g., New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F. 2d 297, 303 (1945), where the court commented:
"Hospital records are no different from any other kind of records kept in the
regular course of business. They must be subjected to the same tests as to

subject matter. Regularly recorded facts as to the patient's condition or treatment on which the observations of competent physicians would not differ are
of the same character as records of sales or payrolls. Thus, a routine examination of a patient on admission to a hospital stating that he had no external
injuries is admissible. An observation that there was a deviation of the nasal
septum is admissible. Likewise, an observation that the patient was well under
the influence of alcohol. But the records before us here are not of that character. The diagnosis of a psychoneurotic state involves conjecture and opinion.
It must, therefore, be subjected to the safeguard of cross-examination of the
physician who makes it. And accounts of selected items with patients must
be subject to the same safeguard."
The New York rule, however, is otherwise. See, e.g., People v. Kohlmeyer,
284 N. Y. 366, 31 N. E. 2d 490 (1940), which recognizes no distinction between the admissibility of evidence of physical or mental condition under the
New York entries in the regular course of business statute, N. Y. Civ. PRAC.
AcT § 374-a.
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jury actually caused by defendant's wrongful act.

If the

stimulus has been a minimal one, expert testimony should
be introduced in order to show what the average reaction
would be to such a stimulus, 254 and, if the plaintiff's reaction
has not been that of the average individual, he should not
recover at all, or at least his damages should be reduced to
a small amount. 255 In addition to limiting the area of liability to the extent of the risk normally to be perceived by
the reasonable defendant, such a rule could have the further

effect of inducing greater psychic strength in people by removing the temptation to develop neurotic
complications in
256
the hope of monetary reimbursement.
In summing up the problem of evidence which the courts
must face, it should be recognized, first of all, that the
254 It would appear that our present psychiatric knowledge is adequate in
most cases to make such determinations as to the normal or idiosyncratic re-

action to psychic stimuli.

Smith & Solomon find that ".

.

. a competent

psychiatrist can usually expose evidence of definite personality neurosis antedating the allegedly causal episode, and make a fair apportionment of symptoms, partly to pre-existing impairment and partly to the aggravation caused
by the accident." Smith & Solomon, Traumatic Neuroses itCourt, 30 VA. L.
REv. 87, 10 (1943).
Medical testimony is not without difficulties, however, in the psychic injury field. Whereas the medical practitioner likes to know the etiology (the
cause), the pathology (the nature), the symptoms, and the course of a disorder, these are never available in complete form when dealing with the psychoneurotic conditions. Furthermore, because no structural pathology of either
the visceral or nervous systems has been discovered to explain psychoneurotic
deviations, it is not possible to check a diagnosis through studies of pathology.
For a general discussion of this problem, see Tibbits, Neurasthenia, the Resuilt of Nervous Shock, as a Ground for Damages, 59 CENT. LAW J. 83 (1904).
255 There seems little doubt that psychic injury cases are now being too
liberally compensated. An analysis of all psychic stimuli cases in the British
and American appellate courts showed that cases of traumatic neurosis following trivial impact or psychic stimulus had received average jury verdicts of
$8,300 despite the fact that such reactions were clearly idiosyncratic, whereas
the verdicts in cases of non-idiosyncratic traumatic neurosis incident to serious
physical injuries were only slightly greater in amount, averaging $9,600. Smith
& Solomon, Traunmtic Neuroses in Court, 30 VA. L. Rrv. 87, 113 (1943).
256 It is at best conjectural to speculate on the effects of the hope of monetary reimbursement in these cases, inasmuch as no reliable statistics are available on the particular question. It may be argued that a high proportion of
these cases is brought against corporate defendants and from that the conclusion may be adduced that the hope of compensation is an important factor.
However, the force of this argument is greatly weakened by lack of statistics
as to the wealth or lack of wealth of these corporate defendants, the extent
of insurance coverage, and so on. It may well be that the hope of compensation, if it is in fact an important inducing cause to the development of neurosis, operates on the level of the subconscious rather than in the form of
deliberate malingering.
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psychic stimuli such as fright do not usually produce either
physical injury or neurotic complications in a person of
average constitution.2 57 Such developments are very likely
to be evidence of a pre-existing disorder and sub-normal
psychic resistance.2 5 8 Even the miscarriage, which so often
appears in the psychic disturbance cases, may well be an
idiosyncratic reaction which should not charge the defendant
with liability unless he somehow had notice of the plaintiffs
condition. 259 The rule of law should therefore be that a defendant is not negligent unless it appears that he created an
unreasonable risk of causing psychic disturbance in a person
257 Persuasive evidence of this contention is the fact that combatant soldiers
and sailors, exposed to fright and other psychic stimuli of far greater intensity
than those normally experienced in psychic injury tort cases rarely develop
either physical or mental complications. See Gowan, Psychiatric Aspects of
Military Disabilities, 41 U. S. NAy. Man. BULl. 129 (1943): "Experiences
so far in the war indicate that from one-half to two-thirds of those who suffer
nervous break-downs are predisposed to such disabilities." Comm. Gowan goes
on further to state: "War experiences often act as a precipitant for emotional
disturbances that under ordinary circumstances are held in suspension. War
neurosis is not a new disease, but merely the appearance of previously existing
neurotic tendencies brought to the front and organized into form by exposure
to war's demands. From one-half to two-thirds of those suffering mental or
nervous disturbances among our armed forces show definite predisposition."
Id. at 137.
258 A study made of the combat neurosis in the recent war shows that even
psychic injury from harrowing experience is likely to result only where preexisting neurotic impairment was present. In a study of individuals who had
survived ship sinkings during the war, it was found that seven out of ten of
the individuals who suffered combat neuroses had had neurotic symptoms prior
to entering naval service, while of those who did not develop neurotic complications only one out of ten had had neurotic symptoms in civil life. As might
be expected eighty per cent of the neuroses were of the anxiety type. Schwab,
Feinesinger and Brazier, Psychoneuroses Precipitated by Combat, 42 U. S.
NAy. MED. Bu.L. 535, 544 (1944).
The detection of the psychoneurotic individual before he enters military
service is, of course, the aim of psychiatrists in the armed forces. How widespread is the existence of disqualifying neurosis is shown by a study of selective service data during the recent war. A sampling study of registrants in
the 21-36 year old group reached the conclusion that over six per cent of those
medically disqualified for service were disqualified for mental and nervous
defects. Rowntree, McGill & Folk, Health of Selective Service Registrants,
118 J. A. M. A. 1223 (1942).
Similar conclusions were advanced from a
study of the younger registrants. Rowntree, McGill & Edwards, Causes of
Rejection and the Incidence of Defects (Among 18 and 19 Year Old Selective
Service Registrants), 123 J. A. M. A. 181 (1943).
259 An analysis of one thousand cases of spontaneous abortion indicated that
only one could definitely be attributed to trauma or psychic disturbance, though
many of the patients believed that the cause was such disturbance. See Hertig
& Sheldon, Minimum Criteria Required to Prove Prima Facie Case of Tranmatic Abortion or Miscarriage, 117 ANN. SURG. 596, 598 (1943) : ". . . it is
the consensus of medical opinion that at least ten per cent of all pregnancies
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The criteria for determining

such risk should be both judicial
notice of scientific fact and
261
expert medical testimony.
IX.

CONCLUSIONS

Many of the courts which passed on this question in the
nineteenth century reached the same conclusion as the New
York Court of Appeals and denied liability. 262 However, the
English courts, where the doctrine was born, have since reterminate in spontaneous abortion, and that only rarely are such abortions
caused by trauma." On the question of time interval between shock and abortion, the same authors indicate that". . . minutes to hours is the time interval
between the occurrence of the external trauma and/or psychic shock which
initiates the sequence of events resulting in the expulsion of a normal ovum."
Id. at 606. As a matter of ultimate conclusion the authors felt that "It is the
consensus of opinion of at least the average conscientious expert medical witness involved, that, all too often, justice is not served and that the plaintiff
is awarded damages for an abortion or miscarriage in which the trauma was,
at most, only coincidentally concerned." Id. at 596. See also Rock, Abortion,
in 1 DAvis, GYNECOLOGY AND OBs'ramics, ch. 10 (1941); GELBER, MEoicoLEGAL TEXT ON TRAUMATIC INUnuEs 70 (1938).

260 Such a rule would leave room for the introduction of new medical discoveries into the law, and for the redefining of "unreasonable risk" as medical
knowledge progresses. For example, it now appears that in a large category
of the fright cases-the miscarriage cases-there is medical evidence to indicate
that frightening a pregnant female does not create "unreasonable risk" of
bodily harm in the form of a miscarriage. Except in those situations where
violence has been inflicted on the fetus itself, factors other than the psychic
stimulus must be viewed as the predisposing causes. Such factors might be
defects in the fetus, or in the mother. For a full collection of authorities on
this question, see Note, Tort Liability for Miscarriage Caused by Fright,
15 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 188 (1947). The writer of the note, on the basis of a
review of leading medical authorities, concludes that fright is not a cause of
abortion, and that there is no known process or route by which a mental state
may transmit a force causing injury to a fetus. The writer indicates that,
despite the great mental tension in unmarried mothers, the incidence of abortion in that group is no greater than among married mothers. Furthermore, it
is pointed out that experiments conducted on pregnant animals, such as cats
and monkeys, in an effort to produce abortion by shocks, have all failed. In
conclusion it is stated: "In the face of the overwhelming weight of leading
medical opinion, plaintiffs should be required to produce more than circumstantial evidence in order to sustain the burden of proving that the miscarriage
resulted from fright. As the law is today, busses cannot jolt, trains cannot
jerk, and men cannot shout or have automobile collisions in front of the predisposed, pregnant woman. It seems unreasonable to ask society to assume this
degree of care. Interested as society must be in the unborn, liability would
appear to place too great a burden upon the everyday activities of a turbulent
civilization. Id. at 192.
281 As to the feasibility of expert testimony in psychic injury cases, see note
254 supra.
262 For a complete listing of the states denying liability and an enumeration
of their leading cases, see note 40 supra.
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pudiated the denial of recovery, 263 and a majority of Ameri-

can jurisdictions now permit recovery. 26 4 The American Law
Institute, while reluctant to take an unequivocal position, in
the Restatement of the Law of Torts has in general effect
disapproved the New York rule, 26 5 and no less an authority
than Justice Holmes has termed it an "arbitrary exception"
to settled principles. 6 6 Legal scholars are unanimous in
condemnation and no one seems
inclined to defend the rule
267
except the New York courts.
But as we have seen even in New York the principle of
no liability has been riddled by exceptions. While the rule
was designed to defeat fabricators, now with all the available
exceptions, it is possible for any fabricator to succeed in his
case by merely including the one necessary magic element
to come within the bounds of an exception. The only one
who is defeated is the honest litigant who will not falsify,
See text, page 3 supra, "DFvEOPM FNT OF THE ENGLISH RULE."
The majority rule decisions are collected in note 43 supra. That the
trend in American law is definitely towards the allowance of damages for mental distresses and injuries resulting therefrom is clear.. An excellent recent law
review note on the general field of damages includes the observation, substantiated by a thorough review of current authorities, that, "An ever-increasing
tendency to award damages for mental distress is apparent from the course of
judicial decisions." Note, Developments in the Lau--Damages-1935-1947,
61 HARV. L. REv. 113, 138 (1948).
265 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 436 (1934)
reads: "Physical Harm Resulting
from Emotional Disturbance.
"(1) If the actor's conduct is negligent as violating a duty of care designed to protect another from a fright or other emotional disturbance which
the actor should recognize as involving an unreasonable risk of bodily harm,
the fact that the harm results solely through the internal operation of the
fright or other emotional disturbance does not protect the'actor from liability.
"(2) If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk
of causing bodily harm to another otherwise than by subjecting him to fright,
shock or other similar and immediate emotional disturbance, the fact that such
harm results solely from the internal operation of fright or other emotional
disturbance does not protect the actor from liability.
"Caveat to Subsection (2): The Institute expresses no opinion that the
unreliability of the testimony necessary to establish the causal relation between
the actor's negligence and the other's illness or bodily harm may not make it
proper for the court of a particular jurisdiction to refuse, as a matter of administrative policy, to hold the actor liable for harm to another which was
brought about in the manner stated in this Subsection."
266 Homans v. Boston Elev. R. R., 180 Mass. 456, 457, 62 N. E. 737 (1902).
267 See, e.g., Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REv. 193 (1944) ; Magruder, Mental and
Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARv. L. REv. 1033 (1936) ;
Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, 34 HARV. L. REV. 260 (1921) ; and other
leading articles mentioned in note 38 supra.
263
264
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and who, if he does not come squarely within an exception,

will not obtain redress for an injury which everyone agrees
was foreseeable and culpably caused by another.

Certainly

the present law is intolerable, and statutory or judicial elimination of the requirement of impact is the only remedy.
Dangers of fabrication of evidence where they exist can be
effectively combated by demanding clear and cogent 26 evi8
dence according to the best medical standards available.

HAROLD F. MONIECE.
St. John's University School of Law.

268 See text, page 76 supra, "RECOOiMENDED RULE" for discussion of evidentiary problems presented. As is there shown, modern medical and particularly
psychiatric testimony can determine with reasonable certainty what reactions
are normal and what idiosyncratic, and, on that basis, judgments can be
awarded which fairly represent compensation for the injury culpably caused by

a defendant. See on this point, note 254 supra and Smith & Solomon, Trauinatic Nearoses i, Cc urt, 30 VA. L. Rxv. 87 (1943), particularly at 107, 108,
112, 113, discussing the concepts of "normal" and "idiosyncratic" and other
problems posed by pre-existing neurotic disorders. An incisive comment on
the need for keeping our law in tune with medical advances in this field is that
of Albert Jones: "There was a time in human history when persons afflicted
with nervous disorders were supposed to be possessed of devils and were either
put to death or confined in institutions. Medical science has progressed a long
way since the Dark Ages and conditions that were once thought to be the
product of the machinations of the devil are now known to be the result of
bodily disorders. In the light of the earlier concept, the courts were fully justified in looking with suspicion upon the claims of individuals so afflicted.
Advances in medical science have taught us the error of the earlier views.
Unless the law is attuned to progress in medicine, psychiatry, psychology, and
other sciences, it will be difficult to maintain the confidence of the average
citizen in the courts." Jones, Fright,289 INs. L. J. 99, 101 (1947). Mr. Jones
is a former chairman of the Insurance Law Section of the American Bar
Association.
One writer has recommended, following the lead of the American Law
Institute's Committee on Evidence, that the caliber of medical testimony in the
psychic injury field and in negligence actions generally could be improved considerably by the adoption of certain reforms. Most prominent of the proposed
renovations are: (1) that the court be given power to appoint a medical expert
upon its own selection or upon the nomination of the parties, (2) that a party
calling an expert witness be required to notify the court and opposing party
of his name and address, (3) that every expert witness be required to examine
the injured person at a fixed time and place and to prepare and file with the
clerk of the court a written report of his examination findings and conclusions,
under oath, (4) that prior to the trial two or more of the expert witnesses
confer with a view of filing an agreed report with the clerk, (5) that the
court-appointed expert's report be read in evidence subject to cross-examination,
and (6) that the court's expert be paid by the parties. Toebaas, Expert
Medical Opinion in Autonobile Damage Cases, 298 INs. L. J. 992, 993 (1947).

